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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Many studies try to understand the financial crisis that began in 2007 by utilizing 
short-term perspectives, but few step back far enough to see how macrohistorical 
transformations created the environment for a crisis of immense magnitude. In this work, I 
apply Arrighi’s theory of systemic cycles of accumulation to the current crisis and find that, 
while this theory elucidates some broad features of the global political economy that 
fostered the crisis, Arrighi’s explicit limitations lead to further areas of inquiry that help to 
understand this crisis in its specificity.  
By analyzing large-scale historical lines unique to the late 20th century, I show that 
financialization and globalization – mediated through US world hegemony and 
neoliberalism – created feedback loops promoting, not just a quantitative rise in the use of 
finance, but qualitative changes to overarching production, distribution, and consumption 
practices throughout the global economy. Some of these changes include the integration of 
many new and varied actors into the financial sector, the financialization of the globalized 
production process, the increased use of finance by lower and middle classes to reproduce 
labor in the face of stagnant wages, and the increased use of derivatives for profit-making.  
Additionally, I elaborate market-level changes in the US financial sector and show 
how the aforementioned macro-level transformations expressed themselves through the 
crisis. The use of “slice and dice” and “originate and distribute” models crippled the 
functions of derivatives and promoted their widespread misuse, even in the face of highly 
regarded theories of risk management. A historical view of derivatives shows that, while 
their use may be a fundamental cause of the crisis, derivatives express deeper trends in the 
evolution of capitalism: derivatives increase alienation, change the way we view 
ownership, and increase competition in our globalized political economy. 
This long-term view allows me to elaborate how the nexus of financialization, 
globalization, neoliberalism, and world hegemony came together to create the most far-
reaching financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
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Introduction 
The financial crisis that began in earnest in 2007 is the most far reaching economic 
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Unemployment soars, production slows, and 
state budget deficits reach staggering levels in all corners of the world. This crisis has 
affected people all over the globe and such a far-reaching catastrophe has a great number 
of causes, some immediate and some reaching far back into history. The surface causes of 
the crisis are mere manifestations of these deeper histories and the crisis itself is only a 
moment in the broader transformations of social relations that have been moving forward 
since the inception of capitalism in the 14th century. While the financial crisis will 
negatively affect many for years to come, it does not present problems that the dynamism 
of capitalism cannot overcome. 
Many in the headlines supposed that the crisis would be short-lived – a single dip 
recession that would soon be ameliorated (Achustan and Banerji 2010; Geithner 2010; 
Hennessy 2010; Lawder 2010). High unemployment and low wages have remained 
consistent since the crisis, and though it seemed for a while that the economy was 
stabilizing, recent volatility in the stock markets brought on by S&P’s downgrade of US 
public debt – due in great part to the US government’s inability to make a timely decision 
on raising the debt ceiling – shows that a second dip to the recession is increasingly 
probable (Jing 2011; Lahart 2011; McIntyre 2011; Norris 2011; Stanley 2011). The 
question remains as to whether those who experience the crisis most harshly will find any 
respite soon. The outlook is bleak. 
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One might think that crises are a rupture with the normal order of things, but history 
shows that crises are endemic to capitalism, not contrary to it (Arrighi [1994] 2010; Arrighi 
and Silver 1999; Baran and Sweezy 1968; Foster 1986; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Marx 
[1867] [1859] [1894] 1978). In an environment of stagnating wages, rising unemployment, 
and a global system that increases the quality of life only for the few and not the many, it is 
necessary to ask what the long-term causes of the crisis are, for without deeper 
understanding, long-term causes beget long-term consequences. 
Many theorists emphasize the necessity of taking a long-term view of capitalism, for 
such a perspective allows one to see the dynamism and changing nature of the system 
itself, the logics that underpin it, and how those logics are expressed in particular events 
(Arrighi 1999; 2009; 2010; Marx 1978; Schumpeter [1942] 1967).  Regarding stark 
changes in the global economic system since the 1970s, David Harvey (1989) asks, “Can we 
grasp the logic, if not the necessity, of the transition? To what degree do past and present 
theoretical formulations of the dynamics of capitalism have to be modified in the light of 
the radical reorganizations and restructurings taking place in both the productive forces 
and social relations?” (p. 173). Now, in the midst of what is arguably the greatest economic 
crisis since the Great Depression, I ask: What can previous theories tell us about the current 
crisis? To what degree do these theoretical formulations have to be modified in light of this 
particular financial crisis? 
While many studies deal with more proximate causes of the crisis such as the housing 
bubble and bust, failed accounting measures, or state reactions (Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey 2010; Chari, Christiano, Kehoe 2008; Chor and Manova 2011; Collander and Kiel 
2009; Davidoff and Zaring 2009; Hellwig 2009; Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Laux and 
Leuz 2009; Obstfield and Rogoff 2009; Shin 2009; Taylor 2009), a thorough understanding 
of such a widespread crisis requires a long-term historical perspective that ties together 
the numerous strands of history that most essentially created the crisis. Furthering such an 
understanding is the goal of this study. As Joseph Schumpeter ([1942] 1962) says, “First, 
since we are dealing with a process whose every element takes considerable time in 
revealing its true features and ultimate effects, there is no point in appraising the 
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performance of that process ex visu of a given point of time; we must judge its performance 
over time, as it unfolds through decades or centuries” (p. 83). 
The intrinsic and deep-seated logics of capitalism such as competition, the profit 
motive, and unending growth hold relatively steady throughout the era of capitalism; they 
are essential parts of capitalism and help to make up its definition. These fundamental 
logics, however, function and are expressed in different ways throughout time and space. 
Underlying macrohistorical trends of accumulation are both consistent and mutable, 
complimentary and contradictory, creative and destructive. To understand their most 
recent expression – the financial crisis – requires a theoretical reach that grasps, not only 
the consistent deeper logics, but how these logics manifest themselves in contemporary 
society.  
Put briefly, I argue that by taking a long-term perspective, something rarely done in 
the literature, we get a much different and richer view of why the crisis happened; we get a 
view that leads to further appreciation of major intertwined macro-historical 
transformations in the world system that led into the crisis. More specifically, I argue that 
while Arrighi’s ([1994] 2010) theory of systemic cycles of accumulation explains a number 
of trends leading into the crisis, an explanation of the processes of neoliberal globalization 
and financialization, as well as the changes they have brought about, is not only helpful, but 
necessary for understanding this crisis in its specificity. Integrating perspectives on 
neoliberal globalization and financialization with the theory of systemic cycles of 
accumulation and applying the resulting synthetic perspective to the financial crisis is the 
aim of this project and fills a wide gap in the current literature.  
Arrighi’s theory suggests that world hegemons generally move through systemic 
cycles of accumulation beginning with a rise to world hegemony through historical 
circumstances that lead to (1) comparative advantages in the production of material goods, 
(2) the relocation of the financial center of the world to that nation, and (3) organizational 
changes specific to that world hegemonic nation that are then integrated by other nation-
states. The outgrowth of such processual changes, Arrighi argues, is a new world hegemon 
that offers a system-wide answer to stagnation and creates a new worldwide paradigm of 
accumulation in the process.  
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Arrighi goes on to point out that as other nations start to utilize the new accumulation 
paradigm, the hegemonic nation’s comparative advantage in the production of material 
goods wanes. Under a more competitive atmosphere, the hegemon’s profits in the material 
sector fall relative to other nations and the hegemon begins to employ its new-found 
advantage in financial goods, shifting toward a more flexible form of accumulation: the 
accumulation of profit through finance (Arrighi [1994] 2010). With this argument in mind, 
I contend that a shift toward finance has been occurring in the US during the waning stages 
of its world hegemony. This shift is a long-term historical cause of the financial crisis. In the 
past the financialization of the world hegemon’s economy was usually a relatively domestic 
change. But in the newest era, globalization and financialization have come together to 
create a feedback loop that pushes more and more economic actors to integrate finance 
into their accumulation strategies, rather than using finance as a mere facilitator. These 
twin histories have come together under the aegis of capitalism to instigate a 
transformation of the general logic of accumulation to include finance as a fundamental 
part of profit-making. Such changes are expressed through the fundamentally globalizing 
nature of US world hegemony and its transition toward finance.  
Instead of instigating a singular worldwide shift in accumulation practices, as 
Arrighi’s theory suggests, the US has led two worldwide paradigm shifts: (1) US free 
worldism and (2) neoliberal globalization and financialization. Whereas a shift toward 
financialization tends to occur only within the waning hegemonic nation, currently the 
general profit accumulation process is financializing due to the globalization process and a 
global stagnation crisis. Though material production is still a key piece of all world 
economies – especially those that are less advanced – finance is now an integral part of 
competitive accumulation strategies; finance is increasingly an intrinsic part of the 
production of finished material goods.   
To be more specific, the globalization process and the extensive growth limit of 
capitalist social relations have led to more intensive forms of capitalist growth: the 
globalization of the production process and a concurrent tendency toward more flexible 
forms of accumulation within the entire system (Callinicos 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; 
Harvey 2005; Robinson 2004). In essence, the US has given two analytically separable 
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system-wide answers to accumulation issues rather than just one world-systemic 
transformation followed by national financialization. 
Over the last few decades national economies have become more spatially integrated 
through the globalization of the production process itself (Robinson 2004). As such, a great 
number of links on commodity production chains are spread throughout the world, leading 
many corporations to shift from vertically integrated, nationally oriented models (US free 
worldism/national monopoly capitalism) to horizontally integrated production models 
that require highly mobile inputs (neoliberal globalization and financialization).  
The shift toward these new forms of accumulation required an ideological shift to 
justify organizational and juridical changes to state policy (Gramsci [1957] 1971; Harvey 
[2005] 2007). Neoliberalism is the common term for this change and is theorized as a 
complex matrix of ideology and a practice. Briefly stated, neoliberalism consists of ideas 
and actions that lead to the deregulation of markets, the privatization of previously public 
arenas, and the discursive removal of the state from the economy. As Arrighi ([1994] 2010) 
and Gramsci ([1957] 1971) note, the difference between hegemony and dominance is 
consent, and consent for changes in production relations over the last three decades was 
created through promotion of the neoliberal ideology (see also Harvey [2005]  2007). The 
ideology of neoliberalism came initially from the US, but gained an almost universal status 
due to US world hegemony, the hegemony of positivism in scientific discourse, and the 
overarching processes of globalization and financialization. Thus, I expound upon the 
domestic rise of the neoliberal ideology and its export throughout the world by 
interrogating political and academic neoliberal discourses and showing how the two 
reinforce each other through a radical reinterpretation of core US political values and their 
application to the universalized economic sphere.  
In terms of state practices, the shift toward neoliberal globalization and the 
subsequent global financial crisis is due, in great part, to changes in the US banking system. 
I discuss these changes through a brief but focused history of the banking system in the US 
since the Great Depression – what Crotty (2009) calls the creation of the new financial 
architecture. I use that history to show how organizational and juridical changes to the US 
banking system are surface manifestations of deeper capitalist logics that create an 
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environment that fosters crises. As the neoliberalizing and financializing transformations 
of ideology and practice in the US system were exported to the world through globalization 
and world hegemony, each historical strand reinforced the other, creating an intense 
feedback loop that has markedly changed processes of accumulation in the world system. 
Additionally, I maintain that while derivatives are certainly a proximate cause of the 
financial crisis, a perspective that focuses only on their role in the crisis and fails to 
question the long-term consequences of their use misses the deeper changes that they 
might bring about. When derivatives are viewed in a wider perspective with an eye toward 
the past and the future, we see that they have great effects reaching far past the financial 
crisis. Some of these include: (1) intensifying a fundamental logic of capitalism: the logic of 
competition; (2) aiding capitalists by acting as tools in the search for more flexible forms of 
accumulation under the global financialization of accumulation processes; (3) performing 
the function of a supranational form of money in the absence of such an entity; and (4) 
changing the way we view ownership in a way that increases the intensity of competition 
in 21st century capitalism (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; 2009). All of these changes may have 
great and frightening effects on labor in the coming years. An analysis of these changes is 
therefore, not just fruitful, but absolutely necessary.  
For these reasons, I contend that the histories of systemic cycles of accumulation, 
world hegemony, neoliberalism, globalization and financialization have all come together 
as different but mutually reinforcing causes of the financial crisis, causes that will have 
jarring repercussions for the future that reach far past the crisis itself. Arrighi’s systemic 
cycles of accumulation thesis requires a deeper theoretical integration of the concepts of 
neoliberalism, globalization, and financialization to supply a rigorous perspective on the 
most recent global financial crisis. While the crisis is a colossal problem and watershed 
event, it is only a symptom of deeper transformations in the global economy as a whole. It 
is not this specific crisis, but its fundamental causes that must be dealt with to stave off 
future social, economic, and political problems. 
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Methods 
I use a version of analytic induction as the method for this study. Regarding my use of 
concepts, Ratcliff (2002:1) paraphrases Znaniecki (1934) stating that:  
 Analytic induction can be contrasted with defining and using terms in 
advance of research. Instead, definitions of terms are considered hypotheses 
that are to be tested. Inductive, rather than deductive, reasoning is involved, 
allowing for modification of concepts and relationships between concepts 
occurs throughout the process of doing research, with the goal of most 
accurately representing the reality of the situation. 
The main framing concepts of the study are world hegemony, neoliberalism, 
globalization, and financialization. Each concept is treated as a hypothesis to be inductively 
modified by relevant historical literature, all of which is centered around the financial 
crisis. As additional histories are introduced, each concept gains further depth from 
discussions of their relationships to each other and to new historical lines that their 
progenitors did not foresee.1 
To elaborate my specific method I paraphrase Ratcliff’s (2002:1-2) list of steps in 
analytic induction and show how they are applied in the present study: 
1. A phenomenon is defined in a tentative manner. The phenomenon in question 
here is the most recent global financial crisis that stemmed from economic problems 
in the US, the arguably waning hegemon of the world system. 
2. A hypothesis is developed about the financial crisis. That the US is arguably the 
waning world hegemon and the primary country that caused the financial crisis led 
to a tentative hypothesis: Arrighi’s ([1994] 2010) theory of systemic cycles of 
accumulation may help to understand the financial crisis because it explains how 
world hegemonic nations shift to finance as their hegemony wanes. 
3. A single instance is considered to determine if the hypothesis is confirmed. 
Arrighi uses three previous world hegemons – the Genoese, the Dutch, and the 
British – as instances that provide the material for his theory of systemic cycles of 
accumulation. Thus, Arrighi completes steps four through six within his own 
research for each of those instances. However, his research includes the US as an 
instance only up to the time of his writing (1994), but does not include the most 
recent financial crisis. This leads to the need for the current study. My aim was to 
see if recent political-economic history focused on the crisis supports Arrighi’s 
theory. Where the history does not support Arrighi’s theory, new theories are 
integrated that help to revise the theory and the initial hypothesis. 
                                                 
1
 See the Appendix for more explanation of this method of conceptual analysis. 
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4. If the hypothesis fails to be confirmed either the phenomenon is redefined or 
the hypothesis is revised so as to include the instance examined. After reading 
more literature on the current crisis, it became obvious that Arrighi’s theory alone 
could not fully explain the crisis, for many new happenings in the last few decades 
contributed to it, not only those dealt with in the systemic cycles theory.  
5. Additional cases are examined and, if the new hypothesis is repeatedly 
confirmed, some degree of certainty about the hypothesis results. Instead of 
examining additional cases – there are no other world hegemons creating global 
financial crises at the moment – I examined other major lines of history in the recent 
political-economic literature that appeared to feed into the crisis.  After much 
additional research, it became clear that the histories of neoliberalism, globalization, 
and 20th century financialization had to be integrated into the analysis to explain the 
crisis in a rigorous manner.  
6. Each negative case requires that the hypothesis be reformulated until there 
are no exceptions. In this project, relevant historical lines not addressed by the 
initial hypothesis were treated as negative cases and integrated in to the analysis. I 
used a method of constant comparative analysis by acquiring data and formulating 
the aforementioned categories. When those categories became solidified, I 
synthesized the additional perspectives and updated the new synthetic perspective 
to include the history of the most recent financial crisis.  
I have also created an appendix that lays out other theoretical and philosophical 
foundations of the study. While elaborating philosophical formulations does not coincide 
with the usual way of presenting social research, I feel that such work is absolutely 
necessary for justifying the methods of study as a whole. Readers interested in this analysis 
should see the appendix at the end of the study.  
Chapter Summary 
In the first chapter, I lay out Arrighi’s theory of systemic cycles of accumulation. This 
theory acts as an expansive, centuries long backdrop to the current financial crisis, for the 
end of each world hegemon’s systemic cycle usually consists of a shift toward 
financialization within that economy for greater profit-making and a resulting financial 
crisis. Contrary to Arrighi’s theory, in the case of the US there have been two system-wide 
shifts. The first came about as an answer to waning British hegemony and shifted the world 
system’s overarching form of accumulation from British free trade imperialism to US free 
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worldism. The second came about as an answer to the US’s waning hegemony and is 
delineated as the shift from US free worldism to neoliberal globalization.  
US free worldism was reinforced ideologically by Keynesian policy, which focused on 
creating demand in times of crisis through government spending and a focus on building 
national economies. As the US lost comparative advantage in the production of material 
goods, it deindustrialized (Bluestone and Harrison 1984) and shifted toward finance 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009), the area in which it had greater comparative advantage. As 
crises of accumulation hit in the 1970s and the US national economy lost material 
productive capacity, Keynesianism was mostly abandoned for the neoliberal economic 
theories that became popular in both politics and academia. One expression of these 
changes is the financial crisis. 
In light of this second shift, the second chapter of the study deals with neoliberal 
globalization. I argue that neoliberal globalization is a complex matrix of ideology, 
economic practice, and political and institutional restructuring that makes up the US’s new 
form of accumulation. This new form of accumulation is the US’s answer to its waning 
hegemony and leads to a shift away from focus on the domestic economy toward a focus on 
profit-making through investment in globalized production. Furthermore, I add a new fold 
to the theory of systemic cycles of accumulation by positing that, rather than the US 
financializing within its own economy, the globalizing nature of the second epochal shift 
and the extension of capitalism to almost the entire world lead to the financialization of 
capitalism in general. The intensified competition that globalization and stagnation bring 
about increases the need for flexible forms of capital and labor leads to increased 
worldwide financialization, an increase in the use and change in the role of derivatives, and 
to the financial crisis itself.  
In the second chapter I show how detrimental changes were justified to the US public 
by arguing that a radical reinterpretation of classical liberalism as a political philosophy 
was used alongside new anti-government economic theories to create the ideology of 
neoliberalism. This ideology gave the domestic consent necessary for the 
deindustrialization of the US economy and its restructuring toward finance and a more 
globalized, horizontally oriented, and flexible form of production – a form of production 
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that has hindered the growth of real wages for the vast majority of the US population and 
benefitted only those at the top. Neoliberalism as an ideology and practice is exported to 
other countries through US world hegemony, globalization, international financial 
institutions, and the hegemony of positivism as a scientific method. Put bluntly, the 
ideology of neoliberalism legitimates domestic and global financialization, both of which 
led to the financial crisis.  
In the third chapter I outline the growth of the new financial architecture2 of the US 
over the 20th century. In the wake of the Great Depression a shadow banking system was 
created to sidestep regulations and keep up the rate of profit. Banks and investors had 
higher demand for liquid capital, which was necessary to keep returns high in the 
environment of waning comparative advantage in the productive sector and the 
globalization of the economic system. As regulatory and institutional structures changed to 
benefit the financial sector, the US economy continually based itself on speculative bubbles. 
As the tech/dot-com bubble burst, finance and speculation transferred over to the housing 
bubble that had been brewing for years.  
I contend that many social science perspectives on derivatives are flawed and must 
take a deeper look at derivatives in 21st century capitalism. New financial instruments were 
thought to be indomitable barriers against risk due to recent economic theory, but the anti-
historical nature of these theories led to their inability to foresee the problems that a panic 
would bring. In times of low liquidity, like when markets get shocked by bursting bubbles, 
derivatives’ value lowers immensely and they are not able to be sold easily in markets – 
something most risk theories did not comprehend. Though derivatives can perform risk 
limiting functions for investors, under the new financial architecture, incentives and 
practices became so flawed and perverse that derivatives could no longer limit risk. 
Leveraging, perverse incentives, and the inability to correctly price financial instruments 
due to opacity from the “slice and dice” and “originate and distribute” models helped to 
create the most far-reaching financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
However, it is doubtful that derivatives will be removed from the global financial 
system due to their role in the crisis, for they perform fundamental roles in facilitating the 
                                                 
2
 The “new financial architecture” is Crotty‟s (2009) term. 
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logics of capitalism by increasing competition and acting as a global form of money in the 
absence of such an entity. Following Bryan and Rafferty (2006), I theorize that as nation-
state money loses its value as the most fundamental form of currency, derivatives contracts 
will become more important. Their performance in the functions of binding and blending 
capital, its attributes, and time will prove more and more necessary as globalization moves 
forward. As an instrument of international trade, derivatives will only become more and 
more prominent as tools for navigating the global financial economy. But, derivatives also 
increase competition between corporations and, taken along with the growing volatility 
from more flexible production processes, they severely promote further downward 
pressure on labor – a pressure that may not be sustainable in the long run. 
In summation, I start with Arrighi’s theory of world hegemony and systemic cycles of 
accumulation and then integrate other critical concepts that frame the crisis, such as 
globalization, neoliberalism, and financialization, showing how each of these concepts adds 
new layers and gives different turns to the analysis as a whole. I show that, rather than 
conflicting with each other, these conceptualizations focus on different aspects of the crisis 
and can come together to give a rigorous theoretical and empirical view of how and why 
the crisis happened. This project also updates and transforms these related theories by 
synthesizing and reinterpreting them through a lens focused on the recent history of the 
financial crisis. The end result is an analysis that, on one hand, shows how a number of 
different but interrelated histories of social relations came together to create the crisis, and 
on the other, points to deepening contradictions in the political-economic system and how 
they may manifest in years to come.  
The crisis is, in essence, a watershed moment and a partial coming to fruition of 
numerous historical lines in the US and global political economy. This “coming to fruition,” 
though, is only a moment in the process of history and, rather than alleviating tensions, 
actually reinforces many of them. Through an analysis of fundamental historical lines 
leading to the financial crisis and how they relate to and reinforce each other, I hope to give 
a cogent view of the crisis itself and the broader transformations that created it. Most 
importantly, I hope to shed light on the effects such changes may have on the people who 
continue to live and struggle in our global political economy. 
12 
These changes are both contradictory and complimentary. They move through 
decades and centuries, peoples and nations. They move through the history of the entire 
world.  
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Systemic Cycles of Accumulation:           
A Macrohistorical View of the Crisis 
Giovanni Arrighi’s book The Long Twentieth Century ([1994] 2010) outlines and 
elaborates a thorough long-term history of the concurrent evolution of capitalism and the 
nation-state system. Through a number of works he has created a rigorous theory of 
history focused mostly on Europe that spans centuries, which, we will see, gives us a long-
term perspective on shifts in world hegemony and the crises that go along with them 
(Arrighi [2007] 2009; [1994] 2010; Arrighi and Silver 1999).  Working in the tradition of 
world systems theory set out by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1983), Arrighi shows how 
the nation-state and capitalism grew up together from the inception of capitalist social 
relations and city-states in the 15th century to the worldwide expansion of capitalist 
markets and ubiquity of the nation-state in the late 20th century. Through elucidating the 
systemic cycles of accumulation that world hegemons undergo over their long centuries, 
Arrighi elaborates both the transhistorical and historically specific aspects of such cyclical 
shifts. Thus, his theory is dynamic, for it shows that while things change within a relatively 
consistent system (systemic cycles of accumulation), it also shows that changes happen 
both within the system and to the system itself.3 In other words, the cycles do not make up 
an objective or universal backdrop and are unique in certain ways.  
                                                 
3
 We can see here the affinity between the work of Arrighi and that of Joseph Schumpeter. Both vociferously 
promote the idea that capitalism is inherently dynamic. For example, Schumpeter ([1942] 1962) asserts that “the 
essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process.... Yet that 
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Systemic cycles of accumulation promote tendencies within the political economies of 
nation-states that push them to move among certain routes; these are not ironclad laws 
that follow inevitably from the theory.4 World hegemonic power shifts from one nation-
state to another within the system and each nation-state uses both progressive and 
regressive tactics for accumulation, which change the equation of the system as a whole. 
Each nation-state internalizes production costs and accumulates in its own unique way, 
reformulating global social relations along its new developmental path. Thus, 
understanding the processes, logics, and dynamics of systemic cycles of accumulation over 
the long durée is necessary for understanding the most recent global financial crisis, for 
crises of accumulation are consistent parts of such systemic cycles.  
This chapter gives long-term context to financial crises in the capitalist system 
through framing the overarching processes that lead to the financialization of world 
hegemonic national economies, for financialization is the usual domestic remedy for crises 
of accumulation in the productive/material sector and is a consistent indicator of a fall in 
world hegemonic power (Arrighi 2010). Such financialization has certainly occurred in the 
US throughout the last few decades of the 20th century5 (Arrighi 2007; 2010; Callinicos 
2010; Davies 2010; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 20116; Foster and Magdoff 2009).  
In attempting to apply Arrighi’s theory to the current crisis, we will find that the 
limitations he puts on his analysis open gaps for further areas of inquiry and point to 
specific structural transformations of the global economy over the last few decades that 
helped to create this particular financial crisis. So, in addition to Arrighi’s argument, which 
suggests that only the falling world hegemon financializes, I argue that the US has instituted 
a second cycle of accumulation in its waning phase of hegemony that pushes numerous 
actors in the global economy to shift toward finance.  
                                                                                                                                                             
fragmentary analysis which yields the bulk of our propositions about the functioning of modern capitalism 
persistently neglects it” (p. 82).  
4 See the Appendix for further explanation of tendencies and laws within social reality. 
5
 Even if one does not agree with Arrighi‟s overarching theory, it has been empirically proven by many across the 
ideological spectrum that the US economy has shifted toward finance (FCIC 2011; Foster and Magdoff 2009; 
Davies 2010). Moreover, Arrighi‟s theory is used in this study as a guide and a facilitator, not as an absolutely 
necessary foundation for the study as a whole. In other words, the findings in this study are supported by empirical 
data and theories that are outside the scope of Arrighi‟s work. 
6
 Hereafter cited as FCIC 2011. 
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Viewing the financial crisis through Arrighi’s lens gives a general, macro-historical 
understanding of transhistorical financialization. More importantly though, when this 
theory is applied to the current crisis, its limitations lead to questions and lines of research 
that allow us to get at other changes in capitalist social relations over the last few decades 
that lead to an understanding of this crisis in its historical specificity.  
In this section I will show how world hegemony – a fundamental organizing concept 
in Arrighi’s theory – frames systemic cycles of accumulation over long centuries and pushes 
nations participating in the world economy to tend toward certain accumulation strategies 
at certain times. Arrighi criticizes previous studies for their conflated definitions of 
hegemony and their emphases on studying changes happening within an invariant system, 
rather than studying changes happening within a qualitatively changing system. In his book 
The Long Twentieth Century, Arrighi ([1994] 2010) lays out his theory using an updated 
Marxian analysis that chronicles the rise and fall of hegemonic powers throughout the 
history of capitalism, as well as the crises that lead to changes in accumulation strategies. 
But what exactly is hegemony?  
According to Arrighi, “the concept of ‘world hegemony’… refers specifically to the 
power of a state to exercise functions of leadership and governance over a system of 
sovereign states” (2010:28). World hegemony therefore utilizes the world system as the 
level of analysis and posits the nation-state as the main actor within that system. Arrighi 
goes on to state that this notion of hegemony is quite different from mere dominance, for 
according to the Gramscian notion of hegemony, it is expressed at the international level 
through both domination and intellectual and moral leadership (Gramsci [1957] 1971). 
Gramsci’s ideas of domination and intellectual/moral leadership are analogous to 
Machiavelli’s two conceptions of power in practice: coercion and consent. According to 
Arrighi, “Coercion implies the use of force…; consent implies moral leadership” (2010:29). 
Arrighi then describes the ways that nation-states become world hegemonic through 
exercising not only dominance through coercion, but also by exercising power through 
ideological consent and leadership. We will see later that the ideology of neoliberalism 
plays an integral role in the creation of domestic and worldwide consent for US policies 
that led into the financial crisis.  
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To hone the definition of hegemony further in contrast to dominance, dominance 
rests mainly on coercion and hegemony is that “additional power that accrues to a 
dominant group by virtue of its capacity to place all the issues around which conflict rages 
on ‘universal plane’” (Arrighi 2010:29; emphasis in original).7 More specifically, world 
hegemony includes not only dominance, or an increase in a state’s power relative to other 
nations, but the ability of a state to lead “the system of states in a desired direction…(which) 
is perceived as pursuing the general interest” (Arrighi 2010:30; emphasis in original). A 
dominant state can also lead by “drawing other states onto its path of development,” but 
this form of leadership does not necessarily fall under the concept of hegemony. A state can 
also be world hegemonic if it can claim (credibly) that it is the guiding force of rulers’ 
collective powers over subjects or that the expansion of its power relative to other states 
contributes to the general interest of subjects from all states, as occurred in the transition 
to US hegemony (Arrighi 2010). In essence, world hegemony means that the hegemonic 
power is perceived to act in the general interest of either the power elite in multiple 
                                                 
7 It is helpful to state that the concepts of dominance and hegemony are dialectical in nature and therefore 
contain tensions and contradictions within them. The two differ in some respects as mentioned above, which 
leads to the need for analytical separation, but they are also not reducible to wholly separate conceptions in 
theory or practice. In the vocabulary of internal relations philosophy, the concepts themselves are 
ontologically related to each other internally rather than externally (Ollman 2003); one cannot be fully 
defined without reference to the other. Additionally, in practice the two coexist at the same time, but in 
analytically separable areas, exemplified by the fact that the US still holds on to some of its hegemonic 
properties – it is seen by many as the legitimate world leader, especially in terms of economic organization – 
but at the same time the US increasingly exerts its power and sheer dominance within the world system 
through war (Arrighi 2007). The US’s shift toward unilateral military action in the early 21st century, along 
with other states’ negative reactions to it, shows a hegemon slipping toward mere dominance (Arrighi 2007; 
Harvey 2005; 2007a; 2010). 
The coexistence and tensions between these two theoretical terms are due in part to the fact that 
world hegemony and world dominance are abstract analytical categories applied to occurrences that are 
ongoing historical processes. Since the processes themselves are contradictory and are held in tension 
throughout the historical process, the theoretical terms used to describe them must also be formulated as 
such. Put more simply, these terms are necessary abstractions that are used to describe concrete reality. 
Concrete reality exists as a multiplicity of internally related gray areas rather than as externally related 
phenomena that can be divided by a hard line (Ollman 2003; Marx 1978; 2003; 2009; 2010). Using dialectical 
conceptualizations such as hegemony and dominance, Arrighi’s abstractions reflect reality more closely than 
bounded abstractions. As we will see later, hegemony and dominance can be used on a domestic level of 
analysis as well, though they are made more robust when viewed on the domestic level and then raised to the 
world-systemic level. See the appendix for more information on abstraction and dialectics. 
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countries or in the general interest of subjects across national borders; it allows that nation 
to put all conflict onto a singular universal plane.8 
Moving further, the claim of a world hegemonic state to be acting in the general 
interest is usually only credible under conditions of systemic chaos (Arrighi 1999; 2010). In 
contrast to the concept of ordered anarchy, defined as organization under “the absence of 
central rule,” the terms chaos and systemic chaos  
refer to a situation of total and apparently irremediable lack of organization. 
It is a situation that arises because conflict escalates beyond the threshold 
within which it calls forth powerful countervailing tendencies, or because a 
new set of rules and norms of behavior is imposed on, or grows from 
within, an older set of rules and norms without displacing it, or because of a 
combination of these two circumstances. As systemic chaos increases, the 
demand for “order”… tends to become more and more general among 
rulers, or among subjects, or both. Whichever state or group of states is in 
the position to satisfy this system-wide demand for order is thus presented 
with the opportunity of becoming world hegemonic. (Arrighi 2010:31)  
Now, to bring ourselves up to speed in understanding the current crisis, we must first 
further understand some pertinent aspects of world hegemonic shifts that have occurred in 
the past, for these shifts show both transhistorical and historically specific transformations 
of accumulation processes and, along with Arrighi’s stated limitations, lead to lines of 
inquiry that frame the remainder of the study. Thus, we will now turn to understanding a 
wide view of changes in state formation and accumulation strategies occurring over the last 
few hundred years that led to the US’s cycle of world hegemony, the waning of which 
created the most recent financial crisis.  
The birth of the capitalist system began during the decay of medieval Europe and the 
creative destruction of feudalist social relations (Arrighi 2010; Schumpeter 1962). It is 
inextricably tied to the creation of the modern nation-state system at the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648. However, Europe invented the modern state twice: once through the 
city-states of the 15th century Italian Renaissance and again during the 17th century 
terminal crisis of the medieval system of rule (Arrighi 2010).  
                                                 
8 The term hegemony, as used in this study, should not be taken in a universal, absolute sense. When a nation 
is termed hegemonic, it does not exercise absolute power over all nations, but does have far more relative 
power and influence over the world system than any other country.  
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Accordingly, the capitalist system’s first full iteration as a systemic cycle of 
accumulation under a state-led hegemony was predated by a more transitional system of 
accumulation under four pre-modern city-states: Venice, Florence, Genoa, and Milan in the 
1400s. This pre-modern political/economic/social system sprang from and operated 
within the medieval European system of rule, but held within it the germ of that system’s 
demise. To paraphrase Arrighi (2010), some features of this pre-modern system include:  
First, a merchant capitalist oligarchy held state power and used a system of war- and 
state-making which focused on profit as the main end of the exercise of power. This use of 
state power for gaining profit, as opposed to gaining territory, exemplifies the capitalist 
logic of power as opposed to a territorial logic of power. We will return to these concepts 
shortly. Second, three levels of a balance of power played key roles in allowing for the 
creation of a capitalist system within the medieval system: one consisting of a balance of 
power between the medieval political rulers (the pope and the emperor), a second balance 
of power between the four city-states themselves, and thirdly, a balance of power between 
the emerging dynasties of Western Europe. This balance of power is a key feature of the 
evolution of the capitalist system, for it allows the capitalist logic to trump the territorial 
logic by lowering protection costs and allowing states to focus on the economy. Third, these 
city-states managed to turn their protection costs into revenues by developing wage-labor 
relations that paid soldiers, who then spent their money domestically, increasing tax 
revenues that flowed back into the state. Fourth, the Italian capitalist city-state rulers 
created networks of residential diplomacy that gave them the knowledge they needed to 
turn the balance of power in their favor. By knowing the capabilities and ambitions of 
others, the capitalists of Italy were able to monitor other political leaders and manipulate 
the balance of power for their own profit-oriented ends (Arrighi 2010). 
These proto-features of the capitalist system bring to the fore two interrelated 
concepts that must be examined before moving any further: the capitalist logic of power 
and the territorialist logic of power (Arrighi 2010). The rulers of these four Italian city-
states were some of the first examples of capitalist rulers. They ruled not for territory or 
political clout but for money alone. Gaining territory and political clout may have been a 
part of their goal, but primarily as a means to acquire more money. This is one of the first 
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ideological shifts that helped to create capitalism as we know it today, and we will see later 
that the capitalist and territorial logics still figure very much into contemporary life, 
especially regarding the shifts from British “free trade imperialism” to US “free worldism” 
and the more recent neoliberal to neoconservative shift in US policy (Arrighi 2007; 2010; 
Harvey 2007).  
One can easily see the differences between the two logics when Arrighi (2010:34-5) 
paraphrases Marx’s general formula of capitalist production: 
Territorial Logic: (T-M-T‟) A territorial state leader uses money or 
economic command (M) as a means to acquire more territory/territorial 
power. Their primary goal is acquiring more territory; the means by which 
they do so is money. 
Capitalist Logic: (M-T-M‟) A capitalist leader uses territory as a means to 
acquire more money. Their primary goal is the acquisition of more money, 
not more territorial power.  
Arrighi (2010), with the use of Giddens’ (1987) definition of a state as a container of 
power, says it nicely:  
Territorialist rulers tend to increase their power by expanding the size of 
their container. Capitalist rulers, in contrast, tend to increase their power by 
piling up wealth in a small container and increase the size of the container 
only if it is justified by the requirements of the accumulation of more 
capital. (P. 7) 
Now, we can see how the four Italian states, although holding power over much 
smaller territories than many other leaders, managed to accumulate great power within 
very small containers using a capitalist rather than a territorial logic, a factor recurring 
again during Britain’s hegemony. With the decline of the medieval system of rule over the 
next two centuries came a change in the balance of power and increasing systemic chaos. 
A lacking balance of power in the 16th and 17th centuries led to the Thirty Years’ War, 
raising protection costs and putting pressure on peasants, which contributed to the 
numerous revolts of the 17th century (Arrighi 2010). In this context then, there was a 
newfound and general-systemic need for sovereign elites to regain power over their 
subjects. A new system of rule giving answers to these problems was found in the birth of 
the modern nation-state at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.  
20 
The medieval system of rule had reached its limits and a new system giving power to 
sovereigns over their own territories and subjects was needed to restore some semblance 
of peace to the world. This system located power in the leaders of nation states, rather than 
in an overarching suprastatal system of a worldwide market, a trait of both US 
accumulation strategies that will be elaborated later. This new system had a particular 
beneficiary in the Dutch state, which would soon rise to hegemony, for the Dutch “had a 
strong common interest with the emerging dynastic states in the liquidation of the claims 
of pope and emperor to a suprastatal moral and political authority as embodied in the 
imperial pretensions of Spain” (Arrighi 2010:46). The Dutch, rather than the Venetians a 
few hundred years earlier, managed this because they had control over financial networks, 
not only commercial networks, their interests clashed very fundamentally with the 
medieval system, they had much better war-making capabilities, and they had much better 
state-making capability than the Venetians. In other words, the Dutch utilized a shift 
toward a more territorialist logic of power to rise in the newly created modern state 
system. These state- and war-making capabilities, forged from the rationalization of 
military techniques and the struggle against imperial Spain, gave the Dutch great 
advantage, including the ability to deal with European power struggles and, most 
pertinently, the ability to internalize protection costs within the state apparatus (Arrighi 
2010). The internalization of the costs of accumulation, we shall see, is a fundamental 
aspect of each successive hegemon. Although the Dutch benefitted from the new 
Westphalian system initially, the British and French powers soon rose in relative power 
and fought to incorporate the United Provinces under their domains.  
The usual first phase of hegemonic succession consists of an attempt to integrate the 
previous world power into the successive power’s territorial domain (Arrighi 2010). 
Although France and England failed at their attempts to integrate the Dutch, the ensuing 
struggle for world supremacy existed mostly between these two up-and-coming powers. A 
struggle for the acquisition of capital accumulation networks is the fundamental 
characteristic of the second phase of the succession of a world hegemon. The third phase 
entails systemic chaos and the subsequent system-wide answer by the new hegemonic 
power. The systemic chaos of this phase was brought on in part by the revolution of the 
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American colonies in 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. These revolts from below 
helped to create the vacuum of power that led to Napoleonic Imperial France. Britain’s 
leadership against these imperial ambitions provided part of its answer to systemic chaos, 
but its reorganization of the world system into what Arrighi (2010) calls free trade 
imperialism under the newly formed classical liberal ideology created the new order that 
would characterize the system for years to come. The liberal ideology – a rebuttal of 
feudalist social relations – gave an answer to some problems in the current system by 
promising increasing freedom, wealth, and dominion over private property to the 
proletarian, democratized subjects of multiple nations, at least nominally. This ideology 
linked the well-being and wealth of subjects worldwide to the wealth of British nationals 
and created the system-wide consent necessary for British world hegemony (Arrighi 
2010).  
The Dutch rose to hegemony by helping grant authority to the emerging nation-states, 
rather than to the suprastatal moral-political authority of Imperial Spain and the Pope. The 
British rose to hegemonic power by nominally relocating power to some people through 
imposing classical liberalism and free trade imperialism. Free trade imperialism, a new 
synthesis of the capitalist and territorial logics, was characterized by England’s use of 
settler colonialism and capitalist slavery, as well as a push for economic nationalism 
(Arrighi 2010). As Arrighi (2010) states: 
A key factor in the rise of a new world hegemonic power consists of a new 
ability to internalize the costs of capitalist accumulation. The Dutch were 
able to internalize protection costs, a feat not accomplished by the Genoese 
due to their lacking state military power. The British internalized production 
costs through industrialization and inflow to the domestic economy, 
bringing productive activities under their organizational structure. In the 
prior two hegemonies, productive actions were mostly accomplished by 
places lower on the commodity chain while those hegemons focused mostly 
on trade and finance; Britain managed to incorporate trade and finance 
along with a more localized productive capacity through the industrial 
revolution. (P. 377) 
 Free trade imperialism was a new and powerful fusion of the capitalist and territorial 
logics of power that both reinforced and went beyond the Westphalian system. By fusing 
the two logics through colonial conquest and expropriation of surplus value from the 
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colonies the British, supported in part by the newly fashioned liberal ideology, created a 
new global order in which the laws of the world market superseded the sovereignty of 
nation-states. However, in contrast to the future American “free” market system, the British 
claimed an almost unilateral authority over and advantage within markets (Arrighi 2010). 
US Free Worldism 
After 1870, England began to lose its control over both the European and the world 
balance of power, due mostly to the rise of Germany and the US. German leaders pushing 
territorial expansion on the European continent threatened the local balance of power, but 
it was the growing powerhouse across the pond that became the greatest threat to British 
hegemony. The dynamism and new arena of the US market put it in a much better place 
than Germany to supersede the wealth and market domination of England. This dynamism 
was characterized by the vast expanse of its territory, its natural resource endowments, 
and a protectionist government policy that kept the domestic market closed from foreign 
goods but open to foreign capital and labor (Arrighi 2010). Furthermore, Weber’s 
Protestant ethic was arguably embodied by the leaders and peoples of the US, leading to a 
capitalist ideology and practice based on working toward limitless profits (Weber [1905] 
2002). The outpouring of resources from Europe to the US gave the country a great 
advantage in the world-system and the insularity of the continent shielded it from the 
systemic chaos and World Wars that were soon to follow (Arrighi 2010).  
The US also took great advantage of the decaying British system of free trade 
imperialism, incorporating its working aspects and creating new answers to prior 
contradictions. The exclusion of non-western peoples and property-less masses from the 
British system fed the new organizational structure spearheaded by the US. This new 
system was not focused only on Europe or the US, but attempted to extend sovereignty and 
private property rights to the entire world, at least discursively. On the surface, this 
entailed massive decolonization and an effort toward anti-imperialism, helping to foster 
general ideological consent in the world. The extension of these rights to the whole of the 
globe was not only an attempt to extend freedom to others, but engendered a way for the 
US to open up the world markets, which, due to its advantages, favored the relatively newly 
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formed country considerably. As will be shown later, this spread of world markets is an 
extensive growth of capitalist social relations (Robinson 2004). The movement was not 
primarily economic, as it was for the British, but encompassed revolutionary political 
action in that it promised new values and rights to the subjects of the world (Arrighi 2010). 
We will later see how the unintended consequences of this political ideology have 
manifested themselves in the financial crisis. 
The supersession of British free trade imperialism by US free worldism took the form 
of a dialectical movement, much like many of the other processes of hegemonic transition. 
This dual movement consisted of the reformulation of the Westphalian order, but left 
behind the overtly imperial and unilateral aspects of the previous hegemon. Through its 
new systemic order it was able to give system-wide answers to the system-wide problems 
affecting others in the world, in some degree through promoting the rights of subjects from 
all countries to consume more and more goods (Arrighi 2010). The British form of classical 
liberalism extended such rights mainly to Europeans, but the US’s first systemic answer 
relied heavily on a discursive spread of those rights to people all over the world, 
integrating them into capitalist markets as actors.  
Another significant and evolutionarily cyclical aspect of the new hegemony is that the 
US was able to integrate yet another cost of accumulation: transaction costs. Though the 
Dutch incorporated protection costs and the British incorporated both protection and 
production costs, the US was able to incorporate both along with transaction costs; in other 
words, the US was able to organize and control “the markets on which the self-expansion of 
its capital depended” (Arrighi 2010:376). This internalization of transaction costs was also 
furthered by the new managerial capabilities of US corporations (Baran and Sweezy [1966] 
1968; Sweezy 1942; Foster and Magdoff 2009). Though these entities were not wholly new 
in the capitalist system, this was the first time that a vertical integration model was carried 
out on such a grand scale. Bringing many enterprises in a commodity chain under one 
nationally based organizational structure led to lower transaction costs, greater economic 
calculability, and greater efficiency (Arrighi 2010). In addition, the proclivity for US 
corporations to spread their wares throughout the world, along with innovations in 
transportation and communication technologies, further fed the organizational abilities of 
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these corporations and pushed the breadth of the capitalist economy toward its extensive 
limits in the latter decades of the 20th century. 
The historically specific place of the US in the global order gave it the advantages 
necessary to answer the problems of the system and become the world hegemon. Through 
access to a vast amount of natural resources, a new vertically integrated organizational 
structure, an ideology that discursively gave rights to people all over the world, and the 
shattering of other world powers’ economies in the wake of the Second World War, the US 
unquestionably ascended to world hegemony.  
Neoliberal Globalization and Financialization 
After the post-war upswing of the US economy in the 50s and 60s, the tendencies of 
the capitalist system toward stagnation began to set in. 9  As US manufacturing jobs were 
exported to nations with lower labor costs in the 1970s through the newfound 
organizational abilities of transnational corporations, the bifurcation of wealth between the 
domestic bourgeoisie and proletariat lowered domestic demand (Bluestone and Harrison 
1984).  
Some changes in the American labor force helped to stem the oncoming demand 
problems, at least for a time. The entrance of more women into the paid labor force and the 
rise in working hours in general gave US families more ability to stay above water. In the 
short-run, low interest rates and increased debt for US families further contributed to 
                                                 
9 Another factor consonant with prior world hegemonic shifts is the fact that the previously mentioned 
historically specific factors led to the rapid growth rate of the US, not aspects intrinsic to the capitalist market 
system itself. In Foster and Magdoff’s words, “stagnation (is) the normal state of the capitalist economy, 
barring special historical factors” (2009:128, emphasis in original). According to Foster and Magdoff, other 
historically specific factors that contributed to the rise of the US political economy after World War 2 and the 
so-called golden age of American capitalism are: 
1) The buildup of consumer savings during the war 
2) A second great wave of automobilization in the United States (including the expansion of the glass, 
steel, and rubber industries, the construction of the interstate highway system, and the 
development of suburbia) 
3) The rebuilding of the European and Japanese economies devastated by the war 
4) The Cold War arms race (and two regional wars in Asia) 
5) The growth of the sales effort marked by the rise of Madison Avenue 
6) The expansion of FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) 
7) The preeminence of the dollar as the hegemonic currency (2009:128). 
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economic stability. The growing debt of everyday Americans stimulated the economy in 
general and later came to be an integral part of accumulation and distribution processes.  
These concrete historical factors, along with many political-economic theoretical 
shifts, helped to set the stage for the neoliberal policy shifts of the late 1970s. The failure of 
the Bretton Woods system removed the US dollar from the gold standard allowing for 
floating exchange rates and greater profit-making capabilities in the trade of currencies. 
Other factors contributing to such shifts were the oil crisis of the 70s and the signal crisis of 
US hegemony: its failure to win the Vietnam War.  
The shift of labor and capital away from what used to be highly profitable material 
industry toward finance, real estate, consumption-based media (advertising), and service 
industries, in conjunction with the loss of jobs to cheaper labor from abroad, left US 
capitalists with an advantage in financial, non-material industries, an organizational 
knowledge of transnational corporations, and an uncanny scientific ability to create 
consent through propaganda. The scope and goals of the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) shifted toward US-led “development” oriented banking, loaning money to 
peripheral countries and imposing strict structural adjustment policies (SAPs) to ensure 
their repayment. These SAPs forced countries to deregulate trade and open their markets 
to pay back loans and compete with the rest of the world in a race to the bottom (Harvey 
2007).  
In Marxian terms, capitalist leaders in the US were able to turn the terms of the 
economy back into their favor by shifting from the capitalist logic based on the production 
of material commodities for profit (M-C-M’) to a financialized logic based on the nominal 
creation of profit through finance (M-M’). The ideological backing for this domestic and 
world-systemic shift was created by a powerful mixture of reinterpreted economic theory 
and a harkening back to core US political values, although in an arguably bastardized sense.  
The aforementioned factors led to the financialization of the US economy but also to 
the financialization of the global economy in general, as well as the export of neoliberalism 
as an ideology and practice. These changes make up the foundations of the second US-led 
world-systemic shift: neoliberal globalization and financialization. 
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A New Research Agenda 
Through Arrighi’s systemic cycles of accumulation perspective we have put the 
current financial crisis into the long history of capitalism and its maturation alongside that 
of the nation-state. Arrighi’s theory also provides reasons for the US’s recent proclivity for 
finance. Due to its explicit limitations though, the theory of systemic cycles of accumulation 
begins to lose its utility when applied to the current financial crisis.  
Arrighi purposefully limits his study to very macro-oriented changes in capitalism as 
a whole, especially with regard to temporal and geographical scope. This allows him to find 
such general consistencies in the long term processes of capitalist accumulation strategies. 
However, he states that: 
This reconstruction of capitalist history has its own limitation. The notion of 
systemic cycles of accumulation… derives directly from Braudel‟s notion 
of capitalism as the top level in the hierarchy of world trade. Our analytical 
construct, therefore, focuses on that top layer and offers a limited view of 
what goes on in the middle layer of market economy and the bottom layer 
of material life. (Arrighi 2010:25) 
Arrighi goes on to state that his construction is 
partial because it seeks some understanding of the logic of the present 
financial expansion abstracting from the movements that go on under their 
own steam and laws at the levels of the world‟s market economy and of the 
world‟s material civilizations. It is somewhat indeterminate for the same 
reason. The logic of the top layer is only relatively autonomous from the 
logics of the lower layers and can be fully understood only in relation to 
these other logics. (Arrighi 2010:25-27) 
Arrighi acknowledges his limitations, but more salient for the present study, these 
limitations specify gaps that lead to a more rigorous understanding of the most recent 
financial crisis in its specificity. By acknowledging and attempting to fill these gaps, we find 
that we should also look to the middle layer of the financial market economy for a more 
pointed view of the crisis. Arrighi’s explicit limitations lead to further interrogation of: (1) a 
second shift in the general capital accumulation process called neoliberal globalization and 
financialization, (2) a need to elucidate the ideology that legitimates this epochal shift and 
the theories that support it, and (3) a construction of the history of changes to market 
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processes, political and economic policy, and the financial architecture within the US that 
have led to the greatest global financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
The mixture of US world hegemony, the globalization and financialization of 
accumulation and distribution processes, the neoliberal ideology, and structural changes to 
the US banking system have led to the financial crisis and to general systemic 
transformations of the capitalist world system. While some of these issues may be outside 
the scope of Arrighi’s work, such changes make up integral pieces of the puzzle of the most 
recent financial crisis and must be interrogated more fully. Arrighi is attempting to study 
world hegemonic shifts on a grand scale and keeps his scope at a world-system level. 
Epochal shifts under the scope of Arrighi’s theory occur through state-centric world 
hegemonic shifts and he gives a more general view of structural changes than what is 
necessary for a full understanding of the financial crisis, which is arguably both a domestic 
and a world-system level phenomenon. By taking a slightly different tact through changing 
the scope of these abstractions, we see that a second worldwide shift has occurred within 
the long US century. Also, the shift toward domestic hegemony of neoliberalism in the US 
had to be justified by changes in ideology, for the deindustrialization and financialization of 
the US economy arguably do not benefit most people in the US (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982; Harrison 1997; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Crow and Albo 2005). The ideological 
support came from radical re-imaginings and recombinations of academic economic theory 
and core US political values (Albritton 2007; 2009; Callinicos 2010; Duménil 2004; 2005; 
2011; Dume nil and Le vy 2005; Harvey 2007a; Jessop 2002; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; 
Munck 2005; Palley 2005). These two lines of interrogation make up the next chapter of the 
study. The other line of interrogation deals with practical changes in the US’s financial 
structure since the Great Depression: the creation of the “new financial architecture” 
(Crotty 2009) and the rise of financial derivatives as facilitators of globalization and 
financialization (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; FCIC 2011). This line makes up the third chapter 
of this study and includes the changing laws, institutional structures, and practices of banks 
and other financial actors since the Great Depression and the changes that derivatives 
make to capitalist social relations. 
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Thus, Arrighi’s long-term, macro-oriented level of theoretical analysis is a starting 
point for understanding the globalization and financialization of accumulation processes, 
the role of neoliberal ideology in justifying changes to economic practices, and the domestic 
changes in the US that led directly into the crisis. We will see that each of these overlapping 
processes buttresses and reinforces the others and, when moving together through history, 
push forth transformations of the capitalist system that will have effects for years to come. 
Analysis of these processes gives a deep and far-reaching understanding of the financial 
crisis, for each perspective grants primacy to differing aspects of 21st century capitalist 
social relations. 
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Neoliberal Globalization and 
Financialization 
The move to US free worldism was not the only epochal change to happen within the 
US’s long century. A second epochal change has happened since the crises of the 1970s: a 
shift toward neoliberal globalization and financialization (Foster and Magdoff 2009; Munck 
2005; Harvey 2007a; Robinson 2004; Rowland 2009; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; 
Thorsen and Lie 2007). This change is in great part a reaction to the falling rate of profit in 
the productive US economy due to increased competition from abroad (Arrighi 2007; 2010; 
National Intelligence Council 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009). As US advantage in the 
productive/material sector waned and the country ran upon stagnation problems, its 
economic practices shifted toward more mobile forms of accumulation and capital to 
combat that stagnation. We saw in the last chapter that the contradictions of capitalism 
lead to stagnation and new logics of accumulation are provided that give system-wide 
answers to system-wide problems. Such answers though, do not last forever. Solutions to 
previous problems are only partial and hold within them their own contradictions. As 
historical processes transform and mature, their contradictions come to a head, leading to 
periodic crises. The financial crisis is a symptom of the maturation of a number of different 
historical lines that make up the US’s answers to the stagnation problems of the 1970s. The 
financial crisis is a glaring example of a crisis of accumulation stemming from the US’s 
attempts to forestall its tendency toward stagnation (Foster and Magdoff 2009).  
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To get at the long-term happenings that led to the financial crisis, I will first 
reinterpret Arrighi’s nation-state-centric world hegemonic epochs into four epochs that are 
less nation-state centric, adding neoliberal globalization and financialization as another 
worldwide transformation of capitalism happening under the US’s reign as world hegemon. 
The shifts from the third to fourth epochs of capitalism preempted the financial crisis and 
when their contradictions matured led into the largest and most pervasive financial crisis 
since the Great Depression. Globalization, financialization, and neoliberalism emerged 
together historically and mutually reinforced each other throughout the end of the 20th 
century and the beginning of the 21st, leading to the crisis. Through a reinterpretation of 
Arrighi’s epochs we will see how capitalism grows both extensively and intensively, though 
it has now reached its extensive limits (Robinson 2004). These extensive limits lead 
capitalism to grow more intensively by embedding more and more arenas into the 
competitive market logics of capitalism, spreading commodity chains across the world, 
globalizing production processes, and integrating new actors into finance to combat 
stagnation and participate in the new logics of capital. Instead of the growth of a domestic 
form of financialization as Arrighi’s theory would suggest, financialization spreads beyond 
US borders and facilitates the newly globalized forms of accumulation and distribution. 
Along with innovations in communication and transportation technologies, financialization 
creates a dynamic era of advanced capitalism in which overaccumulation crises and their 
remedies compound to create large-scale global financial crises.  
These forms of accumulation are spread through the matrix of neoliberalism and US 
world hegemony (Harvey 2007a; Colás 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; Thorsen and 
Lie 2007). Thus, neoliberalism as a historical matrix is interrogated under the lens of 
ideology critique. Specifically, we will see how neoliberalism has been justified through 
discursive means as an ideology in the US, for the political and economic theories that came 
to prominence gave legitimacy to the practices and structural changes that led to the 
financial crisis, as well as to the export of neoliberalism abroad.  
US free worldism was very advantageous for the US in the years following World War 
II. The US had great advantage in the production of material goods at that time relative to 
other countries due to its beneficial place in history. Thus, pushing for the expansion of a 
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worldwide market with low barriers to trade allowed the US to compete with other nations 
while it had great advantages in the production of material goods. As those other countries 
rebuilt after the war or industrialized for the first time, the US lost its advantage in material 
production, but gained advantage in finance, for it has one of the most advanced banking 
systems in the world and still generally an economic powerhouse. The world market 
system became less profitable for US-centered capital working under the free worldism 
system of accumulation. But, by utilizing new technological increases and organizational 
abilities that allowed for cheaper transportation of commodities and information, US 
capitalists satiated their need for more mobile capital by instigating a shift toward 
globalizing and financializing the general accumulation process itself. Newly globalized 
production processes, facilitated by finance, allowed US capital to liquefy in search of 
greater profit from abroad. The integration of many more actors into finance also increased 
profits, at least for a time. 
Globalization 
To begin elaborating the newest epoch of capitalism it will be beneficial to give 
Arrighi’s nation-state/world hegemon centric view on large-scale transformations of 
capitalism a slightly different turn by pushing the nation-state as fundamental unit of 
analysis into the background to momentarily focus on changes capitalist social relations in 
a more general sense. This turn will show that over the last few decades the US has 
financialized – as Arrighi’s theory suggests – but also shows that in addition to domestic 
financialization, advanced economies throughout the world are currently financializing due 
to the globalization of accumulation processes.  
Robinson (2004) posits four epochal shifts of capitalism10 that roughly follow 
Arrighi’s long centuries, but with some differences salient for an analysis of a 21st century 
financial crisis.  For Robinson, the first epoch of capitalism consisted of its evolution out of 
                                                 
10 These epochal changes are not completely distinct and are processual occurrences in which both epochs 
can co-occur. In other words, there are not necessarily immediate, drastic shifts. Instead such shifts occur 
unevenly throughout time and space and are ongoing, overlapping processes. 
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feudalism toward mercantilism and primitive accumulation11 and lasted roughly from the 
15th to the end of the 18th century. It covers the long centuries of the Genoese and Dutch 
systemic cycles of accumulation. The second epoch is the age of competitive capitalism, and 
includes the industrial revolution and colonialism. This epoch lasted until the end of the 
19th century and parallels the British long century and free trade imperialism.  
The third epoch coincides with the US’s initial cycle of accumulation that we have so 
far referred to as free worldism. It is characterized by US post-World War II hegemony, 
Keynesian economic theories based on the nation-state as a fundamental actor in the 
economy, and Baran and Sweezy’s (1968) delineation of monopoly capitalism in which 
national firms vertically integrate, become larger, and compete in an oligopolistic manner. 
Following Robinson (2004), the third epoch also includes the formation of a singular, all-
encompassing world market. In other words it includes the extension of capitalist markets 
across almost the entire world. We will return to many of these points and elaborate them 
more fully later. First, a brief description of the fourth epoch of capitalism is necessary. 
The fourth epoch is, according to Robinson, globalization. It is characterized in great 
part by changes in the role of the nation-state, the shift from a world market to a global 
market, changes in the organizational form of corporations toward transnationality, and 
the globalization of the production process itself. In addition to the idea of globalization, 
this epoch includes the financialization of the global economy, for finance acts as a 
facilitator for the globalization process (Callinicos 2010). It also includes neoliberalism, 
which provides the ideological legitimacy for practical changes to the economy. Thus, the 
fourth epoch will be called neoliberal globalization and financialization, for each of these 
processes make up fundamental pieces of the newest epoch of capitalist social relations. 
Each strand will now be separated analytically to delineate the fourth epoch. We will 
first illuminate the globalization strand, then move into financialization and how it 
facilitates globalization, and finally into neoliberalism as the ideological backing for those 
transformations of the economic system.  
                                                 
11 I prefer Harvey’s term accumulation by dispossession to that of primitive accumulation, for primitive 
accumulation insinuates that this epoch ended at some point. Accumulation by dispossession, on the other 
hand, goes on throughout time and is a relatively transhistorical term. See Harvey 2000; 2006; 2007b; [1982] 
2007c; 2009 for further discussions of accumulation by dispossession.   
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Globalization is, according to Robinson, an “essentially contested concept” (2004:1, 
emphasis in original). The term globalization has been a buzzword in the social sciences for 
at least the last two decades and many debates about the nature of globalization have 
permeated the discourse since. Some argue that globalization is a benign and natural 
occurrence bringing the world together under the rationalization of the market process. 
Others argue that globalization is not necessarily a new phenomenon, but is instead only a 
furthering of previous capitalist tendencies brought to a slightly higher pitch. One position 
that crosses all definitions states that globalization refers to the increasing 
interconnections across the entire world, brought about by technological advancement in 
transportation and information technologies.  
However, globalization should be characterized in a broadly Marxian sense, in that it 
refers to a change in social relations encompassing both the economic and political realms. 
Globalization is not a politically neutral occurrence, for it naturalizes commodified social 
relations, making them seem normal and objective. Put differently, globalization as it plays 
out in history is a definitively capitalist phenomenon, not a natural one.12  
Furthermore, as Colás states, “capitalist globalization cannot be understood without 
reference to its ‘spatial fixes’ (see Harvey 2000); that is, the various sites of regulation, 
control and surveillance – from factory walls to border crossings – which, with the 
legitimation of the state, sustain the reproduction of the capitalist market” (2005:74). One 
of the foremost spatial fixes of globalization is the US acting as world hegemon and 
exporting neoliberal values of marketization and low barriers to trade. Thus, globalization 
affects not only the economy or market, but political actors as well, including most 
specifically the nation-state.  
A pressing issue in debates about globalization concerns the role and power of nation-
states versus the role and power of transnational capital. By moving past this dualistic 
thought process, we can see that these debates can be moved to a different and more 
fruitful plane. 
                                                 
12 We could create a theoretical world in which globalization defined as the spread of technology or 
increasing interconnectedness is not necessarily capitalist in nature. However, in history this is certainly not 
the case. 
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The global/nation-state dualism is similar to the state/market dualism and both 
contribute to a form of social analysis that reifies these different but mutually contingent 
spheres subsequently leading to differentiated logics for global relations or international 
relations and state logics or market logics respectively (Robinson 2004). Following 
Robinson (2004), I conceptualize capitalism and the state/market through Marxian terms, 
which state that the two are internally related to each other, not externally related as a 
Weberian perspective might posit. What this means for the analysis is that, under 
globalization, state and market actors become more deeply intertwined than before while 
at the same time, the role of the state in the global economy changes. State power, 
especially in the US case, is increasingly exercised by capitalists and/or capitalist interests 
(Domhoff [1967] 2009; Liptak 2010; Mills [1956] 2000; Robinson 2004).  
The Weberian view on the state/market dichotomy leads to differentiated logics for 
each, for through this perspective the state and the market are externally related and act 
upon each other rather than between and through one another in a dialectical relationship. 
This dichotomy plays itself out in the globalization debates through analyses stating that 
globalization entails an increase in the power of the economic logic over the logic of the 
state with the result that state power wanes relatively. Furthermore, “economic 
globalization is increasingly recognized, but is analyzed as if it were independent of the 
institutions that structure these social relations, in particular, states and the nation-state...” 
thus, “at the economic level the global logic of a world economy prevails, whereas at the 
level of the political a state-centered logic of the world system prevails” (Robinson 
2004:95).  
Dualistic thought assumes that there are two distinct and totally separate or 
externally related ways to view things. Dualistic thought makes either/or statements 
rather than getting at the true complexity of the subject by using both/and statements. 
Neither of the aforementioned approaches is completely right or wrong, but both tend 
along a spectrum based on the level and focus of analysis. Anti-dualistic thinking moves 
such debates to a new plane by transcending simplistic views and setting those views up in 
relation to each other. By moving past these dualistic formulations, we can better see how 
the state and market reinforce each other to spread capitalist social relations through the 
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world. Additionally, by applying anti-dualist thought to debates about nation-state power 
versus transnational capitalist power, these debates become futile – or better yet – more 
productive (Robinson 2004). If we can move past the global/nation-state dualism to a less 
dualistic and more fruitful conceptualization, the process and effects of globalization gain 
more clarity. 
The nation-state system as set out by the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 set the stage for 
capitalism over the last few centuries. This system has not completely disappeared and 
neither has the nation-state nor its formidable power. But, the international nation-state 
system in which nations are the absolute foremost containers of power is in the process of 
changing, at least to a great enough degree that theoretical analysis must grapple with such 
changes. The international system, especially regarding finance, is turning into a 
supranational system (Bryan and Rafferty 2006) and other actors such as transnational 
corporations, transnational capitalists, and supranational institutions like the IMF, World 
Bank, G-8 and others have moved to the fore as fundamental actors and power-holders 
within the world-system. This has transformed not only the variables within the equation, 
but the relationships between the variables themselves. There has not been a complete 
rupture with the Westphalian international system – nation-states are still some of the 
foremost actors in numerous arenas of power, particularly in exercising military power and 
creating laws that organize capitalist markets. History though, is a process and more than 
enough qualitative change has occurred to require analytical shifts for theorizing the new 
century and the new epoch of globalization. 
The hegemonic nation-state instigates and facilitates changes in worldwide capitalist 
social relations, but by pushing the nation-state as a fundamental unit into the background, 
we see that the overarching logic of competition itself leads to systemic changes that 
transcend nation-states. In other words, it is not only the world hegemon that transforms 
capitalism; the logics of capitalism itself lead to worldwide changes in accumulation 
processes. These changes are initially instigated by the world hegemonic state, for part of 
the reason for a state’s world hegemony comes from its place on the forefront of new 
accumulation processes. Free worldism was the accumulation strategy for the US in the 
post-World War II era under its reign as full world hegemon and the US pushed markets 
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outward because it had advantages in them at that time. After signal crises in its hegemony, 
the US shifted toward financialization as an accumulation strategy for sustaining high 
profits in the face of its waning advantage in the materially productive sector and, taken 
along with the globalization of accumulation processes, this domestically oriented logic 
affected changes in the more general processes of accumulation for other actors in the 
world system, pushing them to globalize and financialize to keep up their rates of profit. 
The US’s initial strategy of pushing capitalist markets outward geographically is an 
example of the extensive growth of capitalism. As that process neared its limits and 
stagnation set in, the unending search for profit pushed an intensive growth of capitalist 
social relations through the globalization and financialization of accumulation processes.  
The extensive growth of capitalism is different from its intensive growth (Robinson 
2004). Extensive growth refers to the widening berth of capitalism or the subsumption of 
more and more places under capitalist social relations. This is a geographical form of 
growth.  In contrast, intensive growth refers to the deepening of capitalist social relations 
in already capitalist markets, or, more and more kinds of social relations being put under 
the auspices of capitalist relations.  For example, the extension of capitalism to formerly 
non-capitalist nations like Russia, Latin America, China, and elsewhere constitutes an 
extensive growth of capitalism. From an international or world-systems level of analysis, 
with nation-states as the main units of analysis, capitalist social relations grow extensively 
as those nations, through institutional and juridical changes, subsume their societies under 
market relations. In Polanyi’s ([1944] 2001) terms, these nation-states embed their 
societies in the world market.  
The intensive growth of capitalism refers to the deepening commodification of human 
activity within an already capitalist place. As Robinson (2004) puts it, “... human activities 
that previously were outside the logic of capitalist production are brought into this logic” 
(p. 6). Intensive growth of capitalism in already relatively capitalist nations like the US 
refers to things like the subsumption of art or healthcare under market relations. For 
example, selling art on the market for profit when it formerly was given or traded is an 
example of the intensive growth of capitalism. To clarify, from an international perspective 
set above nation-states, the extensive growth of capitalism includes the spread of capitalist 
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markets to more and more nations – these nations begin to utilize capitalist markets for the 
first time. From a domestic-level perspective, the intensive growth of capitalism refers to 
already capitalist places putting more social relations under capitalist markets, or 
embedding more areas in market relations.  
With those definitions clarified we can now reinterpret the epochs of capitalism in 
terms of extensive and intensive growth. The primitive accumulation epoch began the 
process of capitalism as a whole. It started with the shift toward a focus on the capitalist 
logic of power, which made the accumulation of profit a fundamental goal for the 
attainment of power and was thus both an intensive and extensive growth of capitalism in 
medieval, feudal Europe, for it put new places and new social relations under the logic of 
the market. In the second epoch, that of competitive capitalism, capitalist social relations 
spread extensively over much more of the world through colonialism and increased 
competition between fundamentally nationally based economies. Capitalist relations also 
grew intensively, especially in Britain, through changes to production processes such as the 
industrial revolution. The monopoly capitalist epoch spread capitalist social relations 
extensively throughout almost the entire world by integrating more and more nations 
under capitalist markets and logics. Over the 20th century the extensive growth of 
capitalism was mostly completed, though some nations held to different social relations for 
a time, even if only discursively. The organization of capitalist relations changed intensively 
in the US (and elsewhere) with the rise of the modern corporation and the promotion of a 
consumer society (Foster and Magdoff 2009).  
During the third epoch of capitalism, the monopoly/corporate capitalism phase, 
world markets were extended geographically throughout the earth. Almost no country has 
gone untouched by capitalism and virtually all nations participate in capitalist markets in 
some form or another (Robinson 2004). This process continues to seep into whatever 
cracks may be left. Regarding globalization, the expansion or extension of the world market 
has reached its limits and intensive growth is all that is left. There are almost no other 
nations for capitalist social relations to spread to. Capitalism has instead begun to grow 
more intensively by transforming previous social relations into marketized relations 
oriented toward the pursuit of profit within already capitalist countries. Note that capitalist 
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social relations must continually grow due to competition and the tendency toward 
stagnation, a point that will be elaborated soon. 
The US’s cycle of accumulation as a whole has a specific tendency toward 
globalization. Through its integration of transaction costs and the extension of markets, the 
US pushed a competitive market onto the world. The US’s shift away from the British style 
of overt imperialism led to a more economically oriented form of imperialism: imperialism 
through the spread of markets and competition. It was a qualitative change, but not the 
only qualitative change that the US century would bring.  
The US’s economic imperialism began as the creation of a world market based on 
competition between nation-states and nationally based small firms (a qualitative change 
from Britain’s colonialist style that then moved into a quantitative, territorial spread of the 
world market). The logic of accumulation then fostered and partially moved through the 
epoch of monopoly/corporate capitalism (an epoch which saw a change in the form of 
domestically internal production through the rise of the large corporation acting as an 
oligopoly with a managerial class in a single nation-state – a qualitative, then quantitatively 
expanding change) toward what has now become a globalized market (another qualitative 
transformation of the capitalist system, yet again moving the predominant forms of 
accumulation into arenas that are more flexible and more competitive). 
Under the Fordist style of business that was predominant in the third epoch, 
production and firms were mostly based in a singular country, while goods were 
increasingly sold abroad. This distribution of goods is what Robinson calls a world market 
and conforms to the epoch of monopoly capitalism, as well as the previous epochs. There 
has been a world market for centuries and over those centuries there has been a 
quantitative rise in trade, but relatively slow qualitative change in the way trade was done, 
aside from through technological increases in transportation and changes to production 
such as the industrial revolution or the Fordist mode of production.  
In the initial phase of its hegemony, the US utilized the free worldism strategy of 
accumulation to spread capitalist markets as far as possible, generating profit through 
competition under terms of US advantage in the production of material commodities. This 
was a very world-market oriented strategy of accumulation and focused on the extension 
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of capitalist social relations, for the extension of capitalist markets is necessary to combat 
the stagnation tendency. Then, as the extensive growth of capitalist markets reached its 
limits, intensive growth became the engine for combating the stagnation tendency 
(Robinson 2004).  
Though it seems we have strayed far from the financial crisis, the intensive growth of 
capitalist social relations in specific arenas over the last few decades are the long-term 
causes of the financial crisis. These arenas include: (1) the globalization and 
financialization of production processes and (2) the financialization of distribution 
processes.  
The globalization transition is not a total rupture with such a world market, but is 
instead a transformation of the mode of production into a more horizontally integrated 
system, what Robinson calls a global market. Though they tend to be treated as such, firms 
are no longer necessarily citizens of a single country, making their goods within the 
country and selling them to the entire world; they are instead global actors that still care 
not who they sell their products to, but more saliently, spread their entire mode of 
production through the world in such a way that their goods can hardly be seen as national 
goods.  
Globalization has shifted the earth from a world market to a global market. For 
example, there is a great difference between a car that is assembled at a Nissan plant in 
Tennessee, engineered in Japan by a company owned by investors all over the world, and 
managed from both Japan and the US – and a car that was made in Detroit by workers in 
the 1950s, under US management, with US steel, and US designs, to be sold mostly to the US 
consumer.  
We can add more concepts to further flesh out this qualitative change. In the middle of 
the 20th century, the Fordist model of firm production and the nation-state oriented 
political economic theory of Keynesianism were dominant. From the 1970s on, the 
vertically oriented Fordist model of production transformed into a horizontal, globalized 
mode. Keynesianism was overtaken by neoliberalism. Keynesian economic theory and 
policy practice were abandoned for neoliberal theories and policy practices that coincided 
more with the needs of US capital. The US, losing its comparative advantage in the 
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production of non-financial goods to both recently industrializing countries and countries 
whose economies had recovered from the war, searched for liquidity through a move 
toward finance and the movement of productive material capital across the globe through 
the newly globalized production process. Furthermore, the globalized production process 
required the participation of many more economic actors in the financial sector, since 
inputs all along the commodity chain were traded on the global markets in addition to the 
usual trade of finished products. 
This difference in the form of production is a qualitative change from mid-20th 
century capitalism to the capitalism of the late 20th and early 21st century, and thus 
requires the analytical distinction of a new epoch. The globalization of the production 
process is an intensive growth of capitalist social relations, for it makes every step on the 
commodity chain, each step being spatially fixed in a certain nation, a part of the larger 
process of production as a whole and puts each participant in these steps in competition 
with others across the whole globe (Robinson 2004). This globalized market is particularly 
suited for transnational investment and its workings increase competition between 
companies and between labor because each input on the commodity chain must compete 
with others all across the world. The globalization of production also increases capital’s 
need for international finance, for commodity chains become transnational and require 
different forms of money at each link of the chain (Callinicos 2010). These increases in 
competition lead to significant changes in the capital-labor relation and forms of ownership 
of capital. We will soon see that new financial instruments come to play a much larger role 
in international finance due to the need to equate many forms of transnational capital 
under a system that utilizes only national money. 
Financialization 
As Callinicos (2010) states, the most recent financial crisis “is an economic crisis that 
exposes the depths of the contradictions that have been at work in the entire process of 
capital accumulation and not merely, as Keynes and Minsky would contend, the 
dysfunctions of the financial markets” (p. 50). Following Callinicos, “A comprehensive 
analysis of the present crisis requires us to distinguish the following dimensions: (i) a long-
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term crisis of overaccumulation and profitability; (ii)  a global financial system that is both 
chronically unstable and structurally unbalanced; and (iii) a growing reliance on credit 
bubbles to sustain economic expansion” (2010:50). Establishing the first two dimensions 
requires showing that advanced capitalist economies are stagnating at the same time that 
developing economies are attempting to unload their surplus through the expansion of 
their markets. Since capitalist markets already cover almost the entire earth, developing 
industrial nations look to advanced capitalist nations for absorption. In this precarious 
situation the US has used its role as hegemon to absorb global surplus through debt that is 
financed by recently industrialized countries (Davies 2010). In effect, the US borrows 
money from surplus countries to pay it back to them in return for their overaccumulated 
commodities. After linking worldwide stagnation and global imbalances to finance, we will 
see that further recourse has been taken in the US to counter stagnation by integrating 
more actors into the financial sector. 
Under capitalist logics of accumulation – barring specific countering historical factors 
– economies tend toward stagnation (Arrighi 2010; Callinicos 2010; Foster and Magdoff 
2009; Harvey 2007; Marx 1978). But it is not only the US economy that is stagnating; many 
nations in the world system are having difficulty finding avenues for the spread of their 
markets to absorb surplus (Davies 2010). To deal with this issue, it will be useful to note a 
theory that deals specifically with finance and the tendency toward stagnation in the 
modern age: the monopoly finance capital thesis.  
It is worth quoting Foster and Magdoff (2009) at some length, for they summarize the 
monopoly capital thesis put forth by Baran and Sweezy (1968) that holds within it a 
formidable transformation of capitalism over the twentieth century that is very germane 
for the study. In essence, this theory links the proclivity for corporate enlargement to 
financialization and the stagnation of economies. According to Foster and Magdoff (2009):  
In bare outline the argument of Monopoly Capital can be summarized as 
follows. At the brink of the twentieth century, capitalism underwent a major 
transformation, marked by the rise of the giant corporation. The early 
decades that followed were dominated by world wars and a depression 
associated with this great transformation. Following the Second World War 
the new stage of capitalism was fully consolidated, particularly within the 
United States, the most advanced capitalist economy. The result was a 
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situation in which a handful of giant corporations controlled most 
industries. This constituted an enormous departure from the freely 
competitive system of the nineteenth century, in which the economy had 
been mostly made up of small, family-based firms that had little control 
over price, output, and investment levels – all of which were determined by 
larger market forces.  
In the new monopoly capitalist order firms behaved not as the freely 
competitive enterprises of textbook economics but as what Joseph 
Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy called “corespective” 
firms, or rational, profit-maximizing oligopolies, each of which took their 
main rivals into consideration in their pricing decisions and in their attempts 
to increase their profit margins and market shares.... The result was what 
Baran and Sweezy called a “tendency of the surplus to rise” in the economy 
as a whole, and particularly in that part represented by the large 
corporations.  
This meant that the main problem of the economy was to find ways to 
absorb the enormous actual and potential economic surplus.... Baran and 
Sweezy argued that the monopoly capitalist economy was characterized by 
a tendency to stagnation as profitable investment outlets for the surplus 
were found lacking and as other ways of absorbing surplus... were unable to 
pick up the slack. The resulting chronic overcapacity in production kept 
capital accumulation on a short leash by reducing expected profits on new 
investments and hence the willingness to invest.  
The pivotal issue for monopoly capital was to find additional outlets for 
surplus, beyond capitalist consumption and investment, that would serve to 
keep the system from sinking into an economic malaise. (Pp. 64-5) 
In addition to the monopoly capital thesis, which is concurrent with the monopoly 
phase of capitalism, Sweezy later noted a great limitation to his and Baran’s argument: they 
did not foresee the growing financialization of the economy (Foster and Magdoff 2009). 
Foster and Magdoff, in their book The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences 
(2009) argue that “although the system has changed as a result of financialization, this falls 
short of a whole new stage of capitalism, since the basic problem of accumulation is the 
same. Instead financialization has resulted in a new hybrid phase of the monopoly stage of 
capitalism that might be termed ‘monopoly finance capital’” (p. 77). This hybrid phase is 
further reinforced by the general stagnation of advanced capitalist economies like the US 
and the overaccumulation problems of recently industrialized economies such as China 
(Callinicos 2010). As stated earlier, this phase is also thoroughly characterized by the 
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globalization of accumulation processes that require finance to “grease their wheels,” so to 
speak. 
Capitalists tend to expand markets for their commodities to keep up their rates of 
profit in the face of stagnation. Now that almost the entire world has become part of 
capitalist markets, there are few if any places to extend those markets further. Accordingly, 
capital has found another way to grow: capitalist social relations grow more intensively in 
already capitalist nations. Under the new epoch of neoliberal globalization and 
financialization a main tactic for this intensive growth is the integration of more actors into 
finance, for finance can raise the rate of profit through interest rates as well as facilitate the 
sale of commodities and capital to actors who may not have been able to afford it to start. 
The integration of more actors into finance increases overall debt for nations, for 
consumers, and for corporations that normally function only in the materially productive 
sector (Callinicos 2010). Increases in debt keep the rate of profit up for a while, but when it 
comes time for bills to be paid many problems arise. 
As capitalist markets approach their extensive limits many recently industrialized 
nations search in vain for new markets for their surplus goods. Then, they look to advanced 
capitalist countries to absorb that surplus (Davies 2010), but those countries’ economies 
have become relatively stagnant due to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. This global 
stagnation leads to an overall savings glut or an overaccumulation crisis in need of remedy. 
That remedy has recently been found in the creation of US debt. The US government, 
through debt-financed consumption, receives loans from developing countries and then 
uses those loans to purchase goods from those countries and pay for war (Davies 2010; 
Callinicos 2010). This process brings nation-states themselves in as financial actors and 
financializes the global commodity distribution process.  
Global account imbalances have been building for years due to lacking avenues for the 
sale of commodities. Aggregate global demand is not high enough to consume all of the 
products coming from newly industrialized countries like China without the use of credit 
and debt. The US has acted as a sink for the global savings glut by increasing “its debt 
dramatically without suffering the inability to finance it” (Davies 2010:18). The recent 
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downgrade of US debt foreshadows the US’s faltering ability to continue this process 
indefinitely.  
Regardless, the role of the dollar as the main global trading currency means that US 
treasury bonds continue to be one of the safest places to hold value; surplus countries and 
businesses continue to purchase US government securities. Such massive purchases (China 
holds around $2.5 trillion in US securities) have kept interest rates low, leading to an 
environment where numerous US investors are searching for high returns in other kinds of 
assets (Davies 2010). These higher returns are found in new financial instruments that 
purport to limit risk while keeping returns high, even in cases like the subprime mortgage 
market, a point that will be elaborated in the next chapter.  
Additionally, other players are brought in to the financial sector as actors increasing 
financialization in general. Corporations that normally work only in the materially 
productive sector such as auto manufacturers expand their operations to include the 
financing of consumer debt, integrating consumers into the financial sector through the 
creation of debt and edging banks out of that arena (Callinicos 2010). This puts more of a 
squeeze on bank profits and pushes them toward more risky investments. For example, 
over the last few years car manufacturers have begun offering their own system of loans to 
consumers, allowing buyers to finance their purchases through the car company itself. 
These corporations integrate finance directly into their accumulation strategies, bypassing 
the banks, and making themselves part of both the financial and materially productive 
sectors of the economy. 
Some might blame US consumers for using credit to keep up the “high-end” lifestyles 
they have become accustomed to. But, rather than treating growing debt only as a US 
phenomenon based on high consumption levels in times of stagnant real wages, the growth 
of overall debt should instead be seen as the result of a systemic capitalist logic that 
integrates more and more actors into the general financial system. As consumers face 
stagnating wages and increased offerings of credit, they are integrated into the financial 
sector as actors by taking on more debt, whether through mortgages, refinancing, auto 
loans, credit cards, or other debt avenues – amounting to the financialization of the 
consumption process.  
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Rather than consumers using money already earned to make purchases to increase 
general demand, this demand is created through debt itself, further integrating labor into 
the financial sector. This is a very interesting tactic because it includes two 
countertendencies to the falling rate of profit. First, the wages of laborers are “squeezed” to 
raise the profit rate, a common happening. Secondly, as prices of commodities rise with 
inflation workers are less and less able to purchase them and they are pushed to utilize 
credit and take on debt. Debt is, of course, not free and workers must not only pay the 
asking price for commodities, but must also pay interest on top of the normal price.  Bryan, 
Martin, and Rafferty (2009) elaborate this nefarious process in Marxian terms: 
Surplus value continues to be produced and appropriated in the 
conventional way, but financialization changes our understanding of labor 
as both variable capital and commodity capital…. Economically, the 
household not only consumes commodities and reproduces labor power, it 
also engages finance, particularly through its exposure to credit, the 
demands of financial calculation, and requirements of self-funding non-
wage work in old age…. With financialization, the reproduction of labor 
power starts not with commodities, as conventionally posed, but with credit. 
Credit is used to buy commodity inputs for the household (M-C at the 
“beginning” of the circuit). Then, leaving aside the issue of how we 
conceive of production within the household, somewhere before the circuit 
begins again, some part of the wages paid to labor power (C-M at the “end” 
of the circuit) must accrue as interest payments on money capital advanced 
to households. (Pp. 461-3) 
Both industrial corporations and laborers, who normally function in the materially 
productive sector, become a part of the financial sector. Thus, they feed more directly into 
the financialization of the accumulation process and financialized social relations grow 
intensively to include not only the way commodities are produced, but the ways they are 
distributed and purchased.  
In summation, the aforementioned global savings glut and its absorption by debt-
financing from the US means that governments themselves have become more integrated 
actors in the global financial sector, contributing to the financialization of the distribution 
process. Corporations that usually act in the material-productive sector begin acting in the 
financial sector and put more pressure on banks. Consumers are added to the financial 
sector because they can no longer afford to purchase all that they need with their profit-
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squeezed wages and the reproduction of labor is financialized. The stagnation of the 
productive sectors of advanced capitalist economies and the extension of capitalist social 
relations all over the world leave no room for the geographical spread of markets in search 
of further investment opportunities. To find more arenas for investment, capital began a 
more intensive form of growth: the financialization of the US and global economies.  
The globalization and financialization of accumulation leads to another change in the 
capitalist world system: derivatives have risen in prominence due to low interest rates and 
squeezes on bank profits. But, as will be shown later, derivatives have risen in prominence 
due not only to increases in financialization and speculation, but also because of the lacking 
ability of national money to anchor the global financial system in the absence of a Bretton 
Woods or gold standard system (Bryan and Rafferty 2006) and the presence of 
transnational links on singular commodity chains.  
While these transformations may have generated profits for US capitalists, the US 
people in general were not so lucky. Wages for US workers stagnated through increased 
global competition in labor markets and a breakdown of the Keynesian labor accord 
(Harvey 2005). In the wake of the oil-shocks and the demise of the Bretton Woods systems 
in the 1970s, exchange rates became more volatile and the policy trilemma moved to a new 
stage.  
The macroeconomic policy trilemma in international finance declares that a nation-
state can provide two, but not three, of the following, as laid out by Bryan and Rafferty 
(2006:107): 
 National policies to support labor’s living standards 
 Large scale capital flows, and 
 Stable exchange rates 
With the dual perceived need to keep up large scale capital flows while stabilizing 
exchange rates, the third leg of the trilemma stool was broken. Capitalist elites in the US 
shifted emphasis away from domestic profit-making toward privatized profit-making for a 
transnational capitalist class, all with the help of the neoliberal ideology. But how were 
these changes – changes that negatively affect an immense proportion of the population – 
thrust upon a purportedly democratic public? 
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To justify these arguably detrimental changes to the majority of US people required a 
strong and comprehensive form of ideological legitimation. That legitimation was created 
by reinterpreting and recombining numerous lines of thought in the US, including a radical 
reinterpretation of classical liberal values that the US was founded on and a very thorough 
and far-reaching change to the Keynesian economic theories that dominated the post-Great 
Depression and post-World War US landscape. This legitimation process is the subject of 
the next section. 
Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is arguably the overarching and hegemonic ideology of both US and 
global capitalism today. Neoliberal policies have been implemented throughout the world 
since at least the late 1970s and these ideas continue to hold sway over the US, as well as 
many other countries and their governing systems. Latin American countries have faced 
the imposition of neoliberal policies (Rowland 2008). Even currently and formerly 
“communist” nations like China and Russia have taken on neoliberal characteristics 
(Harvey 2007a; Lapavitsas 2005; Palley 2005).  
We saw from the previous chapter that capitalism in the world-system roughly 
follows systemic cycles of accumulation over the long run and that in the twentieth century 
the US rose to world hegemony, though its power is now in decline. Much like the world 
hegemons before it, the US has seen a decline in its comparative advantage in the 
production of material commodities, a decline in the profit rate within that sector, and, 
concordantly, a domestic shift toward the financialization of accumulation. Though these 
systemic cycles have similarities, there are also many qualitative changes that occur 
throughout the cycles that are historically specific. For example, the previous section shows 
that when globalization occurs alongside US world hegemony there is a tendency toward 
global, rather than only a national financialization of accumulation and distribution. In 
addition to these changes, neoliberalism became a specific configuration of the political-
economic system of the US in the latter half of the twentieth century, especially since the 
late 1970s, and, when taken along with globalization, financialization, and US world 
hegemony, neoliberalism legitimated and pushed forth a qualitative shift in the capitalist 
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system as a whole, a shift that led to the financial crisis. This shift came about due to 
contradictions inherent in the capitalist system, contradictions specific to the US free 
worldism form of accumulation, and the attempts of US and global capital to maintain rates 
of profit in the face of such problems even at the expense of the US people.  
After the move toward Keynesianism in the first half of the twentieth century and the 
so-called “golden age of capitalism” in the 50s and 60s, we see a shift in American political-
economic ideology and policy toward deregulation of the market and the extension of the 
market mentality to all arenas of life in the US – essentially an intensive growth of capitalist 
social relations. Furthermore, we see a move toward more liquid assets within a globalizing 
world and a concurrent move to globalized forms of production.  
Such an immense shift required thorough legitimation and the creation of consent 
within the American public, for these changes are arguably quite detrimental to US people 
and to others throughout the world. Although from the perspective of US capital, they were 
necessary to increase their rates of profit under waning US advantages. Neoliberalism 
provided the ideological legitimation necessary for capital to make such changes to the US 
economy and is thus a substantial medium term cause of the financial crisis. 
To discursively remove the state from the economy, and therefore free capital to be 
mobilized in more profitable areas outside the US, people in power such as politicians and 
academics utilized a radical reimagining of the classical liberal ideology and core US values 
of individual rights and freedoms to create a hybrid political-economic ideology buttressed 
by new orthodox economic theory and a bastardization of core US political values. The 
word discursive is key here, for the practices under this ideology do not necessarily 
coincide with the theoretical or ideological legitimations espoused by proponents; in fact, 
in many instances these ideas cannot objectively be put into practice. Put simply, the state 
cannot be removed from the economy, for in great part, the state creates the laws and 
institutions that make up the structure of the domestic economy. We must therefore 
interrogate the ideological backing that was necessary to institute such changes, for the 
dialectic of discursive ideology and actual practice make up two fundamental lines in the 
overall restructuring of the US economy over past decades, a global and domestic 
restructuring that set the stage for the financial crisis. 
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The discourses and practices under neoliberal globalization are consistently 
contradictory, but are at the same time deeply interrelated. One cannot be rigorously 
understood without the other. To understand the financial crisis through a thoroughly 
historical lens it is first necessary to understand the ideological component that allowed a 
shift away from domestic production and the so-called capital-labor accord toward an 
economy based in financial profit-making through globalized neoliberalism. Ideological 
backing for this shift was absolutely necessary, for the results for the vast majority of 
Americans were very arguably negative. 
Altogether this chapter and the next function to fill out the lower levels of Braudel’s 
tiers that were left open by Arrighi’s analysis. The two chapters elaborate the recent 
complex interactions between state and market forces, showing how cultural, political and 
economic ideologies have come together to buttress the practiced transformations of 
capitalism over the last few decades, all of which lead directly into the creation of the most 
far-reaching global financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Neoliberal Ideology vs. Neoliberal Practice 
Neoliberalism as a holistic matrix includes the radical reimagining of classical liberal 
values that the US was founded upon and the integration of that ideology with the new 
orthodoxy of economic theory as well as the subsequent use of that theory in political 
practice. However, to better understand the complex entity that is neoliberalism, some 
analytical distinctions are necessary. First, there are two main threads moving 
simultaneously within the concept of neoliberalism that we will focus on.13 One line is 
made up of the economic and political ideological discourses used to justify structural 
changes to the state and economy, which is the subject of this chapter. The second line is 
made up of those actual juridical and organizational changes and includes the changing 
                                                 
13 Neoliberalism is both a political and an economic ideology. This ideology is based in a complex historical 
matrix of economic, philosophical, political, and social theories whose lineage dates back at least to the 
seventeenth century. Due to the variant nature of neoliberalism it can be further broken down into separate 
but not wholly distinct aspects: neoliberalism as a political-philosophical ideology based on liberalism, 
neoliberalism as a reaction to failures and contradictions in Keynesianism, and neoliberalism as it has been 
practiced since the late 1970s in the US. Since these aspects are intimately intertwined with one another, full 
separation is quite impossible. For the sake of further understanding though, we will simply focus our lens on 
the different aspects, letting the other categories fall back into the periphery to be brought back in later. 
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government policies, institutional, and business practices in the US economy since the 
Great Depression, all of which will be elucidated in the next chapter. Thus, this chapter is a 
brief history of some of the ideas that led up to the financial crisis and the next chapter 
further elaborates the practices that led to the financial crisis.  
On the whole, an elaboration of the neoliberal ideology will lead us to a better 
understanding of the relation between liberalism and neoliberalism, the role of 
Keynesianism in the rise of neoliberalism, and how neoliberalism has worked “on the 
ground” through institutional policy, political-economic ideology, and concrete historical 
factors to create the financial crisis.  
Though neoliberalism is an arguably hegemonic ideology that has permeated the 
political-economic landscape for many years, “… defining neoliberalism is no 
straightforward task… because the term ‘neoliberalism’ stands for a complex assemblage of 
ideological commitments, discursive representations, and institutional practices, all 
propagated by highly specific class alliances and organized at multiple geographic scales” 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Furthermore, neoliberalism is deeply intertwined with 
globalization and, much like globalization, is an “essentially contested concept” within the 
social sciences.  
At its base, neoliberalism is defined by the idea that the market mechanism, rather 
than the state or society, holds primacy in the economy (Harvey 2007a; 2007b; Polanyi 
2001). Polanyi, in his seminal work The Great Transformation ([1944] 2001), theorizes the 
shift from feudalist social relations to capitalist social relations in Britain in the 19th 
century. To use the terms previously described, neoliberalism is an intensive growth of 
such relations within the US, for it embeds more social arenas in the market logics of an 
already capitalist nation. Neoliberal ideology also holds that the role of the state in the 
economic sphere should be minimized as much as possible and should serve only to create 
conditions necessary for the market economy to flourish (Harvey 2007a). This idea holds 
within it numerous contradictions, including the fact that the state must play a constant 
and active role in creating the conditions for a “free” market economy, such as upholding 
private property rights and promoting market-oriented legal frameworks. The state plays 
an especially important role in the time of crises as well by upholding the monetary system 
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in the face of dire circumstances. We will see later that this role for the state will cost US 
taxpayers a great deal over many generations. 
One significant piece of neoliberal ideology contends that the welfare state and 
Keynesian style economic intervention are taboo, because individual actors, acting in their 
own “rational” best interests, will lead to the most efficient allocation of resources (George 
1999). We should note, however, that the ideological revolt against Keynesianism has not 
abolished it completely in practice – state manipulation of aggregate demand still happens 
in practice, though it is often either criticized or not addressed discursively at all. Recent US 
debates on Obama’s (perverted) Keynesian healthcare policy and the government’s weak 
Keynesian bailouts in the wake of the crisis are examples of the contentiousness 
surrounding weak 21st century Keynesian policies. 
Harvey states many neoliberal propositions succinctly: “neoliberalism is a theory of 
political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the 
maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized 
by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” 
(2007a:22). Neoliberalism holds true to the US free worldism goal of extending capitalist 
social relations throughout the world, but also entails an intensive growth of such relations 
within the US political economy itself. 
The neoliberal ideology was created from an economic theory “that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free 
markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2007a:2). Strong private property rights, little state 
intervention, and a myopic focus on individual responsibility are fundamental features of 
this ideology. According to neoliberal theory and its foundation on utilitarian economics, 
individuals acting in their own personal interest under markets that are not regulated by 
the state will bring the most well-being for the most people. By reifying the abstractions of 
economic disciplines and treating the market as a comprehensive natural reality, US 
political leaders and economists turned core American values on their head, proposing 
freedom through domination by politically, economically, and ideologically created 
markets. Social welfare was cut immensely, for under this framework, any state 
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intervention, even when directed toward human well-being, is against the general interest 
of the country (MacGregor 2005). Furthermore, social welfare entities creating a cushion 
for the American public, such as social security, were put under the rubric of the privatized 
“free” market under the auspices of the maximization of profits, relegating these safety nets 
to the grand casino of capitalism and increasing the intensive growth of such forms of 
social relations (see Soederberg 2010, Chapter 2). 
To further flesh out the history and present use of neoliberalism, we must first gain a 
greater understanding of liberalism, a nominal source for the political legitimacy of 
neoliberalism. Then, neoliberalism will be framed historically as following the previously 
dominant orthodox economic theory in the US: Keynesianism. After that we will outline 
some further basic ideological and theoretical tenets of neoliberalism by looking briefly at 
some of its founders and main proponents such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrick Hayek, and 
Milton Friedman. Throughout this discussion, neoliberalism will be framed in opposition to 
both Keynesian, and Polanyian theories of political-economic organization, for these were 
the theoretical movements that surrounded neoliberalism’s historical foundations (George 
1999).  
Political Ideology vs. Academic Ideology 
Though its strength comes from the synthesis of legitimating ideologies, it is 
analytically helpful to break the ideological component of neoliberalism into two parts. The 
first arena is the political legitimation of neoliberalism and includes neoliberal’s recourse 
to core American values and the use of political rhetoric. The new orthodoxy of economic 
theory, which informs said political practice, is the second arena through which 
neoliberalism is legitimated and focuses on the shift from Keynesian economic theory to 
theories positing that state intervention in general is detrimental to the economy. These 
two arenas combine together and support each other to create a very strong discourse that 
legitimates the government’s movement away from focusing on national economy building 
and the welfare of US society toward an emphasis on creating a competitive atmosphere for 
transnational capital. Taking neoliberalism as a specifically political ideology, it is a radical 
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reinterpretation of the liberal values that the US was founded on, used as a means to create 
consent in the American public. 
Neoliberalism is, as the name implies, an offshoot and reworking of classical 
liberalism. However, “neoliberalism could scarcely be understood as a as the recovery of a 
lost tradition of liberal, political thought. It should… instead be seen as an ideology 
different from, and often opposed to, what is more commonly described as ‘liberalism,’” for 
in a common understanding, liberalism refers to the general ideas of the promotion of 
democracy and freedom (Thorsen and Lie 2000:3). In short, a harkening back to the liberal 
answers to feudal society and the creation of liberal democracies, rather than furthering 
truly substantive democracy, has actually created a governing system that favors 
oligopolistic corporations and transnational capitalists, not US society.  
Classical liberalism can be traced back to the writings and work of the seventeenth 
century philosopher and political economist John Locke, among others (Locke [1689]1993; 
[1690] 1979; 1997; Locke and Sigmund 2005). One of the most salient pieces of Locke’s 
philosophy is his view on the privatization of land, for on the surface it answers feudalism 
with the liberation of individuals and gives them the ability to exercise more dominion over 
their own lives. In contrast though, we see that these views on private property now allow 
for the monopolization of the ownership of the means of production and, when applied 
under this monopolization of capital ownership, actually lead to less substantive liberty for 
individuals.  According to McCarthy and Prudhon, “For Locke, property relations over land, 
and specifically individual, private property rights guaranteed by the state, constituted the 
foundation of a just and efficient social order… that would replace authoritarian 
ecclesiastical and feudal regimes” (2004:277). These property relations, supported by the 
state apparatus, form a fundamental part of both classical liberalism and neoliberalism. 
Private property, which seems like a “common sense” idea today, has not been universally 
accepted throughout all time, and is therefore historically specific and not necessarily 
natural (Polanyi 2001).  
The liberal ideas of private property actively put land under the rubric of the market, 
and through doing so, (re)created social and economic relations as market based relations. 
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McCarthy and Prudhon (2004) state Locke’s views on nature and private property 
succinctly: 
Locke provides crucial ideological and discursive foundations for liberal 
and modernist dispositions toward non-human nature by (i) conferring value 
on nature only through the application of human labor, and conversely, by 
denigrating „„unimproved‟‟ nature as value-less; (ii) constructing a moral 
economy of liberal society based on exclusive control of land by those 
individuals who work it, including enlistment of the state to protect 
individual land rights; and then, (iii) arguing for the unlimited individual 
accumulation of land and property, including beyond that which individuals 
could work themselves. (P. 277) 
Locke attempted to pull the people out from underneath the feudal system, but his 
ideas had glaring consequences for the structure of society, especially when reinterpreted 
and applied under the epochs of monopoly finance capitalism and neoliberal globalization. 
So, in opposition to most current orthodox political economic beliefs, rather than 
abolishing all classes for freedom and democracy, these Lockean ideas created a new class 
structure based on land ownership, setting up the “state as (the) servant of landed 
property owners” (McCarthy and Prudhon 2004:277). While capitalism may be an advance 
on feudalism, it is not necessarily the most beneficial set of social relations for the world.  
Though the two are certainly intertwined, for our present purposes, it is best to make 
a distinction between liberalism in a political sense and economic liberalism, for liberalism 
in a general sense usually refers to a political ideology based on the ideas of freedom or 
liberty for the individual and a reliance on democratic institutions. In other words, 
liberalism in the general sense refers to the philosophical underpinnings of the modern 
state revolutions of France and the US in the late 18th century, specifically in opposition to 
feudal social relations. Neoliberalism has relied upon such revolutionary answers to 
feudalism as core values, but also reinterpreted and turned those answers against other 
forms of accumulation such as communism, socialism, and the welfare state. On the other 
hand, economic liberalism refers to “the belief that states ought to abstain from intervening 
in the economy, and instead leave as much as possible up to individuals participating in 
free and self-regulating markets” (Thorsen and Lie 2007:2). While the two are inextricably 
connected as shown in Locke’s views above, it is helpful to understand neoliberalism in 
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practice as an outgrowth of the more economically oriented aspects of liberalism, though 
these practices are legitimated through reliance on core revolutionary American political 
values, making them quite strong in the collective political consciousness of the US.  
Consent for neoliberal policy changes was also garnered through political rhetoric. 
Margaret Thatcher’s dictum that “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) is a prime example. 
Freedom is an integral part of any democratic society, for the freedom to vote one’s wishes 
without coercion is what makes up the basis of democracy. Appeals to freedom in the US 
have always run rampant, but under neoliberalism a certain form of freedom must be 
actualized: individual freedom. Under this kind of freedom, one’s decision making and 
actions are considered to be completely distinct and cut off from others.14 On the surface 
this seems quite liberating, at least to a certain degree. Freedom of speech, freedom of 
expression, and freedom to move are all decent freedoms. However, this type of freedom 
also brings with it the freedom to fail, regardless of one’s circumstances. It could also 
include the freedom to abuse the environment. Another kind of freedom could be possible: 
structural freedom. Structural freedoms would include the freedom to access housing, 
health care, unemployment insurance, and the freedom to retire at a certain age regardless 
of status and power. This collective freedom, though, is not the kind of freedom that 
American politicians are talking about. The individual freedom espoused by the neoliberal 
ideology is aimed directly at the state, and more specifically, at the Keynesian welfare state 
that had evolved in the US. When individual freedom is mixed with the economic ideologies 
of people like Hayek and Mises, we are led to believe that collective freedoms accorded by 
the state would lead to nothing but inefficiency in the economy and a worse world for all. 
The omnipresent Cold War ideology and the US’s routing out of communism played a hefty 
role in the creation of the ideology of individual freedom. By cloaking their business 
interests in old American ideas, the capitalist class in America forged a new common sense 
based in a form of libertarianism. We can see from the Tea Party movement today that this 
“common sense” ideology is still quite strong in the American public.15 
                                                 
14
 For examples of the ideology of individualism in the US, see Rand 1963; 1964; Rand et.al. 1986. 
15
 The works of Ayn Rand cited above are oft-cited texts in this movement. 
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The harkening back to liberal values that the US was founded upon and utilization of 
those values to promote further marketization of US society is a stark example of what 
Horkheimer and Adorno ([1947] 2007) refer to as the dialectic of enlightenment. In short, 
the dialectic of enlightenment refers to the mis- or over-application of enlightenment 
values to modern life. As Horkheimer and Adorno (2007) state, “Myth is already 
enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (p. xviii). Neoliberalism and its 
discourses tend to apply concepts of market rationality and reactions to feudalism – ideas 
from the 17th and 18th century – to life in the late 20th and early 21st century. Thus, in the 
current age “enlightenment reverts to mythology;” it reverts to a mythology that reifies the 
market and ideas of freedom by positing a hyper-rationalized, outdated “commonsense” 
understanding of social life that serves to promote the interests of capital over people. One 
would have to be hard-pressed to find a better example of Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
dialectic of Enlightenment than neoliberals’ recourse to centuries-old revolutionary ideals. 
To further show direct political attempts to create consent on a grand level, Harvey 
(2007a) quotes a confidential memo from Lewis Powell to the US Chamber of Commerce: 
Powell… argued that criticism of and opposition to the US free enterprise 
system had gone too far and that “the time had come – indeed it is long 
overdue – for the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American business to 
be marshaled against those who would destroy it.” Powell argued that 
individual action was insufficient. “Strength,” he wrote, “lies in 
organization, in careful long-range planning and implementation, in 
consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of 
financing available only through joint effort, and in the political power 
available only through joint effort, and in the political power available only 
through united action and national organizations.” The National Chamber of 
Commerce, he argued, should lead an assault on the major institutions – 
universities, schools, the media, publishing, the courts – in order to change 
how individuals think “about the corporation, the law, culture, and the 
individual.” US businesses did not lack resources for such an effort, 
particularly when pooled…. The American Chamber of Commerce 
subsequently expanded its base from around 60,000 firms in 1972 to over a 
quarter of a million ten years later…. The Business Roundtable, an 
organization of CEOs “committed to the aggressive pursuit of political 
power for the corporation,” was founded in 1972 and thereafter became the 
centerpiece of collective pro-business action. The corporations involved 
accounted for “about one half of the GNP of the United States” during the 
1970s, and they spent close to $900,000,000 annually (a huge amount at 
that time) on political matters. (P. 43-44) 
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Some further cultural issues were also at play in the creation of consent for neoliberal 
policy. The power of unions and the comfort of the welfare state may have made labor in 
the US feel somewhat safe during the 1970s and contributed to a lacking perceived need for 
unions (Palley 2007). Moreover, liberal use of the Taft-Hartley act contributed to a fall in 
union power and the bargaining rights of employees (Crow and Albo 2005). The fostering 
of a consumer culture in the US also created the identity of individuals through style. In the 
context of falling wages this consumer culture was financed by debt.  
So far, we have seen that neoliberalism is a hegemonic political ideology, especially 
within the US. To make this argument, we must recall Arrighi’s distinction between 
hegemony and dominance: hegemony rests on consent, while dominance rests on coercion. 
It would be quite difficult to coerce US society to deal with the repercussions of neoliberal 
policy practices, for that would require a great amount of resources. Instead, the US 
capitalist class has pushed Americans to consent to such changes through a radical 
reinterpretation of core revolutionary American values, thus making neoliberalism a 
hegemonic ideology in the political realm (Harvey 2007a). 
Neoliberal globalization is the new form of accumulation promoted under the aegis of 
waning US world hegemony. Under such waning hegemony, in order to keep up the rate of 
profit US capital requires recourse to higher liquidity, for more advantage in the production 
of material commodities is now found outside the US economy. To realize these profits 
requires a shift away from focusing on the US economy itself toward a focus on profit from 
investment elsewhere and the ensuing loss of jobs in the US. As such, US capital has relied 
heavily on legitimation of policies through the political ideology of neoliberalism.  
The hegemony of neoliberalism as a political ideology creates general consent from 
the masses, but political consent is not the only strand of discourse that legitimates changes 
to the US social system. US capital has also relied upon ideological legitimation from the 
arena of more purely economic theory.16 A substantial reason for the strength of the 
neoliberal ideology in the US and abroad is its ability to use a mixture of both political and 
academic ideology to support its claims; this mixture creates a very strong discourse in 
which political ideology is justified by “science,” as well as by political beliefs. Recourse to 
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positivist academic theory fuels globalization and financialization, which are beneficial to 
US capital, since economic theory is normally viewed as both natural and objective 
(Albritton 2007), allowing for its export to other countries and keeping US world 
hegemony “legitimate” even in its waning stages. 
Accordingly, the next section deals with the shift from Keynesianism – an economic 
ideology rooted in modern liberal ideals that held great power over the US in the wake of 
the Great Depression and World War II – to neoliberalism as a decidedly economic theory 
based on reinterpretations of classical and neoclassical economics.  
From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism 
 “There is a dramatic contrast between the last 20 years of the twentieth century and 
the previous decades since the Second World War,” according to Duménil and Levy 
(2005:9). They are referring here to the shift from Keynesianism or embedded liberalism to 
the neoliberalism that has characterized US (and global) political economy since the late 
1970s. Although the exact beginnings and transitions of dominant political-economic 
ideologies are difficult to pinpoint, research shows that the periods of 1945 to the late 70s 
and from the late 70s to the beginning of the 21st century are worthy delimiters for the 
temporal distinction between Keynesianism and neoliberalism (Palley 2005; Harvey 
2007a; 2007b; Duménil and Levy 2005). According to Palley, “For the 25 years after World 
War II (1945-1970), Keynesianism constituted the dominant paradigm for understanding 
the determination of economic activity” (2005:21).  
To put Keynesianism in a nutshell, it is an economic paradigm stating that “the level of 
economic activity is governed by demand” and that “capitalist economies are subject to 
periodic weakness in the aggregate demand generation process, resulting in 
unemployment” (Palley 2005:21).  Keynesianism came out of a structural crisis of capital 
accumulation: the Great Depression. Crises of that sort are periodic happenings in 
capitalism; the Great Depression is surprisingly similar to the financial crisis that now faces 
the world.  
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Though Keynesians are certainly still capitalist, they acknowledge and attempt to 
ameliorate some of the barbarities of capitalist accumulation.17 Keynesians tend to believe 
that the government can step in to use fiscal and monetary policy to reinvigorate the 
economy and lower the unemployment rate. Essentially, this means that in times of 
recession or depression, the government should spend money to create more jobs, much 
like during the New Deal era. Similar to monetarist arguments, Keynesians say that the 
government should also utilize federal banking policy to manipulate the money supply and 
lower interest rates, which creates more liquidity in the market (Palley 2005).  
When states promoted their economies by readying for World War II they proved 
some of Keynes’s ideas unequivocally, because “the Second World War rescued 
international capitalism from the Great Slump of the 1930s” and “restored production 
levels, employment, productivity, and profitability in the US, the heartland of the 
international capitalist economy” (Lapavitsas 2005:31). This restoration ushered in what is 
commonly called “the golden age of capitalism.” Along with this great restoration came the 
US’s shift toward Keynesian economics, since Keynesian ideas were given much credit for 
the increases in productive capacity. Furthermore, the capacity of wartime spending to pull 
the US out of the Great Depression gave credence to Keynes’s ideas, as did the creation of a 
highly consumerist society and new forms of increased debt for individuals. Though things 
were far from perfect, many US workers in the 50s and 60s “could expect stable 
employment and rising real wages” (Lapavitsas 2005:31). This stability is commonly 
referred to as the “capital-labor accord.” 
Keynes shunned the economic orthodoxies of the past, including Adam Smith’s 
classical economics and the neoclassical economics of Alfred Marshall. Specifically, Keynes 
attacked three main tenets of the economic orthodoxies of the time: Say’s Law, The 
Quantity Theory of Money, and the anti-psychological rational choice theory of economic 
action (Lapavitsas 2005).  
Say’s Law states that supply and demand will reach equilibrium in the long run and 
thus, that long term capitalist crises will not exist. In the wake of the Great Depression this 
“law” had been proven empirically to be false. Contrasting the orthodoxy, “Keynes argued 
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that aggregate demand systematically falls short of aggregate supply” and that this 
“systemic deficiency of aggregate demand means that free markets fail to clear, thus 
producing mass unemployment” (Lapavitsas 2005:32). One can easily see the parallels 
between then and now. 
The next rejection on Keynes’s agenda was the Quantity Theory of Money, which 
states that “the level of prices is ultimately determined by the quantity of money” 
(Lapavitsas 2005:32). Under this theory, inflation occurs through increases in the money 
supply. However from a Keynesian perspective, during times of recession capitalists may 
choose to hold on to money made from the sale of commodities rather than spending it on 
more commodities, for money is more liquid than commodities. This hoarding of money 
reduces aggregate demand in the economy and furthers stagnation due to lacking demand 
for more commodities and more workers. Although part of the argument in this chapter is 
that Keynesianism has been superseded by neoliberalism, we will see later that Keynesian-
leaning policies are still occasionally implemented, but in bastardized ways that do little to 
create demand. For example, the government bailouts provided after the onset of the 
financial crisis were somewhat Keynesian in that their goal was to use public, government 
funds to alleviate rising unemployment and stem the liquidity crisis. However, the funds 
were distributed with no strings attached and, rather than benefitting people in general, 
they arguably benefitted only financial capitalists, and led to a public reaction against such 
government intervention, further reinforcing a more neoliberal economic agenda. This 
reinforcement is exemplified by the influx of tea party candidates into the government, the 
shift of many Republicans to the far right, and the recent inability of the US government to 
agree on raising the debt ceiling. 
Finally, Keynes rejected the classical idea that economic actors always make purely 
rational choices. He posited that in economic action there are always choices being made 
with regard to future expectations; these expectations have a necessarily psychological 
component to them that may not be fully rational (Lapavitsas 2005). For example, in times 
of recession or crisis capitalists may hoard money due to their expectations, as opposed to 
following the rationality of economic theories by putting it back into the economy. In 
theory, putting that money back into the economy would raise aggregate demand and pull 
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the economy out of recession. Yet again, one can see these issues coming to the fore in the 
government bailouts given to banks and financial capitalists in the wake of the financial 
crisis: instead of using the bailout money to lend, many banks simply sat on their newfound 
reserves and the economy stagnated. 
Keynes’s assertion that aggregate demand may not equal aggregate supply accorded a 
course of action for the state: the government could legitimately intervene in the economy 
in times of recession or crisis, strengthening aggregate demand by “boost(ing) public 
expenditure, cut(ting) taxes, and lower(ing) government interest rates, with a view toward 
strengthening aggregate demand and lowering unemployment” (Lapavitsas 2005:32). 
Keynesian tactics were implemented through state welfare policies affecting 
unemployment benefits, housing, education, and healthcare. These reforms are often 
referred to as “The Keynesian Compromise.” Furthermore, the dualistic climate of the 
postwar years, exemplified by the Cold War and the fear of communism spreading across 
the world, pushed US capital to make things better for the proletariat, at least in the short 
run, helping to fuel the Keynesian compromise. 
The Keynesian policy initiatives of the postwar years alleviated some of the crises 
endemic to capitalism, but this band-aid would not last through the structural crises of 
accumulation in the 70s. On a theoretical level, the divide between Post-Keynesian 
economists and Neo-Keynesian economists who watered down the more radical aspects of 
Keynes’s theories, precluded the demise of Keynesianism (also called embedded 
liberalism) and the rise of neoliberalism, as did the rise of the Monetarist theories of the 
Chicago School of Economics (Harvey 2007a; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). Therefore, we 
will now move our focus toward understanding the theoretical divides in economics that 
paved the way for the rise of neoliberalism.   
Post-Keynesians posit that income distribution depends on institutional factors such 
as minimum wage, trade union power, and others, as well as the supply and demand of 
labor (Palley 2005). Neo-Keynesians, on the other hand, fall more toward the neoliberal, 
Chicago school idea that laborers, as well as capitalists, are “paid what they are worth” 
(Palley 2005:20-1). Another neo-Keynesian view espoused by many American economists 
“stated that economic rigidities were responsible for unemployment and that these 
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rigidities included such factors as trade unions and minimum wage laws” (Palley 2005:22). 
This distaste for such “rigidities” can be seen as a forerunner to the neoliberal policies of 
the late 1970s on. To elaborate, under the naturalistic economic view of the market as the 
fundamental determinant of supply and demand, it is not a very difficult case to make that 
labor unions and minimum wages are market distortions leading only to inefficiency. These 
intellectual divides, among others, opened a way to change the objectives of state policy 
regarding unemployment. Under a purist sort of Keynesianism, the goal of government 
policy is to attain full employment in the face of wage and price rigidity. In the newer 
monetarist style of economics, this goal was shifted to attaining a “natural rate of 
unemployment.” This shift in philosophy serves two purposes according to Palley (2005):  
First, it has provided political cover for higher average rates of 
unemployment, which have undermined the bargaining position of workers. 
Second, it has offered a rationale for keeping real interest rates at a higher 
level, benefiting wealthy individuals and the financial sector. (P. 24) 
Thus, we can see how such changes in mainstream economic theory have both 
philosophical and political dimensions that justify practical changes to the economy that 
benefit specific groups of people. 
In contrast to Keynesianism, neoliberalism holds that supply and demand within a 
“free” market will best determine aggregate employment distribution. This is due to the 
purported fact that the market will not allow productive capital, including labor, to lay 
dormant. Furthermore, income distribution should be determined by the market and those 
with labor and capital to use will “get paid what they are worth” (Palley 2005:20-1). The 
Chicago School of economics, whose main founders include Milton Friedman, among 
others, states that the use of fiscal and monetary policy will merely lead to inflation. To 
buttress the argument that neoliberal economic theory is hegemonic in the US and abroad, 
we should note that numerous founders of the Chicago school have been awarded Nobel 
prizes in economics. 
In the wake of these Keynesian theoretical divides, the monetarist economics of 
Milton Friedman and the Chicago School, which were based heavily on the work of 
Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, came to the fore and signaled a drastic shift 
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toward neoliberalism proper. These theories were proposed as reactions to the crises and 
contradictions that the US system dealt with in the 1970s.  
Friedman’s economic theory was based substantially on a resurrected version of the 
Quantity Theory of Money. Inflation was a huge problem in the 1970s and Friedman argued 
that inflation was “a purely monetary phenomenon resulting from too much money chasing 
too few goods” (Lapavitsas 2005:34). Rather than shooting for full employment as 
Keynesian theory would suggest, Friedman posited a natural rate of unemployment that 
would simply have to be dealt with, otherwise inflation would set in. Since the government 
would only create inefficiency through welfare programs under this theory, it stands to be 
understood what should be done with the naturally unemployed in our society. 
The idea of too much money chasing too few goods meant that states had to keep the 
money supply low to curb inflation. While no empirical relationship between money supply 
and inflation was ever found, unemployment rose and a deep recession hit (Lapavitsas 
2005). The recession curbed consumption and investment, which managed to slow 
inflation. After these monetarist failings, Robert Lucas’s “new classical economics” 
resurrected Say’s Law and the idea that markets will clear to equilibrium, unless the 
government intervenes. This resurrection had great implications for government policy: a 
fully self-equilibrating economy leaves no room for the state or its regulations. However, 
the state still had to resort to macroeconomic intervention over the years, for economic 
crises could not go uncontained. The fundamental feature to grasp is that these new 
theories killed the Keynesian notion that “economic intervention should aim at achieving 
full employment and social welfare” (Lapavitsas 2005:35). This thorough ideological shift, 
buttressed by economic theory, was utilized to create consent in the US and wage a class 
war between capitalists and workers (Harvey 2007a; 2007b).   
That the creation and implementation of these theories came about during the crises 
of the 1970s and the signals of waning US world hegemony is no coincidence. The goal of 
keeping a strong dollar in the aftermath of the collapse of Bretton Woods and the shift 
toward floating exchange rates at the same time that US capital required more liquidity for 
higher profits is also not coincidental. Nor is the focus on keeping interest rates high and 
inflation low – both of these policy imperatives make finance more profitable. Instead, 
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these changes thoroughly support the contention that the US government, economic 
theorists, and capital supported the shift toward neoliberal globalization through the 
export and discursive naturalization of specific economic ideologies that were beneficial to 
its changing the overarching forms of accumulation from material free worldism to 
financial neoliberal globalization. 
The shift from Keynesianism to monetarism and neoliberalism came in the decade of 
the 1970s due to a mixture of theoretical shifts in macroeconomics and the election of 
neoliberal politicians to places of great power. The breaking point of the Keynesian 
paradigm came in the wake of the aforementioned divide between post-Keynesians and 
neo-Keynesians, the oil shocks of the 1970s along with the resulting inflation, and a signal 
crisis of US world hegemony: US failure to win the Vietnam War. Numerous cultural factors 
also fostered the decline of Keynesianism in the US, though they are mostly outside the 
scope of this work. 
Neoliberalism is a hegemonic ideology in the US and abroad. That strong statement, of 
course, requires much support. Neoliberalism has been integrated into the American 
consciousness as an objective reality through myopic political discourse, media creation 
oriented toward consumption and a narrow view of reality, and buttressed by the academic 
world. The American two-party system leaves very little room for movement from under 
this ideology. Though the Democratic Party tends more toward a social welfare state, 
neither Democrats nor Republicans stray very far from the policy prescriptions of 
neoliberal theory. The concentration of the ownership of the means of media production 
into the few hands of the bourgeoisie has been instrumental in narrowing the public 
discourse only to ideas that fall under the umbrella of “free” markets (Ott and Mack 2009). 
It seems no coincidence that the political face and primary pusher of neoliberal ideology in 
the 1980s was Ronald Reagan, a retired movie star.  
Neoliberal theory/ideology has been set forth as a pure, objective science, proven by 
the many calculations of the economists and supported by numerous academic schools of 
thought and capitalist think tanks, such as the Mont Pelerin Society (which included such 
names as Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman), the Heritage 
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Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the Center for the study of American Business, the 
American Enterprise Institute, and the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
The neoliberal ideology is hegemonic, not only in the US, but abroad as well. Margaret 
Thatcher, the Prime Minister of Britain during the 80s, was an avid promoter of neoliberal 
policy (Harvey 2007a; Chorev 2010). The “Washington Consensus” of the 1990s and its 
great influence over world happenings is another instance of the hegemony of the 
neoliberal ideology. Yet, even with consistent empirical evidence for the shortcomings of 
neoliberal policy, many still support its infallibility (Harvey 2007a).  
In addition, the same neoliberal logic has been applied to the international economy: 
more “freedom” in global markets means more economic freedom for everyone in the 
world. But, in contradiction to the promise of a universal reduction of inequalities through 
participation in unregulated global markets, the outcomes for specific states and peoples, 
aside from those at the top, were arguably negative but varied from place to place (Harvey 
2007a; Li 2008).  
Furthermore, the universalizing discourses of positivist methods used by neoliberal 
economists in the US taken along with its general world hegemony, which includes as a 
subset the hegemony of its universities and academics, have led to the worldwide 
hegemony of the neoliberal ideology.  
The social sciences have for many years based their methods on the natural sciences, 
which has led to the (mis)use of positivist methods in disciplines such as economics 
(Steinmetz 2005).  As argued in the appendix, there are many differences between levels of 
natural and social reality and natural science methods should not be fully applied to social 
reality, because while social reality emerges from natural reality, it is not fully dictated by 
it. Social occurrences do not follow ironclad, objective laws, even though many orthodox 
economists treat economic reality in that way. The positivist methods of orthodox 
economists have been chronicled by many critical researchers (Benton and Craib [2001] 
2010; Albritton 2007; 2009; Ollman 2003; Steinmetz 2005; Mirowski 2005; Mitchell 2005; 
Harvey 2007a; 2007b; 2010; Somers 2005; Lawson 2005; Breslau 2005). We can see the 
use of some positivist methods by prominent neoliberal economists chronicled in the last 
few pages.  
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Positivism and its proponents’ adherence to a strong form of empiricism lead to a 
seeming universalization of economic laws. A strong form of empiricism assumes a fully 
objective world that can be understood through experience and the observance of 
consistencies which become natural laws; strong empiricism attempts to apply these 
natural laws to reality in an objective and universal manner (Benton and Craib 2010). 
Empiricism also states that values of the observer must be completely removed for the 
knowledge to be considered scientific, another proven fallacy (See Gerth 2007; Weber 
[1925] 1978; [1905] 2002; 2003). Adherence to positivist methods and epistemology also 
leads to intense reductionism (Schumpeter 1962) and a hard distinction between 
disciplines (Benton and Craib 2010; Steinmetz 2005). The distinction between disciplines 
and the myopic use of statistical methods are other historical factors that contribute to the 
hegemony of positivism and the hard distinctions between disciplines in the US (Gieryn 
1983; Camic and Xie 1994). Economics is both positivistic and empiricist and therefore 
attempts to apply natural laws to social and economic reality, justifying its universal 
applicability.  
Due to historical circumstances such as the use of positivism in the social sciences, 
positivism’s reliance on strong empiricism, and the universalizing nature of empiricist 
assumptions, economics has become a sort of universalizing social science discipline – it 
attempts to place all economic occurrences on a universal plane, defined by professional 
economists. When these factors are mixed with the world hegemony of the US and the 
hegemony of the neoliberal economic ideology within the US, neoliberal ideology tends 
toward hegemony. We are referring here to the more economically oriented aspect of the 
neoliberal ideology, but there are also political-ideological and practical aspects that have 
helped neoliberalism as a whole become world hegemonic. The hegemony of the neoliberal 
political-economic ideology worldwide is buttressed in practice by US-run IFIs like the 
World Bank and the IMF and transnational corporations acting in and creating a worldwide 
“free” market system (Arrighi 2010; Harvey 2007a; 2007b; 2010; Robinson 2004).  
When globalization, financialization, and the neoliberal ideology move together the 
expansion of neoliberal ideas and the “natural” creation of “free” markets across the world 
comes to the fore. Transportation and communication costs have been lowered and social 
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space-time has been compressed by new technological innovations like the airplane and 
the internet, furthering the capacities of the transnationalist capitalist class to move capital 
around the globe with never before seen efficiency. Colás (2005:73) puts it well: 
“Globalization is… seen by most neoliberals as a natural outcome of an untrammeled 
capitalist market; as a positive process which unfolds smoothly once artificial distortions 
created by the state, political interests or archaic customs are removed from the path of 
free and equal exchange.” Once again, we can see an ideology stating that markets are 
natural structures of the world and that agents acting rationally and self-interestedly 
within them for profit will “make all boats rise.”  
Critical globalization theorists tend to take a Marxist, Polanyian, or Gramscian view of 
globalization (Arrighi 2010; Colás 2005; Harvey 2007a). This critical view points to the 
political necessity of states to create markets and the conditions for them, as well as the 
hegemonic nature of market creation (Gramsci and Arrighi), the unnatural aspects of 
markets (Polanyi), and the recreation of social relations that go hand in hand with changing 
economic structures (Marx). The uneven geographical nature of this phenomenon becomes 
quite apparent when looking at how different states have dealt with neoliberalism (Colás 
2005; Harvey 2007a; Li 2008). The use of US led IFIs like the World Bank and the World 
Trade organization to loan money to peripheral nations and change their economic policies 
also pushed globalization, financialization, and neoliberal ideology throughout the world 
(Colás 2005). The collapse of non-capitalist economies such as the Soviet bloc in 1989 
seemed to fortify the idea that capitalism is the best and only road, prompting Fukuyama to 
proclaim the “end of history” and the final success of capitalism (Fukuyama [1992] 2006).  
In summation, the globalization of production necessitates more flexible forms of 
capital and labor, the financialization of the global economy gives the means by which 
capital can become more liquid, and the hegemony of neoliberalism gives the political and 
theoretical justifications necessary for changes to the relationship between the state, the 
economy, and labor, as well as the policy practices that go along with such changes. These 
transformations happened initially in the US, the most advanced capitalist country, and, 
through its world hegemony and other historical circumstances such as capitalism 
approaching its extensive growth limits, such transformations changed the entire world. 
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Now that we see how neoliberalism as an ideology and practice has occurred 
alongside and legitimized or reinforced globalization and financialization tendencies in the 
economy, it is time to move on to the more specific policy changes that took place over the 
20th and 21st centuries in the US that led into the financial crisis. A study of the evolution of 
the US banking system since the Great Depression and the role of derivatives in the 
financial crisis and the global financial economy will make up the next chapter. With these 
new turns and layers we will flesh out the long-term historical factors that led to the crisis 
and begin to theorize the deeper transformations that such a watershed moment will bring 
upon the world system. 
 
 
69 
The Financial Crisis 
It seems now that federal policies mitigated the crisis for the time being. Most 
analysts now refer to it as a recession rather than a depression. But, seemingly benign 
attempts to stall crises tend to cover up surface problems while leaving the deeper causes 
intact. Though the crisis has been stalled for the moment, unemployment is still high, global 
production levels have not fully recovered, and many governments spent a great deal of 
money to avoid catastrophe (Davies 2010; FCIC 2011; Callinicos 2010). Some of these 
countries now face the possibility of sovereign debt crises – even the juggernaut that is the 
US. The crisis will have lasting effects on the global economy and deserves a deeper look 
into its many causes. 
One of the biggest issues in understanding the financial crisis comes from attempts to 
lay primary blame on specific people or sectors when practically all sectors in the US and 
even many from abroad contributed to the crisis in some way. Virtually everyone has been 
integrated into the financialized accumulation processes and thus blame can be put almost 
anywhere. 
The US government can be blamed for its juridical role in creating the new financial 
architecture and the resulting perverse incentive structures, as well as for its role in the 
overall increase of government debt. Financial investors can be blamed for their 
participation in the “originate and distribute” and “slice and dice” models, for creating huge 
leverage ratios, and for creating banks that are “too big to fail.” The Federal Reserve can be 
blamed for its creation of a perceived low-risk environment and low interest rates in the 
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US. Recently industrialized countries like China can be blamed for creating a global savings 
glut that fostered the crisis by pushing down interest rates and pushing the US to act as a 
global sink for overaccumulation through debt-financing. Academics can be blamed for 
their lacking ability to predict and analyze what is happening in the macroeconomic 
system. And the US public can be blamed for their participation in the housing market and 
refinancing, as well as their use of credit cards and the like to increase personal debt. 
In contrast, I argue that while the crisis is certainly multicausal, the blame should be 
put squarely on the workings of capitalism itself. The reason why so many people helped to 
create the crisis is that they all must participate in capitalist accumulation in some way. 
Though governments can attempt to mitigate problems for a time, actions taken toward 
that mitigation merely deal with surface symptoms of the problems, not the deeper 
problems of accumulation themselves. These actions tend only to stave off the crises that 
are virtually inevitable under such a structure. It is not the financial crisis itself that is 
important. On the contrary, the deeper historical logics that led into the crisis hold primacy. 
In this chapter we delineate the numerous causes of the financial crisis and how they 
relate to broader transformations of the capitalist system. In his book The Financial Crisis: 
Who is to Blame? (2010), Howard Davies, the former director of the London School of 
Economics, identifies thirty-eight strands describing causes of the financial crisis. We will 
touch on the majority of these while adding a few of our own, breaking the analysis down 
into three major groups of causes: (1) changes to the US banking industry since the Great 
Depression, (2) structural and organizational changes from the last few decades that led 
the US to financialize its economy and utilize financial derivatives, and (3) more proximate 
tools and actions that led into the crisis.  
First, we will outline some of the juridical and structural changes that have occurred 
in the US banking system since the Great Depression that lead into the crisis, what Crotty 
(2009) calls the creation of the new financial architecture. These include the creation of the 
shadow banking industry and the dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act. The breakdown of 
these regulatory schemas blurs the lines between commercial and investment banks and 
allows them to take part in more risky, uninsured loans than they could under immediate 
post-depression law. 
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We will then move on to describe the more proximate tools and institutional practices 
that helped to create the crisis in the US through the lens of derivatives. These 
circumstances, tools, and practices helped to create the housing bubble and the ensuing 
liquidity crisis which are commonly seen as the real triggers of the crisis. Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and other investors “managed” risk with derivatives and used the originate 
and distribute and slice and dice models to create and distribute mortgages. These models 
and the incentive structures in the mortgage industry, along with other circumstances, led 
to the mispricing and spread of risk to sectors outside the mortgage industry and the 
failure of many banks. 
In addition to describing these causes, we will question the role of derivatives in the 
financial crisis itself and posit that their wider role in the global financial system amounts 
to more than what a short-term crisis-oriented view can provide. Following Bryan and 
Rafferty (2006), I theorize derivatives as more than just managers of risk or forms of 
speculative “fictitious” capital, for the increased use of derivatives points to subtle 
transformations in the global economy that may have effects that echo through the 21st 
century. 
The New Financial Architecture 
The new financial architecture (NFA) is the matrix of US law, banking practice, and 
political-economic ideology that underpins the financial crisis (Crotty 2009). The previous 
chapter showed how neoliberalism, globalization, and financialization reinforce each other 
to create vast changes in the structures and logics of the global economy. This chapter 
continues a similar investigation, but with a more domestic focus on how juridical, policy, 
and organizational changes transformed the banking and financial systems within the US, 
leading into the financial crisis through increased use of new financial instruments, the 
housing bubble, and mispriced risk in the global financial system.  
In the aftermath of the Great Depression the US government realized that regulation 
of its large financial institutions was necessary to avoid future catastrophes. Thus, it put 
into place a regulatory regime to limit the risks of financial institutions and curb 
speculative manias that could lead to great systemic risk (Crotty 2009). The 
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implementation of the Glass-Steagall Act was a fundamental piece of this new regulatory 
regime that has since been dismantled. The repeal of post-Great Depression-era laws 
created a shadow banking industry, allowing banks to participate in more risky endeavors 
than they could in the early part of the 20th century. 
The Glass-Steagall Act was put into place in 1933 as a reaction to bank runs and the 
ensuing collapse of numerous commercial banks in the US. It created the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure bank deposits, thoroughly mitigating future runs 
on banks. Glass-Steagall also separated banks according to the types of business they did; 
commercial banks, which generally deal with deposits and consumer or commercial loans, 
were no longer allowed to deal in capital market activities, for “the use of bank deposits to 
finance speculative capital market activity” helped to create many problems leading to the 
Great Depression such as bank runs (Crotty 2009:5). After the Great Depression, the 
insurance of deposits by the newly formed FDIC alleviated consumer fears of losing their 
money to the banks in the post-Great Depression era. Investment banks, on the other hand, 
were allowed to deal in capital markets, but only with regulations from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). By limiting commercial banks to consumer and commercial 
loans and forcing them to both originate and retain those loans, the Glass-Steagall Act gave 
incentives for commercial banks to limit their risks, since banks originating such loans 
would end up with the profits or losses attached to them. In the most recent financial crisis 
many loans were originated by one bank, then repackaged and sold off to other investors. 
This led the originators to worry less about the final repayment of the loans and focus more 
on the profits gained by originating them, increasing the risk of nonpayment.  
These regulations helped to usher in the “golden age” of capitalism by creating great 
stability in the financial sector of the US, though there were many unintended 
consequences that are manifest today. A particular unintended consequence of such 
regulation was the creation of the shadow banking system, an unregulated financial market 
that exists alongside the traditional banking system (Crotty 2009; FCIC 2011). 
In the search for greater profits in the face of rising interest rates and the price shocks 
of the 1970s, commercial banks found new avenues for higher returns on their investments 
in alternative markets that sidestepped the regulations of the Glass-Steagall Act (Crotty 
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2009; FCIC 2011). The creation of commercial paper and repo markets and their ascension 
in the 1960s fed into the shadow banking system. After the Great Depression, the Fed 
capped interest rates at 6 percent to discourage banks from taking great risks. While the 
market was stable and interest rates were not very high, this system worked well, for 
commercial banks could stay relatively profitable within those interest rate restrictions 
and compete with the less regulated investment banks. In contrast, when inflation and 
interest rates rose above 6 percent in the 1960s, commercial banks began to search for 
new, innovative ways of investing to make profit through lending. An alternative market to 
the more regulated traditional banking industry was created with assets like money market 
mutual funds as the commodities. Money market mutual funds were initially restricted to 
highly rated and highly liquid debt and could be used to limit losses from credit, market, 
and liquidity risks, but through the years capital requirements and restrictions on them 
were watered down immensely (FCIC 2011). Over the years this market grew and assets in 
such funds “jumped from $3 billion in 1977 to more than $740 billion in 1995 and $1.8 
trillion by 2000” (FCIC 2011:30). The commercial paper markets were not insured by the 
FDIC. Instead, they were backed by large corporations that were considered “good for the 
money” such as General Electric and IBM. Corporate backing of financial markets by large, 
normally materially productive companies is an example of the integration of new actors 
into the financial system. 
The repurchase agreement or “repo” market came to be a larger part of the industry 
in the 1960s as well. This was a market in which corporations bought treasury bonds at 
low interest rates, sold them to banks, and invested the money at higher returns in 
securities. Both markets made it easier for corporations to loan and borrow money at profit 
on a short-term basis. These new shadow markets made for an increase in new forms of 
financial asset holdings, but a loss in traditional bank assets that were federally insured 
and highly liquid (FCIC 2011). Since these new assets were not federally insured, the 
government did not feel the need to substantially regulate them – in a “free” market, failure 
was simply failure since contracts were seen as agreements between two consenting 
parties that, in theory, knew the risks involved. As more and more investors participated in 
these alternative markets risk rose, not only for individual investors, but for the financial 
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and economic system as a whole. With laws and regulations for traditional FDIC insured 
banks and a non-regulated market for Wall Street firm investment, one can see the interest 
for investors to participate in the latter, especially when looking for particularly high 
returns in the face of a stagnating productive economy. Figure 1 below shows that the 
amount of money in shadow banking has risen mostly in step with traditional banking 
since the 1980s. The makeup up of bank investments overall became less liquid due to new 
riskier investment opportunities under lax regulation (FCIC 2011). The shift from 
traditional investments to riskier, uninsured investments meant that banks could make 
higher profits in good times, but in times of panic, low liquidity, or a flight to quality these 
banks would be left with unsellable investments.   
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Figure 1: The Rise of the Shadow Banking System 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011; p. 32 
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After the Great Depression of the 1930s, the US legislated and regulated banks much 
more heavily to reduce risk in the system as a whole. With Americans and the rest of the 
world reeling from the economic catastrophe, it was obvious that greater measures had to 
be taken regarding regulation of the finance and the banking industry. Regulation Q let the 
Fed regulate interest rates on savings accounts, which helped to create the shadow banking 
system mentioned above, though this act was repealed in 1980 by the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (FCIC 2011).     
In 1987 the Fed began to dismantle the Glass-Steagall Act that regulated the workings 
of banks since the Great Depression, attempting to give traditional or commercial banks 
back some of the competitive advantage that had been lost to the shadow system. The 
separation between commercial and investment banks that was the cornerstone of Glass-
Steagall was incrementally removed by both the creation of new financial instruments that 
sidestepped such regulation and by deregulatory policies. According to the FCIC, “(the) new 
rules permitted nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies to engage in ‘bank-
ineligible’ activities, including selling or holding certain kinds of securities that were not 
permissible for national banks to invest in or underwrite” (2011:35). Even after a number 
of commercial bank and thrift failures in the 1980s and 1990s and the ensuing $160 billion 
in government cleanup costs – commonly known as the savings and loan crisis – 
deregulation continued. After shadow markets and deregulation continued for years, Paul 
Volcker told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), “There was no regulation…. It 
was kind of a free ride” (FCIC 2011:33). 
In 1991 congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) which gave the FDIC more ability to regulate banks’ capital requirements and also 
attempted to limit the “too big to fail” principle, which allowed for the use of taxpayer funds 
to bail out failing banks. But, two gargantuan loopholes were left: if the treasury and the 
Fed “determined that the failure of an institution posed a ‘systemic risk’ to markets,” the 
FDIC would not be forced to curb the use of taxpayer funds to fix the problem (FCIC 
2011:37). Also, “Wall Street firms successfully lobbied for an amendment to FDICIA to 
authorize the Fed to act as lender of last resort to investment banks by extending loans 
collateralized by the investment banks’ securities” (FCIC 2011:37). Thus, even though the 
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state is very limited in its economic interventions under the new orthodoxy of economic 
theories, it is still given the task of stepping in as the lender of last resort when systemic 
risks become apparent. So under this logic, the state can step in, not to limit systemic risk 
throughout the process, but only when those systemic risks become so problematic that the 
entire financial system is in jeopardy. This role for the state is one of the few that neoliberal 
economic theory allows for and, after seeing the results of the most recent financial crisis, it 
becomes obvious that such an obligation has dire consequences for US taxpayers. It almost 
seems as though many financial capitalists realized that the state would step in to help out 
in a time of systemic crisis, regardless of the risky actions that such investors might have 
taken, since many of the banks involved posed systemic risk to the economy as a whole due 
to their great size.  
The removal of barriers between commercial and investment banks helped to further 
merge banks into larger and larger entities. “Because we had knocked so many holes in the 
walls separating commercial and investment banking and insurance, we were able to 
aggressively enter their businesses....” stated Edward Yingling, CEO of the lobbying 
organization The American Bankers Association (FCIC 2011:54). Through larger, more 
diverse, and more efficient banks, some economists argued, banks could alleviate risks, 
gain from economies of scale, and would be better able to serve the economy as a whole. 
Thus,  
Between 1990 and 2005, 74 „megamergers‟ occurred involving banks with 
assets of more than $10 billion each. Meanwhile the 10 largest jumped from 
owning 25% of the industry‟s assets to 55%. From 1998 to 2007, the 
combined assets of the five largest U.S. banks – Bank of America, 
Citigroup, JP Morgan, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo – more than tripled, 
from $2.2 trillion to $6.8 trillion.... The assets of the five largest investment 
banks – Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehmann 
Brothers, and Bear Stearns – quadrupled, from $1 trillion in 1998 to $4 
trillion in 2007. (FCIC 2011:52-3)  
The mixture of bank mergers, deregulation, and the loopholes of FDICIA would prove 
to be catastrophic, for they helped to create great systemic risk in both the US and global 
economies. As we will see shortly, many banks benefitted greatly from these changes, for 
the loopholes in FDICIA were exercised to award taxpayer money in the bailouts after the 
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crisis, in effect socializing the costs of the crisis while allowing the profits to stay with the 
investors who made poor decisions. 
Many regulators and legislators also approved of the deregulation of financial 
markets because they assumed that financial institutions had strong incentives to protect 
shareholders and regulate themselves. They also assumed that the financial market would 
further discipline them through “analysts, credit rating agencies, and investors” (FCIC 
2011:35). The FCIC report quotes two big players in the game: “... Fed Vice Chairman Roger 
Ferguson praised ‘the truly impressive improvement in methods of risk measurement and 
management and the growing adoption of these technologies by mostly large banks and 
other financial intermediaries,’” while Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan noted that  
It is critically important to recognize that no market is ever truly 
unregulated.... The self-interest of market participants generates private 
market regulation. Thus, the real question is not whether a market should be 
regulated. Rather, the real question is whether government intervention 
strengthens or weakens private regulation. (FCIC 2011:53-4) 
The words uttered by these two Fed heavyweights exemplify some of the failures of 
economic theory that led to the crisis. First, the adoption of new financial technologies and 
risk management did not limit risks as many thought they would; many economists and 
investors assumed that such technologies and theories would hold true even in times of 
market panic and low liquidity. History now shows they have not. Secondly, perverse 
incentive structures throughout financial commodity chains, among many other issues, 
soon proved Greenspan’s steadfast reliance on the self-regulation of the market – an 
obviously neoliberal ideology – to be false. These perverse incentive structures will be 
elaborated soon. Additionally, lobbying for changes in financial regulation practically 
became an industry in itself: “From 1999 through 2008, federal lobbying by the financial 
sector reached $2.7 billion; campaign donations from individuals and PACs topped $1 
billion” (FCIC 2011:55). Through immense lobbying efforts and further integration of 
capital into politics, laws changed in the interest of financial capital, not in the interest of 
US society.  
The dismantling of Glass-Steagall and the creation of the shadow banking industry 
allowed banks and investors to do whatever they thought would get them the most profit, 
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even if they were walking the same lines as those who created the Great Depression. As 
banks merged into entities too big to fail and financiers continued to invest in uninsured, 
unregulated assets, individual risk changed into systemic risk and the financial sector in the 
US became unstable.  
Derivatives and speculative bubbles are commonly noted to be fundamental pieces of 
the financial crisis puzzle. But, rather than merely viewing derivatives as simple risk 
management tools or as examples of the creation of fictitious or speculative capital that led 
to the crisis, we should also look at derivatives as a transformation of capital itself that 
could have far-reaching consequences for the future workings of the global capitalist 
system.  
Derivatives in the Financial Crisis 
There can be no doubt that derivatives make up one of the most fundamental causes 
of the financial crisis. Yet viewing derivatives only as a form of speculative capital or as a 
novel way of hedging risk in the grand casino of 21st century capitalism leaves them 
woefully under-theorized, for they perform numerous functions in the global financial 
economy and these functions may become more and more pronounced over the coming 
years (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). Looking at derivatives with too myopic a perspective 
skews the analysis and makes them seem like only an upgrade to capital’s bubble blowing 
machine. Similar to the foundational aim of this work, it is the long-term macro-historical 
evolution of derivatives that is far more important to comprehend than their short-term 
role in the crisis. Understanding that short-term role is fruitful, but only when placed in the 
greater historical context. 
The creation of complex financial instruments, especially derivatives, make for a 
subtle transformation in capitalism and require much more theorizing than they have 
received in most literature from the social sciences. To deal in earnest with derivatives, we 
must deal with them not only from an economic or financial perspective, but with a 
political-economic and historical lens. The creation and evolution of complex financial 
instruments, specifically derivatives, is multicausal. It is in part an outgrowth of the shadow 
banking industry and the attempts of banks to sidestep regulation. It is also a result of the 
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US’s switch in its style of accumulation to neoliberal globalization and financialization. 
More interesting though, the creation of derivatives is the result of capital’s search for an 
anchor to the global financial system that is not found in nation-state money. Derivatives 
are also an expression of capitalism’s general tendency toward increased competition. The 
need for supranational money arises in the wake of the failure of the Bretton Woods 
system and the oil shocks of the 1970s, which led to a system of floating exchange rates 
that must be accounted for under the auspices of highly competitive global trade. Put 
bluntly, the globalized economy requires a supranational form of money to deal with 
globalized accumulation processes. There is no such thing at the moment, but derivatives 
can fulfill many of the functions of a global form of money (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). I will 
return to this point soon.  
First, a look at how derivatives are commonly theorized and what derivatives actually 
are is necessary because they are generally poorly understood. Secondly, derivatives’ direct 
role in the financial crisis must be elaborated for it is through derivatives and the ways they 
were distributed that the housing boom and bust added fuel to the fire of an already 
unstable financial system that ended in the conflagration that is the financial crisis. 
Derivatives have been sorely under-theorized by social scientists up to this point, 
even though they make up a huge percentage of global financial transactions today (Bryan 
and Rafferty 2006; Callinicos 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; FCIC 2011). Orthodox 
economists have so far viewed derivatives as risk management tools that allow investors to 
“slice and dice” their risks, repackage them, and sell them off to those who want specific 
kinds of risk (See Greenspan in FCIC 2011). On the opposite end of the spectrum, Marxist 
theorists tend to merely relegate derivatives into the category of fictitious commodities 
that push the economy past its limits, creating bubbles that do not relate to the so-called 
“real” economy (Foster and Magdoff 2009). Much of the problem is due to the different foci 
of fragmented disciplines; this fragmentation leads to an inability to understand finance in 
a thoroughly globalized economy. 
Financial bubbles and the volatility of the market are hard to comprehend through the 
equilibrium focused lens of neoclassical economics without adding in post hoc models of 
distortion (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). Previously, we saw that neoclassical or monetarist 
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economics attempt to abstract away socio-historical circumstances that change the 
workings of the economy over time – a fact that crucially limits the analysis. Most 
economists did not foresee the financial crisis due to their theories and empirical data 
being based almost solely on boom times with rising housing prices. Furthermore, 
accounting practices for businesses that sell derivatives have not caught up with the actual 
practices and consequences of selling derivatives. Accounting failures led in great part to 
the market shocks, for the actual debts of many companies were unknown (Stiglitz 2010; 
FCIC 2011).  
Keynesian views treat finance as a very nationally-oriented phenomenon in which 
nation-states, acting as separate units with separate monetary systems, interact with each 
other through the world market and have more agency in monetary policy than is actually 
the case. The Keynesian view is not wholly untrue, but cannot serve in understanding 
finance as an inherently global phenomenon that transcends national borders. In the 
globalized system of finance, politics and the strength of economies matter, but recent 
changes to production processes like the rise of corporations as horizontally integrated 
transnational entities blurs the line between nation-states as the foremost or only 
containers of power (Robinson 2004). Derivatives’ ability to blend different forms of 
nation-state money through exchange rate calculations elevates them to a level above that 
of national money.   
And though Marxian analysis utilizes socio-historical context to understand the 
transformations of the world system, many Marxists jump far too quickly to condemn 
finance to a mere grand casino of capitalism, rather than attempting a more thorough 
analysis (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; Foster and Magdoff 2009). In the Marxist tradition 
derivatives and securitization are commonly seen as fictitious forms of capital that serve to 
blow the bubbles that the financialized economy is increasingly based upon. Viewing 
derivatives in such a way makes them seem like mere toys for fictitious profit-making 
when they are actually deeply integrated tools that facilitate the workings of the global 
financial system – they may even change the way we view ownership in a way similar to 
the advent of the joint-stock company and the modern corporation (Bryan and Rafferty 
2006). It is safe to say that derivatives will not go away any time soon, for they have 
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become an integral part of the workings of the system as a whole. Thus, a further 
understanding of derivatives will be helpful in understanding both the crisis itself and the 
underlying capital accumulation processes of the 21st century.18  
Derivatives in general perform two main functions: binding and blending (Bryan and 
Rafferty 2006). Bryan and Rafferty (2006) define these functions of derivatives succinctly:  
Binding: Derivatives, through options and futures, establish pricing 
relationships that “bind” the future to the present. Derivatives bind the 
present to the future. (For example, the current price of wheat and the future 
price of wheat are mutually determining.) 
Blending: Derivatives, especially through swaps, establish pricing 
relationships that readily convert between (or commensurate) different 
forms of asset. Derivatives blend different forms of capital into a single unit 
of measure. (They make it possible to convert things as economically 
nebulous as ideas and perceptions, weather and war into commodities that 
can be priced relative to each other and traded for profits.) (P. 12) 
The definition and role of derivatives has changed over time and will continue to 
change; they have moved from commodity-based derivatives to financially-based 
derivatives and have come to play a significant role, not only in the financial crisis, but in 
the relationship between labor and capital (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). Instead of a static 
definition, derivatives should be defined as a process moving through time, for they have 
gone from playing a marginal role in the economy to becoming a fundamental aspect of its 
workings, or in the case of the financial crisis, its failings.  
To start, derivatives were, prior to the 1980s, used mostly to lock in the prices of 
commodities over time and manage the risks associated with price volatility in those 
commodities (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). A wheat farmer and a flour miller may both want 
to exchange wheat at a future date, but they may also want to lock in the price of wheat so 
                                                 
18
 The work and primary theoretical perspective of Neil Fligstein (1993; 1996; 1997; 2001; 2008a; 2008b; 2010; 
Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Fligstein and Goldstein 2010), an economic sociologist, 
is a promising exception to the models listed above. His political-cultural approach to understanding markets 
(Fligstein 1996), though in its infancy relative to other more popular perspectives, may lead to analyses that sidestep 
many of the problems of Keynesian, neoclassical, or Marxist market models and allow for social-theoretically 
grounded, nuanced empirical research that gets at the dynamics of market processes by delineating the social 
construction of markets and how institutions and people act within them. Though the project at hand focuses on the 
long-term histories that led to the crisis, reconstructions of the financial crisis with a smaller temporal scope would 
benefit greatly by taking Fligstein‟s work into consideration. See especially Fligstein and Goldstein‟s (2010) chapter 
on the creation of the mortgage securitization crisis. 
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they can make more solid decisions regarding their businesses. They could sign a forward 
contract stating that the miller will buy a certain amount of wheat for a certain price at a 
later date. While this locking in of price may seem like a zero-sum game since one person 
will win and one will lose depending on whether the final market price is higher or lower, 
the forward contract gives both parties a certain security in the future transaction and their 
business decisions along the way. Options are, in essence, an optional futures contract. They 
allow a buyer to purchase the right to buy a commodity at a certain price at a later date, but 
do not require them to do so. The buyer may later decide not to exercise the option due to 
lower demand for the commodity or lower prices in the spot market and they may lose 
money from the purchase of the option. But, the buyer was still able to limit the risks 
associated with price volatility. 
The term derivative comes from the nature of these transactions – the prices of 
options and futures "'derive' from prices in the spot market" and these prices are 
considered to be the "real" value of the commodity at that time (Bryan and Rafferty 
2006:45). Commodity forms of derivatives perform the binding function by linking the 
present to the future and allow their users to either hedge the risk of price volatility or to 
take on that risk through speculation.  
Derivatives were in a commodity based form for most of their existence which kept 
their use relatively marginal until the 1980s. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s a number of 
historical factors contributed to the rise and importance of derivatives in the global 
economy. The collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement moved the world economy to 
floating exchange rates and the oil shocks of the 1970s exacerbated price volatility. One of 
the functions of derivatives is to limit exchange rate and price volatility. Finance grew in 
importance due to the US’s search for more liquid capital, the globalization of accumulation 
and distribution processes, and the financialization that facilitates transactions between 
nations. Globalization created more exposure to competition through increased capital 
flows and the multinational or transnational firm became a fundamental actor in the world-
system. The globalization of the production process itself further increased the 
international flows of input commodities within each output commodity chain (Robinson 
2004). These occurrences created more volatility in markets and derivatives allow for the 
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manipulation of that volatility. However, explaining derivatives only through volatility 
leaves us with too small a view of their significance (Bryan and Rafferty 2006).  
Derivatives not only bind the present to the future, but also blend the features of 
assets into many conglomerations. In this context, swaps come to the fore as financially 
oriented derivatives that “help to blend all interest rates and currencies into a single 
market” and allow companies to swap exposure based on their specific needs (Bryan and 
Rafferty 2006:49). Take for example a company that is moving into a new national market:  
The firm may borrow funds at the globally lowest cost in whatever currency 
and term structure (fixed or floating) it can get its best deal. The firm can 
then swap the borrowing into the desired currency and term structure that 
best matches the firm‟s other exposures. Banks (either indirectly or as an 
intermediary) can then find another borrower with the opposite borrowing 
needs to swap the (net) interest rate payments. Overall, the effect is that by 
both parties borrowing at the lowest cost and swapping repayment 
obligations, both parties finish up with lower interest rate costs. (Bryan and 
Rafferty 2006:49) 
Thus, swaps not only bind the present to the future, but blend different sorts of assets 
together, such as loans and currencies, and, in theory, allow firms to operate more 
efficiently around the world. These features led Greenspan to state that “... by far the most 
significant event in finance during the past decade has been the extraordinary development 
and expansion of financial derivatives” (quoted in FCIC 2011:48). Greenspan was partially 
correct in recognizing the significance of derivatives, but his emphasis on “... the fact that 
the OTC markets function quite effectively without the benefits of [CFTC regulation]” would 
soon be proven wrong (quoted in FCIC 2011:48). Analyses of the ability of derivatives to 
mitigate risk happened throughout boom times when derivative contracts were liquid and 
easy to sell on the open market. At the onset of the crisis though, markets dried up and 
previously opaque risks became more apparent, derivatives became harder to sell and lost 
much of their value.  
Credit default swaps (CDS) are an over-the-counter traded form of derivative that 
offer the buyer protection against default on loans. The buyer of a CDS is, more or less, 
purchasing insurance in the case of default on a certain loan. If a loan defaults, the seller of 
the CDS pays the buyer an agreed amount. This form of derivative made up a substantial 
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piece of the financial crisis puzzle, for CDS are not heavily regulated and allow for hefty 
leverage ratios. The largest banks in the US make up the vast majority of traders of CDS and 
hold a substantial portion of their assets in these derivatives: JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, 
Bank of America, Wachovia, and HSBC traded 97 percent of OTC derivatives in 2008 (FCIC 
2011). Goldman’s mortgage department stated that 86 percent of its trades from May 2007 
through November 2008 were derivative transactions (FCIC 2011). Thus, trading 
derivatives makes up a substantial portion of the transactions of large banks in the US. 
CDS are usually viewed as insurance against default on an underlying asset:  
The purchaser of a CDS transferred to the seller the default risk of an 
underlying debt. The debt security could be any bond or loan obligation. 
The CDS buyer made periodic payments to the seller during the life of the 
swap. In return, the seller offered protection against default or specified 
“credit events” such as a partial default. If a credit event such as a default 
occurred, the CDS seller would typically pay the buyer the face value of the 
debt. (FCIC 2011:50) 
However, in this form of “insurance,” investors can speculate on the defaults of 
commodities not owned by them – the buyer and seller do not have to have any interest in 
the underlying asset; they are able to speculate on the attributes of an asset rather than the 
asset itself (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). This fact contributes to Bryan and Rafferty’s (2006) 
conceptualization of derivatives as metacapital, for the nature of capital ownership changes 
greatly with derivatives, a point elaborated later. Furthermore, there are no reserves 
necessary to hedge exposure, so no actual collateral is necessary. AIG accumulated five-
hundred billion dollars of credit risk without posting any collateral or provisions for loss 
(FCIC 2011). CDS allow investors to bet on defaults on loans. In other words investors can 
hedge and limit their losses if something goes awry by purchasing CDS. CDS can limit losses 
in some circumstances, leading to the idea that new financial instruments allow for less risk 
overall, but under a system with perverse incentive structures and large crises that affect 
liquidity in the system as a whole, CDS become sorely ineffective.  
If derivatives are so powerful in managing risk – an idea commonly held by many 
economists – how did they contribute so much to the financial crisis? The answer is that 
they were thoroughly misused and under the circumstances – such as perverse incentive 
structures and theories that deal only with individual risk and not market risk – derivatives 
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did not perform their functions well. Derivatives, on a surface level at least, are one of the 
most substantial causes of the financial crisis. The risks related to subprime lending in the 
US market were sliced, repackaged and then sold throughout the world to bidders who 
wanted to take higher risks and receive higher returns. These buyers assumed that the 
risks were worthwhile. Why? Because, in light of much recent and highly regarded 
economic theory on risk management, it seemed that the risks were either spread thin 
through the use of complex financial instruments or at least sold to investors who were 
willing to take such risks for higher returns. Though derivatives can and have performed 
their function as managers of risk in some instances, the economic theory used to calculate 
their prices is abstract and anti-historical, leading to a myopic view of derivatives. 
Furthermore, the incentive structures within the US economy, especially those relating to 
the housing and mortgage industry, were highly perverted and led to the misuse of 
derivatives and a failure of one of their main functions: binding the present to the future. 
We will now elaborate these points more fully through a discussion of an oft-cited 
proximate cause of the crisis: the US housing bubble.  
While derivatives are a great part of the financial crisis, it is their misuse under 
perverse incentive structures, the inability to price and rate them correctly, and the overall 
lacking theorization of derivatives that contributed to the financial crisis, not necessarily 
the form of derivatives themselves. We should not downplay the nefarious aspects of 
derivatives though, for the consequences of their increased use may be dire (Bryan and 
Rafferty 2006; Bryan, Martin, and Rafferty 2009). Derivatives express the innate tendency 
toward increased competition under capitalism.  
Creating the Housing Bubble: Perverse Incentives 
The housing bubble in the US is widely perceived as the greatest contributing factor to 
the financial crisis. In contrast, the housing bubble is merely a surface manifestation of 
problems endemic to capitalist accumulation itself. The housing bubble was supported by 
changes in the structure of the banking system outlined above, political support for home 
87 
ownership from all presidential regimes (Republican and Democrat alike),19 and the 
integration of everyday American consumers into financial markets. These factors led 
outstanding debt in the US credit markets to triple “during the 1980s, reaching $13.8 
trillion in 1990; 11% was securitized mortgages and GSE debt” (FCIC 2011:68). GSEs are 
government sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Figure 2 below shows 
the makeup of sources of mortgage funding, especially the massive rise in GSE funded 
mortgage debt. The rise in GSE funded mortgage debt further supports the idea that roles 
played by the government, the financial sector, and regular people all combined together as 
great contributing factors to the crisis. 
                                                 
19 Politicians on both sides of the aisle supported an increase in home ownership and, implicitly, increases in 
the personal debt of US people. Both Clinton and G. W. Bush pushed home ownership as fundamental to the 
American middle class. Home “ownership,” or rather increasing personal debt, expanded the realm of finance 
to include the American middle class, for few people actually own their homes; instead they get loans to 
acquire them. Subprime mortgages would later extend such options to the lower classes of the US, all with 
great consequences (Callinicos 2010; FCIC 2011).  
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Figure 2: Funding for Mortgages 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; p. 69 
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Increased access to credit for everyday people in the US fuelled household 
consumption in the face of stagnating wages. Rising home prices, ownership of a home 
being the largest investment for most Americans, kept the housing market booming and 
kept bank investments like securitized mortgages liquid. Rising home prices also helped 
these Americans to feel more financially sound, because their investment continually rose 
in value over the years as evidenced by Figure 3 below, though such rises were not 
inevitable and would end in catastrophe for many. Mortgage debt also rose because in the 
wake of the dot.com bubble the Fed lowered interest rates to keep liquidity in the system 
up. In an environment of low interest rates, rising house prices, and stagnant real wages, 
many in the US public turned to home ownership and refinancing as ways to increase their 
wealth and living standards. Rising home prices and lowering interest rates can be seen in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 below. Results include increases in consumer spending and a drop in 
the savings rate. Thus, from 2001 to 2007 mortgage debt almost doubled. According to the 
FCIC (2011), “Household debt rose from 80% of disposable personal income in 1993 to 
almost 130% by mid-2006. More than three-quarters of this increase was mortgage debt” 
(pp. 83-4). 
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Figure 3: US Home Prices 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; p. 87 
 
 
Figure 4: Bank Borrowing and Mortgage Interest Rates 
Source: FCIC 2011: 86 
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Securitization itself and mortgage-backed securities (another form of derivative), 
along with the models of loan origination and distribution along the commodity chain, are 
fundamental proximate causes of the financial crisis because they helped to raise debt 
exponentially and perverted incentive structures so that short-term profits could be made 
by selling low quality long-term debt. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, given the ability to 
operate in securities markets with generous government subsidies, grew “their debt 
obligations and outstanding mortgage-backed securities... from $759 billion in 1990 to $1.4 
trillion in 1995 and $2.4 trillion in 2000” (FCIC 2011:40). Through the years, Fannie Mae, 
initially a government entity created to purchase and resell mortgages after the Great 
Depression, turned into a major player in the mortgage industry and subsequently the 
crisis. Fannie and its “brother” corporate entity Freddie Mac transformed along with the 
new financial architecture and were allowed to branch further and further into the new 
ways of finance, leveraging their debt to outstanding proportions.  
In 1968 Fannie’s accumulated debt began to weigh on the government. To get this 
debt off the balance sheets Fannie was transformed into a publicly traded company, 
turning it into a hybrid government sponsored enterprise. Fannie and Freddie became key 
players in the housing market, but their dual missions to promote the US economy and US 
public through mortgage lending and maximize returns to shareholders were contradictory 
to say the least.  
Around this time Fannie and Freddie were given the option of securitizing mortgages 
rather than holding on to them, which began the originate and distribute model that 
became so common over the last few years. This model provides incentives through every 
step of the commodity chain to resell debt, first due to the profits made by reselling the 
debt and secondly through removing that debt from companies’ balance sheets, making 
them seem more profitable. Accounting measures for understanding these types of debt 
and their resale are inadequate, especially when dealing with high leverage ratios and “off 
the books” accounting methods (FCIC 2011). Additionally, the slice and dice model allows 
for the repackaging and pooling of many forms of debt such as mortgages, auto loans, credit 
card debt, and others. In this model, debt of various types with various quality ratings can 
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be sliced and diced, or cut up and re-pooled into new forms. The new forms can then be 
resold to others.  
These two models of financial processes working in tandem made for the spread of 
opaque, mispriced, and highly leveraged debt all across the world, leading many investors 
to have very little knowledge of where their debt actually came from. Opacity is one of the 
ways problems moved outside of the US mortgage industry to other investors who had no 
idea they had invested in subprime loans.  This led to an exacerbation of market panic 
because liquidity dried up outside mortgage markets since no one knew who held bad debt. 
Repackaged loans increase the difficulty in correctly pricing them, for a singular loan 
is far easier to understand than a heterogeneous mixture of different kinds of debt. In 
theory, repackaging allows investors to pick only the aspects of debt that they care to 
invest in (high vs. low risk, etc.), but in reality repackaging, especially through the ways it 
was done leading up to the crisis, increases the opacity of the security. Reselling the debt 
also makes the assets of companies more opaque through moving debts off balance sheets; 
this makes the value of a company much more difficult to understand since usual 
calculations do not account for them. The difficulties that people had in figuring out the 
actual value of banks and their debt obligations through certain stages of the crisis 
exemplifies this problem.  
The originator of the loan and the investors who might benefit from the loan’s 
repayment were separated by numerous links on the commodity chain through reselling – 
the originate and distribute model. In addition, at each link in the chain that debt could be 
sliced and diced, or repackaged into a new bundle, re-leveraged, and resold to the next 
investor. Under the new financial pay schemes that allowed actors to profit in the short 
term, the long-term consequences of the implementation of these models were either not 
foreseen or not cared about. 
Individual compensation was closely linked to the overall performance of a private 
company in previous decades because private investment banks operated as partnerships. 
When banks became publicly traded entities this link broke down and changed the culture 
of the industry – bankers were now trading shareholders’ money, not just their own. 
During the 1980s and 1990s many investment banks went public. Annual compensation 
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was increasingly given in stock options and became tied to annual earnings, which 
incentivized short-term payoffs, rather than long-term benefits to be paid at retirement, as 
in the older partnership system. This in turn incentivized greater risk-taking, greater 
leveraging, and even some number fudging (FCIC 2011). Moreover, according to Sheila 
Blair, FDIC Chairman, the compensation structure for the whole chain of mortgage 
securitization 
... was based on the volume of loans originated rather than the performance 
and quality of the loans made.... Many major financial institutions created 
asymmetric compensation packages that paid employees enormous sums for 
short-term success, even if these same decisions result in significant long-
term losses or failure for investors and taxpayers. (Quoted in FCIC 
2011:64) 
New incentive structures, fewer regulatory constraints on both commercial and 
investment banks, and the increased ability to leverage through derivative markets drove 
profits up. As Figure 5 shows below, financial pay outstripped non-financial pay for the first 
time since before the Great Depression, providing evidence for Arrighi’s argument that a 
waning hegemon gains advantage in finance as they lose advantages in the production of 
material goods. At the same time, new risk management techniques and bank mergers 
were lauded as ways to mitigate the growing risks taken by the banks. These individual and 
structural changes, together with the role of the Fed and the rise of the over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives markets, helped to create a perfect storm for crisis. 
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Figure 5: Rising Compensation in the Financial Sector 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; p. 62 
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High leverage ratios in banks were also a substantial contributing factor to the crisis. 
High leverage ratios generate large profits during a boom time, but when faced with falling 
housing prices and growing defaults on loans, banks with high leverage ratios in mortgage 
debt take on larger losses (Goodhart 2008). These immense leverage ratios were fostered 
through a number of occurrences including the creation of the shadow banking system, 
deregulation of the financial industry, a changing mortgage industry, increased competition 
between banks fighting stagnation, and the creation of complex financial instruments such 
as securities, derivatives, and the like.  
In the late 80s new rules allowed for greater leverage ratios in many banks and 
helped lead to the failure of large financial institutions. The Basel International Capital 
Accord, or “Basel I,” is an international regulatory regime that, among other things, sets 
international capital standards. In 1988, many of the world’s central banks and bank 
supervisors met to set out principles for capital requirements. One outcome of this meeting 
was the requirement that banks hold more capital against riskier assets. But, these new 
Basel rules “made capital requirements for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities 
looser than for all other assets related to corporate and consumer loans” (FCIC 2011:49). In 
fact, the capital holding requirements for banks’ holdings of such securities were less than 
all other assets except for those explicitly backed by the US government” (FCIC 2011:49). 
As we will soon see, leverage ratios in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also highly 
problematic. 
Government subsidies such as tax exemptions and large credit lines from the treasury 
gave Fannie and Freddie a competitive edge over other banks and the political support for 
home ownership granted them both much legitimacy. Capital requirements on the two 
companies were much lower than for regular banks and tacit support from the government 
made their investments seem quite safe. When stiffer regulations were placed on thrifts in 
the early 90s, it became more profitable for banks to securitize or sell their loans through 
Fannie and Freddie, leading to some astronomical leveraging statistics: in 2000 “Fannie 
and Freddie held or guaranteed more than $2 trillion of mortgages, backed by only $35.7 
billion of shareholder equity” (FCIC 2011:42). The rise in asset-backed securities in the 90s 
can be seen in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; p. 45 
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This discussion of the role of Fannie and Freddie in the creation of the crisis shows 
the interplay between the government and the market, proving that they are not separated 
and have great effects on each other. It is now apparent that government actors pushed 
lending in the housing market to new heights by: changing laws for personal, political, or 
economic benefit; enacting policies that fostered large leverage ratios; utilizing problematic 
lending models; and inserting government entities into the economy. We should also note 
that these practices contradict the neoliberal ideology, even though many involved were 
active proponents of such an ideology, at least on the surface.  
One of the most fundamental contradictions of the financial crisis was the mispricing 
of risk in the face of much highly regarded financial-economic theory that proposed to 
lower that risk. The anti-historical nature of orthodox economic theories pushed many to 
abstract away historical change and use in its place general theoretical perspectives on risk 
that applied only to an economy in a boom time or only dealt with individual rather than 
systemic risks. Rather than dealing with the empirical aspects of the economy, these 
theories were based mainly on the functioning of newly formed financial instruments. 
Contrary to these theories, the mispricing of risk in the economy was due to a number of 
historical factors including: a low risk spread, low interest rates, and pricing problems in 
OTC markets. 
Risk spreads are the differences between riskier and safer assets and affect the price 
and profitability of those assets or debts. In the 2000s these spreads moved to historically 
low levels due in great part to the role of credit rating agencies. For example, many 
collateral mortgage obligations were rated AAA, suggesting that they were no more risky 
than government bonds, traditionally the least risky group of assets. Most importantly, 
credit rating agencies rate only the credit default risk of assets, not the market or liquidity 
risk. They can therefore be misleading or easily misinterpreted if one is not watching the 
macro-economy as a whole. Also, there is an obvious conflict of interest involved within the 
credit rating agencies, for they are paid by the originators of loans to rate the loans in 
question. Credit rating agencies became the evaluators of such investments and were paid 
lucrative fees by those in the securitization industry, further perverting incentives (FCIC 
2011; Callinicos 2010).  
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Options, a form of commodity derivative, are usually traded in formal markets like the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, but financialized derivatives like swaps are increasingly 
traded in over-the-counter markets (FCIC 2011). These markets involve two parties 
contracting directly with each other, rather than in a formal standardized market. The 
upshot is that financial derivatives are not easy to regulate by nations, nor are they easy to 
account for on company balance sheets; accounting problems led to great difficulties in 
understanding who had investments where, for many investments were sliced up, 
repackaged and resold in the lead up to the crisis. Tracing loans to their originators was a 
difficult task and raised the panic level in worldwide markets, spreading the crisis past the 
borders of the US.  
Moreover, pricing derivatives is quite difficult because understanding specific 
derivatives requires a thorough comprehension of numerous factors relating to global 
production and consumption that would be necessary to accurately price them. Just a few 
of these factors are supply, demand, interest rates, exchange rates, and most importantly, 
the risk associated with predicting such variables through time and space. Without an 
incredibly complex grip on highly contingent phenomena, it is very difficult to price 
derivatives correctly, especially under perverse incentive structures and a highly 
contingent global financial economy. Such issues show how a housing and liquidity crisis in 
the US crisis became the largest global financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
The Fed’s role in creating stability also contributed to the mispricing of risk. In the 
past, the Fed consistently stepped in to help avert disaster in the markets: “In 1970, the Fed 
had supported the commercial paper market; in 1980, dealers in silver futures; in 1982, the 
repo market; in 1987, the stock market after the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 26% 
in three days” (FCIC 201:57). Through cutting interest rates deeply to foster borrowing and 
calling emergency meetings with banks, the Fed created the perception that they would not 
allow systemic crises in the economy and fostered a false sense of safety for investors. We 
should recall that there is virtually no role for government entities prior to the onset of a 
crisis under the current system; government agencies must wait for crises to hit before 
acting. The Fed’s role in the crisis is an example of the ironies involved in trying to mend an 
intrinsically broken system. The Federal Reserve and other government entities were given 
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powers to limit systemic risks after the Great Depression and even though many of those 
powers have since been removed, the few that are left actually contribute to crises by 
covering them up in the short run; these entities do not contribute to stopping crises; they 
only stave them off for a while. 
The early 2000s were also a time of very low nominal and real interest rates which, 
on one hand, led to more borrowing in general due to its low cost. On the other hand, low 
interest rates and competition from large commodity-based companies moving into the 
financial sector led banks and investors to search for higher profits from other assets that 
were more risky and seemingly more profitable. After the bursting of the tech bubble in 
2001, central banks pushed interest rates down in fear of price deflation and followed a 
Friedmanite expansionary monetarist policy. The global savings glut was also perceived to 
be a factor in the worldwide low interest rates (Bernanke 2005, cited in Goodhart 2008; 
Callinicos 2010; Davies 2010). Furthermore, macroeconomic stability of many core 
countries (not including Japan) in the 1990s led to low inflation with rather steady growth 
and the perception of less risk in the overall economy (Goodhart 2008).  
When a company became “too big to fail,” or posed systemic risk to the economy as a 
whole, the Fed could and would step in to create macroeconomic stability, one of the few 
roles left to the state under the neoliberal ideology. It seems that capitalists realized this 
role of the Fed and exploited it ruthlessly through their actions leading up to the crisis and 
through the actions they took after state bailouts.  
The FCIC states that:  
The late 1990s was a good time for investment banking. Annual public 
underwritings and private placements of corporate securities in U.S. 
markets almost quadrupled, from $600 billion in 1994 to $2.2 trillion in 
2001. Annual initial offerings of public stocks (IPOs) soared from $28 
billion in 1994 to $76 billion in 2000 as banks and securities firms 
sponsored IPOs for new Internet and telecommunications companies – the 
dot-coms and telecoms. A stock market boom ensued comparable to the 
great bull market of the 1920s. The value of publicly traded stocks rose 
from $5.8 trillion in December 1994 to $17.8 trillion in March 2000. The 
boom was particularly striking in recent dot-com and telecom issues on the 
NASDAQ exchange. Over this period, the NASDAQ skyrocketed from 752 
to 5,048. (2011:59; emphasis added)  
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In the spring of 2000 this bubble burst, causing the NASDAQ to fall almost two thirds 
in one year. Some successful hedging by firms that purchased credit-default swaps led 
many to believe that the new financial instruments were able to do their purported job by 
transmitting high risk to those who were willing to purchase it. The Fed also moved in to 
stave off a depression of the economy by slashing the federal funds rate (the overnight 
lending rate for transactions between banks) from 6.5 percent to 1 percent. In addition, 
“the Fed flooded the financial markets with money by purchasing more than $150 billion in 
government securities and lending $45 billion to banks,” while also suspending 
“restrictions on bank holding companies so the banks could make large loans to their 
securities affiliates” (FCIC 2011:60). The Fed attempted to funnel liquidity into the system. 
These kinds of actions are now commonly referred to as “The Greenspan Put.” The 
Greenspan put, in a nutshell, allows bubbles to grow and grow, with only a few shy 
warnings to actors. Then, when the bubbles pop monetary policy is pushed into full gear to 
mitigate as much pain as possible.    
Thus, the role of the Federal Reserve in creating short-term macroeconomic stability 
has had the unintended consequence of creating a climate of perceived low financial risk. 
With less risk perceived in the economy, investors searching for higher rates of returns in 
highly competitive arenas tend toward more risky investments such as subprime mortgage 
lending. As Lawrence Lindsey, former National Economic Council director and former 
Federal Reserve governor told the FCIC, “We had convinced ourselves that we were in a 
less risky world…. And how should any rational investor respond to a less risky world? 
They should lay on more risk” (FCIC 2011:61).  
From Black Monday in 1987 to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to the LTCM collapse 
in 1998 to the tech bubble collapse in 2001, the Fed has consistently mitigated problems in 
the financial system. But monetary policy can only deal with these issues for a limited time 
before deeper problems stemming from stagnation in the productive economy surface. 
While the Fed’s actions were helpful in addressing the short-term problems of the 
economy, overall its efforts created an environment in which financial risk is perceived as 
less than it actually may be (Goodhart 2008; FCIC 2011). The role of the Fed and the US 
government in creating stability in the macroeconomic system, on the surface, seems 
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intelligent and benign. However, these actions have contradictory and unintended 
consequences: on one hand, the surface economy appeared less risky, though on the other 
hand, deep structural problems were covered up and investors moved toward very 
hazardous endeavors.  
The risks in the financial system, it now becomes obvious, were certainly spread – 
they were spread globally through opaque financial calculus. But how did so many banks 
and investors make such horrible decisions? In part, it was due to a lacking understanding 
of how derivatives act in a time of panic and low liquidity – as markets panicked and the 
boom turned to bust, highly leveraged derivatives, rather than turning immense profits, led 
to immense losses, for leverage ratios work both ways (FCIC 2011). In addition, mortgage-
backed securities are often traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets and are contracts 
between two entities. With little to no regulation or insurance in these OTC markets 
investors must trust each other to pay out when necessary. Since mortgage-backed 
securities and the like can be used to transfer debt off company balance sheets, many 
companies may have seemed more trustworthy or solvent than they actually were. Moving 
debt off a balance sheet is a rather tantalizing action for many companies and, when mixed 
with the profitability of selling debt along the commodity chain, made for great difficulty in 
figuring out who owned what debt and how solvent each company actually was. The slice 
and dice model of selling mortgage-backed securities and credit-default swaps helped to 
make derivatives more opaque. After being repackaged and resold a number of times, it 
became very difficult to tell where the debt actually came from. Was it subprime or what? 
Due to inadequate accounting measures for complex financial instruments and debt 
obligations, many companies’ balance sheets were rather difficult to understand 
contributing to the market scare and liquidity crisis.  
Moreover, credit ratings agencies did not fulfill their task very well (Callinicos 2010; 
Davies 2010; FCIC 2011; Goodhart 2008; Stiglitz 2010). Derivatives were sliced and diced 
so much that these agencies gave triple-A ratings – the same ratings that the safest 
investments like government bonds get – to mountains of bad debt. So, many of the 
derivatives that became problematic during the crisis were horribly mispriced due to being 
“sliced and diced” and rated at much higher quality than they actually were. 
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Actors within the system that used ridiculous leverage ratios under perverse 
incentive schemes also made many derivatives defunct as tools of risk management. 
Leveraging can increase profits in boom times but increases losses just as much in a bust. 
In the long housing boom people seemed to assume that prices would never go down, so 
leverage ratios went up. The “originate and distribute” model was used often, for it allowed 
for short term profit making. Selling mortgage-backed securities all along the commodity 
chain was common. When profits for CEOs of investment banks are based on short-term 
gains that pay out every year, they will have already made their money by the time the 
bubble bursts. In cases such as that derivatives’ function of binding the future to the 
present no longer matter, for the incentives of those making the transaction are paid before 
any profits could be made from the actual repayment of the loans. With short term profit 
incentives for the sale or resale of mortgage debt (debt that takes a long time to repay), 
incentives become contradictory and the function of derivatives becomes defunct. 
When the house of cards began to crumble “Who owns the risk?” became a salient and 
frightening question. The slice and dice model of securities and mortgage sales created 
much panic in the markets, for it was almost impossible to know who owned what debt and 
what quality the debt was, for it had been repackaged and resold along the commodity 
chain so many times. Due to lacking knowledge about debt in general, the failures of credit 
ratings agencies to accurately rate pieces of debt, and the inability of accounting measures 
to understand the real worth of companies that held their debt in complex financial 
instruments banks and investors were apprehensive to loan money to anyone that may not 
be able to pay it back. Under a stage of crash and panic that included virtually everyone. 
Furthermore, interest rates were incredibly low and left investors little incentive to loan 
money.  
Since the 1960s most banks have been holding more assets in the private sector 
rather than holding obviously liquid assets like government debt. These private sector 
assets, prior to the crisis at least, had rather high credit ratings but were still not as easy to 
sell on open secondary markets like OTC markets. Residential mortgages are a prime 
example of these kinds of assets (Goodhart 2008). In boom times assets with increasing 
prices are quite liquid; it is easy to sell them in a secondary market. However, in times of 
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crisis these assets become much less liquid, making it much more difficult for banks and 
companies to move assets and go about their daily business. The increasing use of these 
assets has lowered banks’ ability to deal with liquidity crises and have pushed them to rely 
more on the central bank for help.  
We will now take a brief look at Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), for it is a 
large US hedge fund that exemplifies the consequences of structural problems within the 
new financial architecture and how those problems can spread quickly. Furthermore, it is 
an example of how Fed actions taken to mitigate crises can have the unintended 
consequence of fostering false perceptions of low risk. LTCM is a precursor to the crisis and 
a microcosm of processes that happened on a more global scale through the financial crisis 
and it therefore makes for a good example of processes that led to the crisis. 
When Russia defaulted on part of its national debt in 1998, the market became 
panicked and many investors sold their higher risk securities to move into safer 
investments like US treasury bills and federally insured deposits (FCIC 2011). Many 
corporations and states in the US use short-term paper markets to roll over short-term 
debt so they can pay their operating costs. When these markets become troubled, liquidity, 
the lubrication of the financial system, goes down and companies have trouble paying their 
everyday costs. They then turn to commercial banks for loans to prevent disruptions in the 
flow of goods and services.  
LTCM utilized leveraging to borrow $24 for every $1 of investor equity – this led to 
returns of 19.9%, 42.8%, 10.8%, and 17.1% over the previous four years respectively – a 
handsome investment by almost any standards (FCIC 2011). However, leveraging works 
both ways and losses during a bust become magnified as much as profits in a boom time. In 
this bust LTCM lost $4 billion (80% of its capital) and faced insolvency. A singular firm, 
even a large one, going bankrupt is not normally a threat to the system as a whole. But, 
LTCM “had further leveraged itself by entering into derivatives contracts with more than 
$1 trillion in notional amount – mostly (through) interest rate and equity derivatives” 
(FCIC 2011:57). LTCM negotiated its contracts in the OTC markets, which we have seen to 
be unregulated and relatively opaque. Thus, with immense amounts of leveraging and little 
understanding of what banks may be affected by a run on LTCM, the already fragile money 
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market could fall and spill over to affect others not involved with LTCM. In essence, there 
was great fear of a run in the credit and derivatives markets, markets that are integral to 
the working of the economy as a whole.  
The periodic crises in finance were continually averted – or, more truthfully, 
postponed – over the last years of the 20th century. The dot-com bubble and its transfer 
into the housing bubble over the beginning of the 21st century boosted the US economy and 
made it seem, at least on the surface, that growth was moving along at a decent pace. 
However, artificially rising housing prices and the creation of new forms of debt follow 
Foster and Magdoff’s (2009) phases of a crisis: markets marched into “speculative manias,” 
“novel offerings,” and “credit expansions,” which would go through a phase of “distress” 
(evidenced by rising interest rates and lowering housing prices in 2006) that soon ended in 
“crash and panic.” As Bear Stearns’s assets lost a huge portion of their value, faith in global 
markets was lost, due in great part to the fact that many banks all over the world had been 
speculating on hedge funds and in such an opaque system could not tell how toxic their 
assets actually were – a situation similar to that of the LTCM crisis, but on a global scale. 
Panic spread across the world, there was a run on US treasury bills (a traditionally “safe” 
place to hold money due to the hegemony of the dollar), and a drastic decrease in lending.  
Though the financial crisis should be viewed as an ongoing process with specific 
watershed moments, it began in earnest with the collapse of Bear Stearns in July of 2007. 
One of those moments was the fall of Bear Stearns in the face of lowering housing prices 
and numerous mortgage defaults. The company’s collapse was based on its risky dealings 
in mortgage-backed securities and subprime mortgages. As the housing market fell and 
delinquencies on subprime mortgages rose, there was a run on Bear Stearns’ assets, for the 
company was exposed to risky mortgages, had high leverage ratios, and relied heavily on 
short-term funding (FCIC 2011). The compensation scheme for the CEOs of Bear Stearns 
was rather perverse, incentivizing short-term gain with minimal consequences for future 
losses within the company.  
Throughout 2007 numerous mortgage delinquencies and defaults pushed ratings 
agencies to downgrade CDOs and mortgage-backed securities. As the demand for 
mortgage-backed securities dried up, Bear Stearns was left with highly illiquid debt that 
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could no longer be moved around. The plummeting prices of banks that were failing 
allowed for their buy up at “fire-sale” prices, creating larger conglomerations in the 
financial industry20 (Foster and Magdoff 2009). There was, as in past times of economic 
uncertainty, a flight to quality and a fear of investing and loaning through the markets in 
crisis. The liquidity crisis of Bear Stearns frightened investors and that fear spread the 
liquidity crisis to global markets. 
Davies (2010) describes the beginnings of the crisis itself succinctly: 
In the early summer of 2007, the cost of insuring subprime mortgages began 
to rise sharply. The ratings agencies put subprime-related securitizations on 
„downgrade review.‟ Some hedge funds run by Bear Stearns had difficulty 
meeting margin calls and Countrywide Financial announced a sharp drop in 
earnings. By July, the market for short-term asset-backed commercial 
paper, an important source of liquidity for the banks, began to dry up. IKB, 
a German bank active in the subprime market, was unable to roll over its 
paper in July and a rescue package was put together. On 9 August, BNP 
Paribas froze redemptions for three investment funds. On that day, the 
European Central Bank responded to the freezing up of the markets, and 
particularly the inter-bank market, by injecting almost €100 billion in 
overnight credit, and the US Federal Reserve followed suit quickly. By 
September, Northern Rock, which had financed its operations through a 
massive securitization programme, was unable to secure finance and had to 
go to the Bank of England for liquidity. (P. 51) 
The further specifics of the crisis itself are outside the scope of this work. Instead of 
dealing with those specifics, we must focus our lens on the results of the crisis that signal 
other long-term transformations of capitalism. While the crisis itself is quite an occurrence, 
it is only a hiccup in the capitalist system as a whole. Though the crisis shocked many and 
continues to have consequences, it does not in itself signal a change in the workings of 
capital. If anything, the crisis will only teach capital to work in more dastardly and insidious 
ways. So, rather than looking at the minutiae of the crisis, we should now turn to 
understanding how a long-term transition in capitalism might affect the world in the 
                                                 
20 The crisis itself and the ensuing low prices of banks and mergers show how the crisis is both a release of 
certain tensions that had been building prior to the crisis as well as an extension and compounding of other 
tensions. The tensions are released momentarily and brought to fruition by the panic that spread through the 
markets. It finally became obvious that there were great contradictions in the system, namely that the 
financial and productive sectors of the economy had fallen out of step with each other. However, at the same 
time, the realization of these problems led to a fall in the prices of banks and many of them were merged and 
bought up. So, one of the contradictions that led to the crisis - that banks became “too big to fail” - was 
actually exacerbated in the wake of the crisis through further merging of banks into larger and larger entities.  
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coming years. We must look at derivatives and their role in the system in general, not 
simply their role in the crisis. 
Derivatives in Global Capitalism 
Derivatives may continue to play a substantial role in the global financial system, for 
the globalization and financialization of the economy require a new form of supranational 
money to facilitate trade under transnationalized capital accumulation processes. As US 
hegemony wanes, there is a realistic possibility that the hegemony of the US dollar will 
wane as well (Cohen 2009; Calleo 2009; Kirshner 2009). It is also unclear as to whether 
another national currency will be able to play the role of hegemonic currency (Helleiner 
and Kirshner 2009).  
Thus, it is necessary to question the future role of derivatives in the global financial 
system by further theorizing their use in history. Bryan and Rafferty, in their book 
Capitalism with Derivatives (2006), take an innovative and radical stance on the role of 
derivatives today and also argue that derivatives will play a large, if somewhat frightening 
role in the future of the global system. A reinterpretation of their work in terms of the 
financial crisis will make up the next section of the essay. 
Derivatives signal a number of large-scale transformations in global capitalism, not 
only – as happened during the crisis – that debt and investments can be thoroughly 
obscured and profited upon within the financial system. The two large-scale issues that 
deeper theorization of derivatives brings to the fore are: (1) derivatives can act as an 
anchor to the global financial system in the absence of a supra-national form of money; and 
(2) derivatives change the ways we view ownership and the resulting views emphasize the 
tendency of capitalism toward intensified competition.   
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 1970s, in which 
nation-state money was all pegged to the US dollar which was in turn pegged to gold, 
exchange rates began floating and there was nothing to explicitly peg nation-state money 
to. The US dollar has been an implicit peg for many international transactions for decades, 
but the fate of the dollar as a hegemonic currency is quite contingent and could change 
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quickly (Helleiner and Kirshner 2009). Financial derivatives add a new fold to 
contemporary discussions of money and its role in the global economy. 
To get past the usual, surface level understandings of money toward a view that 
integrates derivatives in a deep manner, we must briefly interrogate theories of value. 
Theories of value up and to this point have had great troubles finding a universal measure 
of value and though derivatives do not give this universal measure, they do reflect 
contingent values between commodities, leading to their ability to anchor to the global 
financial system (Bryan and Rafferty 2006).  
Using the neoclassical version of theory gives a subjectified utilitarian view – you may 
be willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for a car, but I am not, for expensive cars hold 
little utility for me. What if a car that was worth a hundred thousand dollars two years ago 
has sat in a lot for the duration? The car has lost value. A Marxist theory of value places the 
value on the labor power sold to produce the commodity and is based on the level of 
productive capacity and average skill within a society. But what if we move from one 
society to another? Do the values not change? The question remains: which theory of value 
is correct? Depending on the perspective, both are, or at least both can be. People still 
purchase things and economists of all stripes still make equations that assume a certain 
value. The world still turns, even though we have not found a universal way to understand 
or measure value (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). 
What the conflict between these theories of value shows is that value is contingent. 
The current theories of value also show that it is difficult to add variations in time and 
space and still deal with value in an objective way. Discussions of price usually enter the 
picture quickly after value, for they are easier to deal with and give a much more objective 
feel, but nonetheless still do not get at a fundamental valuation of goods. Since years of 
economic theory and political economy have not led us to a singular definition of value, and 
value is still utilized in everyday transactions, there may be another way. In order to deal 
with the contingency and dynamism of value, we require a more dynamic way of valuing 
things, a way to sidestep value in some sense. This dynamism is found in derivatives 
because they include the contingency of values within themselves (Bryan and Rafferty 
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2006). By calculating investors’ values and predictions of exchange rates, derivatives allow 
for the supersession of national money that is not anchored to gold. 
Getting past nation-state money is one of the main functions of derivatives. To 
comprehend the current phase, we must first comprehend the changing nature and role of 
derivatives, for they not only give a new way to move capital around the world, but may 
qualitatively transform the form and logic of capital with dire repercussions for labor.  
The US’s role as forerunner in qualitatively transforming capitalism is still continuing. 
The financial crisis has shown yet another change in capitalism over the last few decades: 
the increasing use of derivatives as metacapital in a globalized world. Granted, the use of 
derivatives contributed much to the crisis itself, an obviously negative occurrence, but the 
explosion of derivative markets over the last three decades points to a change and 
contradiction in the global financial system. Nation-state money and nation-state 
regulation are viewed and treated as absolutely fundamental to capitalism, but in a global 
economy there is an urgent need for capital to hedge against exchange rate volatility and 
other types of risk through a supranational form of money – derivatives are that form. 
A vast contradiction exists between thought and policies regarding the economy, for 
corporations function in a system that provides only nation-state money but now expects 
global competition and the mobility of goods along global production chains. Capitalists 
need global money, but there is no global guarantor of money. Instead capitalists choose to 
enter into derivative contracts with each other that, in situations with good information, 
allow them to calculate and hedge against risks like price hikes, exchange rate fluctuations, 
or changing government monetary policies. The discussion in chapter two of the need for 
an analytical shift in our views of the nation-state applies similarly to our views of nation-
state money: under globalization national money becomes problematic due to the 
supranational nature of the economy and must be dealt with through theory, since it has 
already been dealt with in practice.  
Derivatives help to anchor the global money system much like gold did in the 19th 
century because they supersede nation-state money through containing exchange rate 
volatility, or containing risk due to loan payment default. They give a universal measure 
that transcends states by their popularity in OTC markets and their ability to bind and 
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blend assets and money from all over the world. Thus, as commodity chains become more 
globalized, derivatives may come to play a more integral role for transnational capitalists 
that fight the tendency toward stagnation by searching for the cheapest inputs they can 
find. By facilitating transnational investments and the movement of capital across 
countries, derivatives increase pressures on local workers and manufacturers to become 
more and more competitive. In addition to these new capitalist faculties, derivatives also 
change how capital is owned and how profits are made from investments, for with 
derivatives an investor does not need to own rights to a piece of capital, or even to a 
corporation; they can speculate only on the performance of capital by betting on its future 
profitability. This allows for the temporary overcoming of capital’s spatial fixes and gives 
capitalists yet another way to move their money more freely to find profits in more 
competitive arenas. 
Much like the new form of ownership that the joint-stock company brought about 
centuries ago, derivatives in their financial forms change the way we view ownership in 
21st century capitalism (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). Derivatives have affected a change in 
types of ownership of capital and thus become a form of metacapital because “the 
derivative owner does not have a right to ownership of capital as it is conventionally 
understood, but they do have ownership rights associated with the attributes of capital,” 
which has effects on how we theorize ownership and how new forms of ownership 
increase competition in the system (Bryan and Rafferty 2006:68; emphasis added). New 
forms of ownership increase alienation under capitalism because they increase the 
distance between capitalist investors and the workers who create the material goods at the 
base of the economy. 
Ownership under capitalist social relations can be broken down into three degrees of 
separation (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). Each of these degrees corresponds to an increase in 
alienation. The first degree of separation includes separating the worker from ownership of 
the means of production and can also be viewed as alienation of the first degree. Under this 
form of ownership, capitalists own the means of production and have control over them. 
Laborers are alienated from those means of production and participate in production only 
through wage labor. This form of ownership coincides with the transition from feudalism 
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to capitalism and the creation of the firm as the main entity conducting production. 
Laborers are no longer tied to or “owned” by the feudalist lord and acquire the freedom of 
movement, but must now compete with each other for work.  
“The second degree of separation of capitalist ownership involves the process in 
which company ownership is separated from production and capital competes as 
companies” and is historically represented by the joint-stock company (Bryan and Rafferty 
2006: 72, emphasis removed). By purchasing a share in a joint-stock company, investors 
purchase rights to the profits of that company – they acquire equity in the company – but 
do not control production directly. That function is taken over, at least for the most part, by 
a managerial class. The two classes together, owner and manager, participate in the firm as 
capitalists, but as capitalists of different kinds. The two kinds of capitalists though have the 
same goal: profit. Now, juridically, the company becomes a legal “person” with the singular 
goal of acquiring profit; it becomes a new entity, alienated from labor, that exists and 
performs under its own logic, a logic indifferent to the needs of labor: the logic of profit 
accumulation.  
The shift toward the joint-stock company increases competition in three ways: (1) by 
articulating a structural, alienated competitive logic; (2) by facilitating an increased scale of 
operations; and (3) by increasing flexibility (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). Regarding the first 
point, in the joint-stock company, owners have only a financial claim to the profits of the 
company, not to the capital that makes up the company itself. Owners become alienated 
from the actual production process and move to a second degree of alienation from the 
laborers performing those processes; they have no interaction with these laborers. 
Managers are alienated from both ownership of the means of production and from the 
laborers themselves. Workers continue to be alienated from the mode of production since 
the manager makes the decisions. But the laborer also becomes further alienated from 
capitalists themselves; the owners of the company have no direct relationship with the 
workers that make their profit. All of this creates a compounded, removed structure of 
alienation – the joint-stock company – whose only driving force is to increase profits. 
The new ability for capitalists to invest in joint-stock companies with only their 
money increases the scale of operations as a whole because capital is able to be pooled 
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through investments. Moreover, owners need little or no knowledge of the actual 
production process and can thus pool their capital together toward ventures such as 
railway systems and other large-scale projects – projects that individual capitalists would 
have trouble acquiring enough assets for. Ownership of companies is then put on a 
secondary market: the stock market. This allows for ownership itself to become more 
mobile and liquid. The owner does not stake claims on the actual material of the company, 
but only on an abstract value of that company. Owners are not compelled to care for labor, 
only for profit and can drop their investments on a whim. Capital competes on the stock 
market as firms and ownership can be transferred quickly and easily, depending upon the 
expected rates of profit for those firms. 
Under the third degree of the separation of capital from ownership – the degree that 
derivatives add – capital starts to compete as itself, for “capital ownership is separated 
from company ownership” (Bryan and Rafferty 2006:74). First, owning a derivative share 
in a company entails an investment in attributes of that company. An investor may 
purchase a derivative that profits from speculation on the price of a company share in the 
future or from speculation on the profitability of a company. The derivative owner does not 
own a stake in the company itself, only a stake on the performance of that company. An 
investor may also purchase another kind of derivative, say a mortgage-backed security. 
This security is a claim on the performance of a mortgage loan or pool of mortgage loans, 
not a claim on the profit from the loan itself. For example, an investor may purchase a 
derivative that would pay out if a specific set of loans were not repaid. The investor thus 
speculates on the attributes of capital: the likelihood that a mortgage or set of mortgages 
will be repaid. “A derivative therefore gives its owner exposure to a selected range of 
different underlying asset values within the one, combined, form of capital, but... it can 
provide this selected exposure because it is separated from ownership of the underlying assets 
themselves” (Bryan and Rafferty 2006: 74-5; emphasis in original). Now, the capitalist has 
little reason to care for the company as a whole; if the company is expected to be 
unprofitable, the financial capitalist can simply bet against the well-being of the company. 
Those with the money are now separated from labor by yet another degree. They could 
continue to be indifferent to labor, or, they could even bet against labor. The financial 
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capitalist is not fixed in space and can easily move investments across the world with the 
click of a button. The increased mobility of investment and lacking concrete ties have great 
effects on competition in the system as a whole.   
Competition under the third degree of separation is different from the second.  Under 
the second degree, firms or corporations compete with each other in the stock market by 
attempting to maximize profit for a company as a whole entity. Under the third degree, 
capital competes as assets and   
Competition... pertains to the relative valuation of different assets and 
liabilities between and across asset forms, time and space, irrespective of 
their ownership. The logic of competition is not of firms or corporations 
maximizing profit, but of assets, everywhere, being continually 
commensurated with each other on the basis of their profit-making 
potential. Derivatives, therefore, represent a form of capital that is 
inherently competitive, because they embody an intense market-driven 
relative valuation of different assets. (Bryan and Rafferty 2006: 76-7) 
The logic of competition is different here than in the second separation: firms and 
corporations do not only compete regarding profitability in the stock market; the 
disaggregated capital of firms is broken down into its attributes, which then compete 
against each other in financial markets. Thus, the calculations of financial market 
participants push company owners and managers to fret about more than their end 
product or the profitability of their company – capitalists must also make their 
individualized assets competitive. Labor must also become more competitive under this 
schema by agreeing to lower wages and increased productivity at each step in the 
commodity chain. 
The joint-stock company removed investors from owning and managing physical 
capital itself, and gave them the ability to own a financial stake in a company. Derivatives 
allow investors to move away from investing in companies as whole entities toward 
investing only in the attributes of disaggregated capital that they deem profitable. These 
investors no longer care so much about the profitability of the company itself, but instead 
focus on the profitability of its disaggregated assets. Instead of companies competing 
against each other in the stock market, their assets now compete against each other in 
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financial markets. This increases competition, for capitalists must focus on and constantly 
revalue numerous different sectors within their production processes.  
Most importantly, the repercussions for labor could be dire. Increased competition in 
the system as a whole is usually dealt with, at least in part, by putting more downward 
pressure on wages and more upward pressure on productivity. But how much pressure can 
labor take? 
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Conclusion 
The preceding pages have outlined a far-reaching look into the long-term 
transformations that helped create the financial crisis. The perspective put forth here 
elucidates the ways that systemic cycles of accumulation, world hegemony, neoliberalism, 
globalization, and financialization have all come together as analytically separable but 
mutually reinforcing lines of history that promoted and led into the financial crisis. This 
research is, of course, far from exhaustive. The crisis is far too complex and nuanced to be 
fully elaborated within the span of a single project. Thus, there is much left to be done. The 
main goal of this work, though, was to put the crisis into a theoretically robust 
macrohistorical context, with the intent that future researchers could overcome some of 
the problems that stem from more orthodox, myopic views on the subject. I hope I have 
succeeded in this goal. 
To conclude, I would like to elaborate some themes germane to the project as whole: 
the role and necessity of dynamic dialectical theorizing and the effects that spatiotemporal 
scope and quality have on analyses of capitalism and creative destruction. 
Enlightenment Logic vs. Negative Dialectical Logic 
To start, a simple, Enlightenment-era logic would lead one to believe that a crisis 
would beget reactions that actually remedy the ensuing problems. Instead of taking a 
simplistic, Enlightenment perspective on the crisis, we must view the crisis through a 
thoroughly dialectical lens. To be more specific, we must view the crisis through a dynamic, 
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dialectical lens that has the ability to move through numerous frames of reference and 
holds contradictions in tension instead of trying to explain them away. 
An Enlightenment logic will not quite do for this task, but a dialectical perspective that 
draws on Adorno’s (1990) negative dialectic will. Simple enlightenment logic will not 
suffice, for this linear form of logic focuses on the resolution of tensions as opposed to their 
deepening. While Enlightenment logic would posit a mounting contradiction, a moment of 
crisis, and a subsequent synthesis or understanding that releases tensions, to understand 
the financial crisis requires a negative-dialectical logic that places the continuation and 
deepening of tensions at the fore while still comprehending any synthetic elements. In a 
negative-dialectical logic, tensions may be momentarily released on the surface through 
crisis or the weak reactions to it, but in the wake old tensions become more strained and 
new ones become apparent. 
The orthodox economic perspectives of today follow Enlightenment logics and 
include mixtures of classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, monetarist, and neoliberal 
perspectives, all of which have flaws that keep them from a cogent view of the crisis. Such 
perspectives look only at surface problems and therefore give only surface answers. The 
use of these perspectives in policy practice tends to reinforce the problems that are 
supposed to be fixed. Consequences from the bailouts are now starting to hit home in the 
US. Congress’s inability to come to a timely decision on raising the debt ceiling – an action 
they have undertaken many times over the years – pushed S&P to downgrade the credit 
score of the US for the first time in history. At the time of this writing, markets are still 
shaky.  
Moreover, even though neoliberal policies contributed to the crisis, many 
governments are now attempting to use what they see as ameliorative neoliberal policy to 
fix problems stemming from those policies. In the US, these changes will probably come in 
the form of cuts to entitlement programs by the so-called “Super Congress.” According to 
Glen and McAuliff (2011), “if the new legislative body, made up of six Democrats and six 
Republicans from both chambers, doesn't come up with a bill that cuts at least $1.5 trillion 
by Thanksgiving, entitlement programs will automatically be slashed.”  
116 
In Europe, the financial crisis has helped to create a periphery within the usual core of 
Western European countries. The EU’s attempt at creating an integrated regional economy 
that uses a supranational currency, the euro, is creating new problems that threaten to 
send the global market into further recession. Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and 
France, the core countries in the EU, implemented export-led development policies since 
the adoption of the euro, while the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) 
adopted debt-financing to import goods from the core countries, leading to a dire 
imbalance in the regional and global economy. The PIIGS now face austerity measures to 
keep themselves solvent and keep the Euro viable. Greece in particular is now faulted for 
its “socialist” system (Panageotou 2011; Perez-Caldentey and Vernengo 2011) and 
austerity measures are being proposed reminiscent of the IMF-led structural adjustment 
programs thrust upon Latin American countries and others throughout the last few 
decades (Robinson 2010).  
One of the greatest contradictory consequences of the financial crisis and the failure 
of the economics profession is the re-establishment and reinforcement of neoliberal state 
values and practices that squeeze labor and whatever is left of the welfare state. Austerity 
measures for the PIGS and the US are most certainly on the table. And, at least in the US, tax 
hikes are not. 
To add another contradictory fold, the crisis has affected a reinforcement of right-
wing, anti-state, or neoliberal values in at least a portion of the US public. It was fairly 
obvious in the 2008 US presidential election that many were tired of Bush-era strategies 
and it was time for a “change.” The real turning point in the election came from the Obama 
campaign’s ability to give quick answers to the problems of the financial crisis while 
McCain’s campaign sputtered. Obama won the election based on his change campaign, but 
by inheriting a mountain of debt from the Bush administration wars on terror and a global 
financial crisis, positive change became hard to come by.  
As the government continued to pile on more debt with more bailouts, a vocal group 
of tea partiers chided the use of US taxpayers’ money to support the financiers who so 
directly contributed to the crisis. The loss of Democratic majority in congress further stifled 
the Democrats’ ability to react to the crisis. Moreover, the healthcare changes that Obama 
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pushed through have had few perceivable effects on the population as a whole. The effects 
that are addressed tend to come only from critics. The Obama administration was unable to 
quickly fix the financial crisis – a crisis brought on by neoliberal ideology and practice – and 
a decidedly right-wing ideology came to the surface, due in part to the weak Keynesian 
policies that increased government debt and showed little sign of pushing the economy 
toward recovery. It appears that austerity measures will soon be implemented in the US 
through a further reduction of the already barely-existent welfare state; social security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment benefits and the like may soon change. Labor, already 
squeezed for decades, may soon face more austerity.  
In essence, policymakers’ orthodox reactions to the crisis are analogous to putting a 
band aid on a gaping wound. Without radical changes in the way the economy is managed – 
and the ways individuals view the role of the economy – crises will continue to be a 
recurrent part of social life.  The failures of the economics discipline to provide workable 
answers to the crisis, taken along with most policymakers’ inability to create and 
implement innovative policy, have created an environment in which it seems very little can 
be done.  
Some have acknowledged the issues that plague the discipline of economics: 
according to some critical economists, “the deeper roots of this failure (are due) to the 
profession’s insistence on constructing models that, by design, disregard the key elements 
driving outcomes in real-world markets” (Colander et al. 2009:1). Suffice it to say that what 
depth economics has comes from an intense focus on minutiae that promotes a disciplinary 
disdain for history and a love of mathematical models. Contemporary economics deals in 
highly abstracted models that do not reflect the interconnectedness of history, politics, and 
economic reality.  
A different kind of perspective is necessary to understand the crisis, a perspective 
that embraces the history of the economy-society relationship and delineates qualitative 
changes in that relationship. I will now delineate this dynamic, dialectical theory in terms 
of creative destruction, crisis, and the history of capitalism. 
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Creative Destruction 
Using dynamic theory requires that qualitative and temporal scope be made explicit, 
especially when dealing with broad concepts like crisis, creative destruction, and 
capitalism. Elements that are relatively transhistorical from one frame of analysis may 
become historically specific when that scope is changed. Schumpeter and his concept of 
creative destruction are prime examples, for Schumpeter’s “main emphasis was on the 
need to grasp how economic reality is entwined with social reality, as a dynamic process 
whose appreciation facilitates an understanding of how economy, society, culture, and 
politics influence each other, are reciprocally constituted, and change over time” (Dahms 
2011:449, emphasis in original). Creative destruction, in a general sense, refers to the 
creation of new forms that destroy the old and we can see this process at play on various 
temporal and analytical levels throughout history. By applying this concept through 
different frames of reference, we can gain, not only a better understanding of the past, but a 
tentative look into the future. 
Limiting analysis to the inception of capitalism, creative destruction refers to the 
creation of capitalism and the destruction of feudal social relations. Moving on to a frame 
surveying only the evolution of capitalist history, which treats capitalism as transhistorical, 
it seems that crises have been thoroughly integrated into the overarching logic of 
capitalism. Within this frame of reference, capitalism, taken as a whole, integrates crises – 
especially financial crises – into its modus operandi through certain forms of creative 
destruction, supplying capitalism as a systemic logic with great dynamism, adaptability, 
and an uncanny ability for crisis-management that serves to promote the further 
intensification of capitalist social relations and accumulation by dispossession in the wake 
of crises.   
Additionally, by expanding our scope to include pre-capitalist history, capitalist 
history, and the possibility of a post-capitalist future, we find that capitalism may hold 
within itself the germ of its own demise; creative destruction in yet another sense of the 
term. Capitalism has not always been the fundamental guiding logic of society and another 
form may someday come to the fore as the primary determinant of social relations. While 
capitalism has matured and deepened over the centuries by drawing on forms of creative 
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destruction that allow it to continue growing on a level above that which is destroyed, the 
driving force that is creative destruction may soon turn on to capitalism itself, destroying 
the latter and creating something qualitatively different in its wake. 
We can delineate five different types of creative destruction by shifting frames of 
reference. All but one of these types are integral parts of capitalism’s modus operandi that 
initiate, extend, and intensify its existence, turning it into a highly dynamic structuring 
logic. Being explicit about frames of reference helps to distinguish between the inception of 
capitalism and creative destruction, types of creative destruction that act through 
capitalism, and the possibility that an evolved form of creative destruction could turn 
inward onto capitalism itself and open the way for new forms of social relations. I will now 
elaborate these points in more detail. 
The Creation of Capitalism and the Destruction of Feudalism: Creative Destruction as 
Primitive Accumulation 
Capitalism overtook the last system-wide organizational schema through the 
destruction of feudal social relations, commonly referred to as primitive accumulation 
(Marx 1978; Schumpeter 1962). Primitive accumulation is the initial form of creative 
destruction and is the driver for the inception of capitalism.  
The primitive accumulation process continued over the last few centuries, spreading 
competitive markets geographically through a second kind of creative destruction: 
extensive accumulation by dispossession. Centuries ago, as entrepreneurial merchants 
created new practices for gaining wealth, the seeds of a creative, destructive, and 
fundamentally expansive form of social relations leeched life from the old ways and spread 
across the earth. An increasingly rational and abstract process sprouted in the economic 
sector of protean city-states, edging out and transforming irrevocably those institutions 
and systems preceding it.21 As the creation of new values and their corresponding practices 
intensified, monarchies began their long march toward destruction.  
                                                 
21
 See Karl Polanyi (2001) Chapter 7 for a description of the institution of market capitalism in England in the 18
th
 
and 19 centuries. 
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Over the years, social relations became increasingly based on the rationalization of 
economic production – to use Polanyi’s (2001) terms, society was embedded in the market. 
“Rational” actors used their newfound efficiencies to thrust competition on others, forcing 
either adherence to the new modes of accumulation or annihilation in their wake. In the 
process, laborers moved from under the heels of fiefdoms into the arena of markets. 
Feudalism gave way to the modern nation-state, kings and queens became politicians, 
the words liberty and democracy grew from ideas into partial realities, and as the 
Enlightenment swept over the West, science displaced religion as the primary law of the 
land. From old myths sprang new ideas, ideas that promised wondrous advances, ideas that 
promised the liberation of all humankind and the mastery of nature.  
But, just as the feudal, atavistic world gave way to rationality, rationality, touting its 
unerring universalism, turned inward, perverting its own ideals in the name of itself. As 
Horkheimer and Adorno put it: “Just as myths already entail enlightenment, with every 
step enlightenment entangles itself more deeply in mythology” (2002:8). The rationality of 
the economic sphere bled into the rationalization of organizations, and the push for 
individualism and democracy subtly transformed into a tendency toward totalitarianism 
(Schumpeter 1962). However, this new totalitarianism promotes itself in the name 
freedom and democracy; it promotes itself in the name of science. 
The third form of creative destruction, termed intensive accumulation by dispossession, 
is made up of the destruction of non-capitalist processes that exist in already primarily 
capitalist spaces and the creation of more profitable (or exploitative) processes to take 
their place. These new processes serve to further embed society in the competitive market. 
As we saw earlier, capitalism has run up against extensive limits, and, relying on growth for 
its survival, has now begun to grow more intensively through the financialization of 
consumption, distribution, and production processes. 
Creative Destruction as Essential to Capitalism: Dynamism and Increasing Tensions 
Speaking from a frame of reference focused only on the history of capitalism that 
excludes future possibilities, the effects of the financial crisis, rather than indicating an end 
to capitalism, actually exemplify and reinforce many of the tensions that created the crisis 
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itself; put differently, the effects of the financial crisis deepen many of its temporally prior 
causes. Crises are relatively non-problematic because capitalism has integrated many kinds 
of crises into its schema through different forms of creative destruction. These 
simultaneously creative and destructive modes are integral parts of capitalism that initiate, 
extend, and intensify its existence, making evolutionary change a defining feature of 
capitalism itself. Schumpeter, the progenitor of the concept of creative destruction tells us:  
The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing 
with an evolutionary process.... Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or 
method of economic change and not only never is but never can be 
stationary.... The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist 
engine in motion comes from the new consumers‟ goods, the new methods 
of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of 
industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.... The opening up of 
new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development... 
illustrate the same process of industrial mutation... that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative 
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. ([1942] 1962: 82-3, 
emphasis in original) 
Schumpeter’s statements bring to the fore the need to distinguish one’s scope of 
analysis. Discussing creative destruction as an “essential fact” of capitalism implicitly treats 
capitalism as relatively transhistorical; one is led to believe that capitalism as a system is 
inexorable, unstoppable, and universal. From a limited temporal reference frame, this 
seems to be the case; the crisis itself and its consequences exemplify creative destruction 
and the deepening of tensions.  
A fourth kind of creative destruction makes crises an integral part of capitalism. This 
more purely economic conception of creative destruction refers to the devaluation of 
existing capital that allows for further growth. This conception is exemplified by (1) the 
“destruction” of previously powerful companies like Sears & Roebuck and their 
replacement by corporations like Wal-Mart; (2) the replacement of VHS tapes by DVDs and 
other technological advances that are mostly unnecessary for the reproduction of society; 
(3) the destruction and rebuilding of capital through war-making, exemplified by the great 
gains of the US after World War II; and, most pertinent for the present study, (4) the 
destruction or devaluation of capital in the aftermath of financial crises. As Marx (1858) 
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stated in The Grundrisse, capital is destroyed, “not by relations external to it, but rather as a 
condition of its self-preservation."22 This condition of self-preservation is creative 
destruction. Thus, crises are not necessarily problematic for capitalism; from this frame of 
reference, they are essential to it. 
For example, banks not crushed by the crisis were able to quickly buy up those that 
were. Subprime homeowners, on the other hand, were left with houses worth far less than 
what they paid for them, forcing many to wake up from the American Dream of home 
ownership. In great contrast, financial capitalists – at least those who bet against the 
repayment of subprime mortgages or otherwise managed to avoid catastrophe – were 
presented with a housing market characterized by the lowest prices and interest rates seen 
in years. Giving a slight spin to Andrew Mellon’s infamous statement, David Harvey (2010) 
hits the nail (or the proletariat) right on the head by reminding us that “in a crisis, assets 
return to their rightful owners” (p. 11). These “rightful owners,” of course, are the 
bourgeoisie. To make matters worse for the general public, the Bush administration quickly 
pushed through a rescue package that funneled taxpayers’ current and future money into 
the financial system. By giving banks a boost to their books, economists and policymakers 
thought they could forestall the coming liquidity crisis and keep the US economy on track.  
The immense size of banks led to the crisis and in the aftermath numerous banks 
merged into even larger entities; financial capitalists helped cause the crisis, but many 
were also its beneficiaries; neoliberal policies and ideologies contributed to the crisis, and 
neoliberal austerity policies are now put forth as remedies for it. Capitalism’s ability to deal 
with and even be strengthened by crises is part of what makes it so adaptable.23 This 
adaptability, however, may not be eternal. As capitalism reaches limits to growth, creative 
destruction, the essential engine of that growth, may turn on its longtime benefactor.  
The Possibility of the Creative Destruction of Capitalism 
By taking a wider frame of reference and applying the idea of creative destruction to 
capitalism, rather than treating creative destruction as something consisting only within 
                                                 
22 See http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch15.htm for the specific quote.  
23
 See Harvey 2010, Appendix 1 for a list of debt crises over the last forty years. Debt crises promote capitalism, 
they do not destroy it. 
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capitalism or as a part of it, we see that capitalism may hold its end in itself. Looking at 
creative destruction in this different light leads to a fifth typology: the destruction of 
capitalism and the creation of something qualitatively different in its place.24 Elaborating 
this form of creative destruction is outside the scope of this work. However, imagining that 
“another world is possible” is a first step in creating a post-capitalist society. 
Though many thought that the crisis would be only a single dip recession, it seems 
now that we may be in the midst of a transition from short-lived recession into ongoing 
depression. Global overaccumulation problems and the extensive limits of social, economic, 
and natural environments leave little room for the kind of expansion that our current 
socioeconomic system is so fundamentally based on. Put bluntly, the worst may be yet to 
come. 
The outlook for the future may not be so dismal though. As I wrote much of this work, 
general US sentiments about the crisis appeared to be either apathetic or shifting further 
toward right-wing authoritarianism. As stated earlier, the financial crisis, rather than 
promoting a legitimacy crisis in neoliberal ideology, seemed to reinforce the same 
ideologies that promoted the crisis in the first place. Calls for less government intervention 
in markets, more focus on personal responsibility, and the retreat of whatever may be left 
of the welfare state were trumpeted by the most prominent movement in the initial wake 
of the crisis: the Tea Party.  
Now however, new social movements such as Occupy Wall Street and others around 
the globe offer some hope for imagining another world. While these movements are 
currently in their formative stages, they indicate a will within the people to take more 
control over the economy. The global financial crisis proves that in the 21st century people 
all over the world are inextricably tied to one another. As the awareness of this fact grows, 
so does our ability to take control of the processes that dictate social reality.  
Furthering such awareness is the goal of this study. While the analysis is far from 
complete, I have shown that the financial crisis is not simply due to recent occurrences like 
                                                 
24Note that it is somewhat problematic to talk about capitalism as a monolithic “thing” that can be overcome. The 
process described is not a singular revolutionary moment in which capitalism will be quickly overthrown. Instead, it 
is best to view this form of creative destruction as an ongoing process working on different levels across space and 
time. This process would not completely destroy capitalist social relations, but would transform many of those core 
elements.  
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the housing boom or speculation and greed. It is instead a consequence of many strands in 
the evolution of the capitalist world system. These strands are both contradictory and 
complimentary. They move through decades and centuries, peoples and nations. They 
move through the history of the entire world.  
 
The question remains: can we take control of history or will history take control of us? 
 
 
Nature, nurture, heaven and home 
Sum of all and by them driven 
To conquer every mountain shown 
But I’ve never crossed the river 
 
Braved the forest braved the stone 
Braved the icy winds and fire 
Braved and beat them on my own 
Yet I'm helpless by the river 
 
Angel, angel what have I done? 
I've faced the quakes, the wind, the fire 
I've conquered country, crown, and throne 
Why can't I cross this river? 
 
Pay no mind to the battles you've won 
It'll take a lot more than rage and muscle 
Open your heart and hands my son 
Or you'll never make it over the river 
 
It'll take a lot more that words and guns 
A whole lot more than riches and muscle 
The hands of the many must join as one 
And together we'll cross the river 
 
Maynard James Keenan25 
                                                 
25
 Puscifer 2011 
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Here, I will briefly lay out the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings that inform 
the study as a whole. The discipline of sociology in general does not normally deal with 
issues of the philosophy of social science explicitly, unless that is the specific goal of the 
project in question. However, I contend that such background formulations should be 
explicitly formulated in sociological research, for they help to give legitimacy to social 
science perspectives that attempt to move beyond more traditional, positivistic research.  
Dynamic critical theory informed by dialectical critical realism gives the best 
perspective on the financial crisis. Put briefly, critical theory justifies immanent critique, 
political economy over orthodox economics, and a dialectical conception of reality which 
leads to dialectical theorizations. Critical realism justifies the use of social science practices 
that differ from those of the so-called natural sciences and leads to multicausal 
interpretations of the crisis. Furthermore, rather than predicting occurrences through 
ironclad laws, critical realism uses the idea of tendencies to show why certain changes may 
occur. Dynamic theory includes utilizing abstraction as a fundamental category to move 
explicitly through levels of generality, temporal scope, and geographical scope. All of these 
positions mutually reinforce one another and create a cohesive framework that drives the 
study. 
First, a distinction should be made between traditional theory and critical social 
theory. Traditional theory can be traced back to Descartes’ maxims stating that we should 
begin with the simplest objects, and through deduction, arrive at more complex 
formulations of how the world works (Horkheimer [1937] 1975). In traditional theory 
objects and their relationships are defined and put into a coherent, cohesive system of 
thought in which contradictions are synthesized and empirical facts are relegated to their 
respective places. The general scientific method and the practices of positivism are 
examples of traditional theorizing.26   
                                                 
26 It should be noted that the social sciences grew up in a world in which the natural sciences and 
Enlightenment values acted as constantly hovering parents (Mirowski 2005). Boundary work had to be done 
to delineate science from non-science and one discipline from another (Gieryn 1983). These boundaries will 
be dealt with more fully later, for feminist theory and the Frankfurt School have a great deal to say about such 
happenings. 
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Traditional theory does not normally recognize its socio-historical context. It acts as if 
in a vacuum and assumes that empirical “facts” speak for themselves. Traditional theory 
does not act as if it is a product of social institutions and norms, though the actual practice 
of science has been shown to be so (Camic and Xie 1994; Kuhn 197827; Mirowski 2005; 
Steinmetz 2005; Mitchell 2005; Benton and Craib 2010). Critical theory, on the other hand, 
takes its socio-historical situation as a fundamental aspect of its existence (Horkheimer 
[1937] 1975; Marx [1845] [1859] [1861] 1978; [1867] 2010). This fact is made explicit and 
utilized, not as a hindrance to objectivity, but as an effective measure for getting at what is 
actually happening in social research and society at large. Taking sociohistorical context as 
a possibly limiting factor leads me to look past more recent data and search for the longer 
term causes of the crisis.  
Dynamic critical theory, as the name states, is a perspective that relies on immanent 
critique. The idea of immanent critique is a necessary part of critical theory, especially in its 
Marxist and Frankfurt School versions. The constantly changing social milieu that theory 
and science take place in necessitates immanent critique28 (Marx 1978; 2010). If society is 
always changing, then the tools we use for understanding society must change as well. 
History moves inexorably forward and is reinterpreted through current lenses and new 
contexts call for new ways of conceptualizing the world.29 To put it bluntly, a critical 
theorist’s work is never done. This type of theorizing is against a “first philosophy,” or a 
unified, universal conception of ontology and epistemology like the Enlightenment thinkers 
from Descartes onward.30 It is also against using theory and science as purely instrumental 
knowledge that is utilized for mere prediction or the mastery of nature and people. Thus, 
critical theory as I conceptualize it is always in motion; it is, in a word, dynamic.  
                                                 
27 Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ([1962] 1978) was helpful in disseminating some of 
these ideas to a broader audience, however, he does not give a systematic and cohesive way of further 
understanding the actual practice of scientific research. This is something that has been remedied by a more 
explicit sociology of science, such as Camic and Xie’s work on the institutional and social factors that fed into 
the heavy use of statistics in American sociology (1994). 
28 One way to conceptualize immanent critique and dynamic theory is to note its parallel with the general 
existentialist dictum that things are always becoming and never simply being. See Jaspers [1957] 1995; 
[1935] 1996; [1949] 2011; Nietzsche 2000; [1886] 2011a; [1885] 2011b; and others. 
29 This most certainly holds true for social sciences, though it is arguable that the natural sciences require a 
critical version of theory as well. 
30 Later we will see that the commonsense Cartesian style of dualistic thinking can be a great hindrance to 
social research. 
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Dynamic critical theory also relies on the dynamic nature of modern society as a 
fundamental theoretical category. In other words, it takes the changing nature of social 
relations as a fundamental category of analysis. The old adage that “the only constant is 
change” is something that few would disagree with. Theorizing must try to mold itself in 
the fashion of what it is trying to understand. History (or social reality) is an ongoing and 
dynamic process, thus theory must also be so. However, the dynamism in question here 
takes this statement on a slightly different but imperative path: to use a mathematical 
metaphor, we must note that it is not only the variables within the equations that change; 
the equations, or the relationships between things, change themselves. This position leads 
me to explicitly change focus throughout the study, which brings in new concepts or layers 
of history and then add the new perspectives into the analysis as a whole, creating an 
additive framework that becomes more and more fleshed out along the way.  
The Frankfurt School style of critical theory bases itself fundamentally on the works 
of Hegel and Marx and, utilizing the ideas outlined above regarding the differences between 
philosophy and theory, moves from philosophy toward social theory as the preeminent 
way of understanding and changing modern society. The idea of the dialectic is also a 
fundamental aspect of Frankfurt School critical theory, for contradictions become quite 
apparent through a brief look at modern society. There are numerous contradictions: 
between fact and norms within society, between how we understand reality and how 
reality plays out, between the goals and workings of the state, economy, and society, and 
many more. These contradictions should be a fundamental category through which we 
view the world. One point should be made about the dialectic as I conceive it: traditional 
theory attempts to explain away and remove contradictions by making things fully 
cohesive and rational, but critical theory tends to accentuate the inherent contradictions, 
holding them up in tension, and using them as heuristics for further understanding 
(Adorno [1965-1966] 1990; [1966] 2008; Marx 1978; Horkheimer and Adorno [1947] 
2007). Here, I mean to get across that contradictions exist and, rather than explaining them 
away through over-rationalized, oversimplified theory, we should take the world as it is 
and work from there. I do not mean that we should never try to remove such contradictions 
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– that is part of the goal of emancipatory social research – but in a world fraught with great 
contradictions, we should conduct our research with the acknowledgment that they exist. 
The focus on social relations is a fundamental characteristic of the Marxian method 
(Ollman 2003; Albritton 2007; Benton and Craib 2010). As one variable changes its 
relationships to other things change as well. Thus, dynamic critical theory relies in great 
part on a philosophy of science that Bertell Ollman (2003) calls internal relations 
philosophy. Internal relations philosophy states that a singular thing cannot be defined 
without defining its relationships to other things. Its definition rests on its surrounding 
relationships and as those relationships change, the thing itself changes as well. For 
example, could you really define yourself without giving a definition of your parents and 
your relationship to them? Could you define yourself without talking about the place you 
grew up, the school you went to, or the friends you have? Our relationships to other people 
and things make up the definitions of ourselves. The same goes for social, economic, and 
political reality. They must be defined through their relationships with other things 
existing at one point in time, as well as through their relationship to the past and future. 
The financial crisis cannot be defined without understanding its historical context, its 
relationships with business, politics, markets, and actors, relationships between nations, 
NGOs, international financial institutions (IFIs), or its relation to the lives of everyday 
people. This philosophy of science leads me to focus closely on the long-term historical 
nature of the financial crisis and the relationships between national laws and policies, 
organizational structures, market actors, and ideologies.  
With an internal relations philosophy it seems that we must interrogate every aspect 
of social reality to truly understand the financial crisis. That is both true and impossible. So, 
instead of attempting to understand every shred of existence, dynamic critical theory, along 
with its explicit basis on the dialectical critical realist philosophy of science, pushes us to 
examine the process by which we break down social reality: abstraction. This gives a 
window into the ways we understand the world and, most importantly, leads to a path that 
helps us to break that world down in a methodical way. By interrogating the ways we 
abstract for understanding, we are able to see how we get to certain conclusions and how 
we can do so more explicitly and methodically in the future.  
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The fact that we abstract constantly seems obvious upon first glance. However, 
abstraction is so close to us that it is almost foreign (Ollman 2003). Abstraction is rarely 
talked about in most research projects. We can take human sight as an example of 
abstraction. Humans do not see the entire spectrum of light, only a small portion of it. We 
do not see microwaves, x rays and many others. Instead, our eyes evolved to block out 
those unnecessary waves for they are not germane to everyday existence. We do not think 
about all the light waves outside the spectrum, but our eyes are seemingly purposefully 
limited to maximize and focus cognitive power on the portion of the spectrum that matters 
most. The others are abstracted away. Once again, we do not think about this fact 
consistently; it simply happens.  
While that may work well in a normal setting, social theory and social research 
require a more rigorous and explicit formulation of how we abstract, even though many 
social theorists abstract without doing so explicitly. Abstraction refers to how we delimit 
the totality for further understanding. Good abstractors show the ways they do so. Thus, 
throughout the study I will explicitly limit certain boundaries or temporal and geographic 
scopes of analysis in each section. This allows for a more clear understanding of what 
aspects are being abstracted in each portion of the study. Put briefly, in this project my 
method of breaking down the causes and salient histories that led to the financial crisis 
consisted of (1) reading relevant literature31 and searching through the sources of that 
literature for further reading, (2) finding consistencies in the overarching lines of history 
that fed into the crisis, (3) dividing and synthesizing these histories into easily 
comprehensible subject- or concept-specific areas, (4) explicitly formulating the temporal 
and spatial boundaries of each area – in other words, concretizing the level of generality, 
(5) analyzing those histories along such levels, and (6) adding the new levels back into the 
perspective as a whole, which enriches the overall depth of the analysis.32  
                                                 
31 Secondary sources were used along with more primary government data such as The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission Report 2011. 
32 For example, I start by analyzing the Arrighian long-term theory of systemic cycles of accumulation which 
is deemed to be relatively cogent. Then, drawing from other sources, I add a new hegemonic epoch to the 
previously theorized US world hegemony: neoliberal globalization. That leads into the need for 
understanding the hegemony of neoliberalism and globalization, which according to the Arrighian definition 
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A dialectical critical realist philosophy of science is the basis for good theory, 
especially good social theory (Benton and Craib 2010; Steinmetz 2005; Ollman 2003). 
Dialectical critical realism is a mixture of general critical realist philosophy that takes a 
dialectical or internal relations philosophy as an ontology/epistemology. It is highly 
compatible with Frankfurt School style critical theory and both mutually reinforce each 
other. This perspective views social relations as fundamental parts of existence and as 
fundamental parts of defining things as previously mentioned, but also adds in the critical 
realist ideas of emergence and multicausality.  
A critical realist theory of knowledge is “committed to the existence of a real world, 
which exists and acts independently of our knowledge or beliefs about it….” (Benton and 
Craib 2010:121). Concordant with Frankfurt School style critical theory, it “differs from 
empiricism in theorizing knowledge as a social process which involves variable ‘means of 
representation’” (Benton and Craib 2010:121). These variable means of representation 
require a “reflexivity about the conditions for a possibility for thought, or language, to 
represent something outside itself” (Benton and Craib 2010:121, emphasis in original). By 
subscribing to a dialectical conception of reality and reflexivity about representing an 
external reality through language, dialectical critical realism requires the use of dialectical 
concepts in an attempt to make reality and the representation of reality coincide more 
fully. Furthermore, the “critical realist(’s) insistence on the independent reality of the 
objects of our knowledge, and the necessity of work to overcome misleading appearances, 
implies that current beliefs will always be open to correction in the light of further 
cognitive work,” meaning that it coincides closely with the Frankfurt version of critical 
theory (Benton and Craib 2010:121).  
Critical realism puts positivist/anti-positivist debates almost to rest by moving them 
to a new level. Critical realism does this, in part, through the idea of emergence. Emergence 
refers to the fact that certain arenas of reality emerge from others. Take for example the act 
of speech. The ability to speak is based on our biology, psychology, and on physics, among 
other things. We could analyze our speech at the level of linguistics or psychology by 
                                                                                                                                                             
of hegemony requires both consent through the creation of ideology and organizational/juridical changes. 
Those analyses lead into a further discussion of financialization, and so on. 
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abstracting away the biological and physical aspects. However, the psychological portion of 
the speech act emerges from the fact that we have vocal chords, that we live in a place with 
air, and that sounds move through that air. Without the latter things, speech would be 
impossible, or at least very different. We may speak different languages or use different 
words, but these languages are based on and emerge from physical reality, though the 
causal mechanism can move both ways (Benton and Craib 2010). 
This may seem like commonsense, but the idea of emergence has great impact on how 
research is done and what type of research is most salient for certain topics. In essence, 
critical realism and the concept of emergence show that there are rather fundamental 
differences between the methods of so-called “hard” sciences and the social sciences. 
Though the methods for understanding both may have many commonalities, I argue that 
these methods are different in numerous respects and that understanding social reality 
requires a method unlike that of the natural sciences, namely a historically oriented 
analysis.  
One of the upshots of emergence and the differences between understanding social 
reality and physical reality is that for social reality there are no ironclad laws, only 
tendencies (Benton and Craib 2010). The law of gravity and the tendency for waning world 
hegemons to shift their economies toward finance have very different factors of 
generalizability. The laws of gravity apply to an immense and seemingly universal set of 
variables, while the tendency for waning hegemons to shift toward finance is relatively 
historically specific and applies only over the lifespan of capitalism. Moreover, even though 
each hegemonic transition has many factors that are quite similar to others, many 
differences can be found between each of them. Put slightly differently, some aspects of 
hegemonic transition are relatively transhistorical, while some are highly specific and 
contingent. The specific and contingent aspects emerge from the more transhistorical 
aspects and give different turns to those aspects. For example, there is a tendency for a 
waning hegemon in the world system to financialize its economy, however, under the 
processes of the globalization and financialization of the general production process itself, 
all actors in the world system tend toward financialization, but do not necessarily 
financialize as if acting under a natural law like gravity.  
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Another concept from critical realism that thoroughly informs the study is 
multicausality. Put simply, the idea of multicausality states that there can be numerous 
causes for something to happen (Benton and Craib 2010). This is opposed to an attempt at 
reducing causes to singular phenomena as is the practice in many types of social scientific 
research (Albritton 2007). The financial crisis is a great example of multicausality because 
so many different actors and organizational, juridical, and world systemic changes led into 
and “caused” the crisis. 
For example, actors in the US financial system such as investors and debtors helped to 
create the housing bubble, which was a great part of the crisis. From a temporal scope of a 
few years and a geographical scope limited to the US, it seems that the housing bubble and 
those acting to create it caused the financial crisis. But, from a temporal perspective of 
decades that is still geographically limited to the US, changes in laws and banking practices 
allowed those actors to make decisions that added to that bubble, thus making such 
structural changes to the US economy a factor in the crisis. From an even more general 
perspective of centuries and shifting world hegemons, the financialization of the US 
economy as a whole led to those changes, due in great part to the long-term historical 
circumstances of the US economy at the time. Under the logic of that perspective, the 
systemic cycles of accumulation within the capitalist world system led to the financial 
crisis. However, as we will see, all of these aspects led into the financial crisis and an 
attempt to find a singular cause for the financial crisis is a rather fruitless endeavor. 
In summation, a historical, political-economic perspective using dynamic critical 
theory supported by a dialectical critical realist philosophy of science gives a rigorous view 
of the long-term causes of the crisis, for critical theory, dynamic theory, dialectical 
ontology, internal relations philosophy,  and critical realism all come together to mutually 
support one another as organizing concepts within a singular framework – they form a 
cohesive theoretical and philosophical background for the study. Furthermore, when these 
organizing concepts are used along with explicit abstractions the analysis is geared toward 
shifting through time and space explicitly and dynamically, which leads to the ability to 
continually shift focus and integrate new aspects into the analysis. 
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